


was at Dalton, with an army which he sums up at about 43,000. If counted after the ordinary method, his army probably numbered not fewer than 55,000.

Sherman had 98,000 men, consisting of the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General George H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General James B. McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General John M. Schofield. The discrepancy in numbers seems very great, until we consider that Sherman was not only to take the offensive, but must constantly leave detachments to guard his communications; for he drew all his supplies from Nashville, over one single-track railroad, liable to be broken at any time by guerrilla raids. Johnston had nothing to fear in the rear, for he was fighting on his own ground, and could bring his entire force to the front at every emergency. All things considered, it was pretty nearly an even match.


When Sherman concentrated his forces at Chattanooga, he found that about 130 cars loaded with provisions must arrive at that point every day. But that railroad had not cars and locomotives enough for such a task, and so he sent orders to Louisville for the seizure of trains arriving there from the north, and soon had rolling-stock in great abundance and variety. While he thus provided liberally for necessary supplies, he excluded all luxuries. Tents were taken only for the sick and wounded. Sherman himself had no tent or train. Every man, whether officer or private, carried provisions for five days.

The army set out from Chattanooga on the 5th of May, following the line of the railroad south toward Atlanta. A direct approach to Dalton was impossible, because of Johnston's fortifications at Tunnel Hill. So Sherman made a feint of attacking there, and sent McPherson southward to march through the gap in the mountains, strike Resaca, and cut the railroad over which Johnston drew all his supplies. Here at the very outset was the brilliant opportunity of the campaign. McPherson reached Resaca, but found fortifications and an opposing force there, and just lacked the necessary boldness to thrust his army into a position where it would have made the destruction of Johnston's almost certain. Instead of this, he fell back to the gap, and waited for the remainder of the army to join him there. But this enabled Johnston to learn what was going on, and when Sherman had passed down to the gap with his entire army, he found of course, that his antagonist had fallen back to Resaca and concentrated his forces in a strong position.


On the 14th of May, Sherman's army was in position around Resaca on the north and west, and on that and the next day there was continual skirmishing and artillery firing. Neither general was willing to fight at disadvantage; Sherman would not attack the intrenchments, and Johnston would not come out of them. McPherson, on the right, advanced his line of battle till he gained an elevated position from which his guns could destroy the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula in the Confederate rear, and all attempts to drive him out of this position



LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.



SAVED BY HIS WIG.



EVERETT PEABODY.

ended only in bloody repulse. On the left of the line, Hooker exhibited something of his usual dash by capturing a small portion of the enemy's intrenchments with four guns and some prisoners. Meanwhile, Sherman had thrown two pontoon bridges across the river three miles below the town, so that he could send over a detachment to break the railroad, and had also sent a division of cavalry down the river, to cross at some lower point for the same purpose.

Johnston, therefore, having no good roads by which he could retreat eastward, in the night of the 15th retired southward across the river, following the railroad, and burned the bridges behind him. Sherman, without the slightest delay, started his entire army in pursuit of the enemy, who was found, on the 19th, in position at Cassville, just east of Kingston, and apparently ready to fight; but when Sherman's columns converged on the place the Confederates retreated again in the night of the 20th, and crossed Etowah River. Johnston had really intended to fight here, and he explains his refusal to do so by saying that Hood and Polk told him their corps could not hold their positions.

Here Sherman halted for a few days, to get his army well together, re-provision it and repair the railroad in his rear. Knowing that Allatoona Pass, through which runs the railroad south of

Kingston, was very strong and would probably be held by Johnston, he diverged from the railroad at Kingston, passing considerably west of it, and directed his columns toward Dallas; his purpose being to threaten Marietta and Atlanta so as to cause Johnston to withdraw from Allatoona and release his hold on the railroad, which became more and more necessary to the invading army as it advanced into the country. Johnston understood this manœuvre, and moved westward to meet it. The armies, in an irregular way came into

collision at the cross-roads by New Hope Church. Around this place for six days there was continuous fighting, sometimes mere skirmishing, and sometimes an attack by a heavy detachment of one party or the other, but all such attacks, on either side, were costly and fruitless. The general advantage, however, was with Sherman; for as he gradually got his lines into proper order, he strengthened his right, and then reached out with his left toward the railroad, secured all the wagon roads from Allatoona, and sent out a strong force of cavalry to occupy that pass and repair the railroad. Johnston then left this position at New Hope Church, and took up a new one.

Thus ended the month of May in this campaign, where each commander exercised the utmost skill, neither was guilty of anything rash, and the results were such as would naturally follow from the military conditions with which it began. The losses on each side, thus far, were fewer than 10,000 men; but strong positions had been successively taken up, turned, abandoned; and Sherman was steadily drawing nearer to his goal.

Johnston's new position was on the slopes of Keresaw, Pine, and Lost mountains, thus crossing the railroad above Marietta. It had the advantage of a height from which everything done by Sherman's