

approaching army could be seen; but it had the disadvantage of a line ten miles long, and so disposed that one part could not readily reinforce another. The National army kept close to its antagonist, and intrenched at every advance. The railroad was repaired behind it, and the trains that brought its supplies ran up almost to its front.

Sherman finally occupied a strongly intrenched line that followed the contour of Johnston's and at nearly all points was close to it. Both sides maintained skirmish-lines that were almost as strong as lines of battle, and occupied rifle-pits.

The next day Sherman advanced his lines, intending to attack between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, but found that Johnston had withdrawn from Pine Mountain, taking up a shorter line, from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain. Sherman promptly occupied the ground, and gathered in a large number of prisoners, including the 14th Alabama Regiment entire. The next day he pressed forward again, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Lost Mountain, but still occupied Kenesaw covering Marietta and the roads to Atlanta. The successive positions to which Johnston's army had fallen back were prepared beforehand by gangs of

to dislodge them; and the next day Hooker and Schofield pressed forward to within three miles of Marietta, and withstood an attack by Hood's corps, inflicting upon him a loss of 1000 men. As the National line was now lengthened quite as far as seemed prudent, and still the Confederate communications were not severed, Sherman determined upon the hazardous experiment of attacking the enemy in his intrenchments. He chose two points for assault, about a mile apart, and on the morning of the 27th launched heavy columns against them, while firing was kept up all along the line. He expected to break the



SIEGE OF ISLAND NO. 10.—NIGHT BOMBARDMENT BY THE FEDERAL MORTAR-BOATS, MARCH 18, 1862.
FROM A SKETCH BY HENRY LOVIE.

From these the roar of musketry was almost unceasing, and there was a steady loss of men. On June 14, while Sherman was reconnoitering the enemy's position, he observed a battery on the crest of Pine Mountain, and near it a group of officers. Ordering a battery to fire two or three volleys at them, he rode on. A few hours later, his signal officer told him that the Confederates had signaled from Pine Mountain to Marietta, "Send an ambulance for General Polk's body." The group on the mountain had consisted of Generals Johnston, Hardee and Polk, and a few soldiers that had gathered around them. One of the cannon-balls had struck General Polk in the chest and cut him in two.

slaves impressed for the purpose, so that his soldiers had little digging to do, and could save their strength for fighting. After a time Sherman adopted a similar policy by setting at work the crowds of negroes that flocked to his camp. The fortifications consisted of a sort of framework of rails and logs, covered with earth thrown up from a ditch on each side. Miles of such works were often constructed in a single night.

Sherman was now facing a little south of east, and kept pressing his lines closer up to Johnston's, with rifle and artillery firing going on all the time. On the 21st the divisions of Wood and Stanley gained new positions, on the southern flank of Kenesaw, where several determined assaults failed

centre, and with half of his army take half of Johnston's in reverse, while with the remainder of his troops he held the other half so close that it could not go to the rescue. But his columns wasted away before the fire from the intrenchments, and, as in Pickett's charge at Gettysburg and Grant's assault at Cold Harbor, only a remnant reached the enemy's works, there to be killed or captured. This experiment cost Sherman over 2500 men, while Johnston's loss was but little over 800.

It was evident that any repetition would be useless, and the approved principles of warfare seemed to supply no alternative. What Sherman therefore did was to disregard the maxim that an army