

entered Kentucky from the south, with 3000 cavalymen, increased as it went by accessions of Kentucky sympathizers to about 4000, with ten guns. He captured and robbed the towns of Columbia and Lebanon, reached the Ohio, captured two steamers, and crossed into Indiana. Then marching rapidly toward Cincinnati, he burned mills and bridges, tore up rails, plundered right and left, and spread alarm on every side. But the Home Guards were gathering to meet him, and the great number of railways in Ohio and Indiana favored their rapid concentration, while farmers felled trees across the roads on hearing of his approach. He passed around Cincinnati, and after much delay reached the Ohio at Buffington's Ford. Here some of his pursuers overtook him, while gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men were patrolling the river, on the watch for him. The gunboats prevented him from using the ford, and he was obliged to turn and give battle. The fight was severe, and resulted in Morgan's defeat. Nearly 800 of his men surrendered, and he with the remainder retreated up the river. They next tried to cross at Belleville by swimming their horses; but the gunboats were at hand again, and made such havoc among the troopers that only 300 got across, while of the others some were shot, some drowned, and the remnant driven back to the Ohio shore. Morgan with 200 fled still farther up the stream, but at last was compelled to surrender at New Lisbon. He was confined in the Ohio Penitentiary, but escaped a few months later by digging under the walls.

When at last Rosecrans did move, by some of the ablest strategy displayed in the whole war he compelled Bragg to fall back successively from one position to another, all the way from Tullahoma to Chattanooga. This was not done without frequent and heavy skirmishes, however, but the superiority of the National cavalry had now been developed at the West as well as at the East, and they all resulted in one way.

The purpose of Rosecrans was to get possession of Chattanooga; and when Bragg crossed the Tennessee and occupied that town he set to work to manœuvre him out of it. To effect this, he moved southwest, as if he were intending to pass around Chattanooga and invade Georgia. This caused Bragg to fall back to Lafayette, and the National troops took possession of Chattanooga.

Supposing that Bragg was in full retreat, Rosecrans began to follow him; but Bragg had received large reinforcements, and turned back from Lafayette. The two armies, feeling for each other and approaching somewhat cautiously for a week, met at last, and there was fought, September 19 and 20, 1863, a great battle on the banks of a creek, whose Indian name of Chickamauga is said to signify "River of Death."

Rosecrans had about 55,000 men; Bragg, after the arrival of Longstreet at midnight of the 18th, about 70,000. The general direction of the lines of battle was with the National troops facing southeast, and the Confederates facing northwest. Thomas held the left of Rosecrans' line, Crittenden the Centre, and McCook the right. Bragg was the attacking party, and his plan was, while making a feint on the National right, to fall heavily upon the left, flank it, crush it, and seize the roads that led to Chattanooga.

The battle of the 19th began at 10 a. m., and lasted all day. The Confederate army crossed the creek, and moved forward confidently to the attack. But the left of the position, the key-point, was held by the command of Thomas, who for a slow and stubborn fight was perhaps the best corps commander produced by either side in the whole war. Opposed to him, on the Confederate right, was General (also Bishop) Leonidas Polk. There was less of concerted action in the attack than Bragg had planned

for, partly because Thomas unexpectedly struck out with a counter-movement when an opportunity offered; but there was no lack of bloody and persistent fighting. Brigades and divisions moved forward to the charge, were driven back, and charged again. Batteries were taken and retaken, the horses were killed, and the captains and gunners in some instances, refusing to leave them, were shot down at the wheels. Brigades and regiments were shattered, and on both sides many prisoners were taken. Thomas' line was forced back, but before night he regained his first position, and the day closed with the situation practically unchanged.

During the night both sides corrected their lines and made preparation for a renewal of the struggle. Bragg intended to attack again at day-break, his plan (now perfectly evident to his opponent) being substantially the same as on the day before. He wanted to crush the National left, force back the centre, and make a grand left wheel with his entire army, placing his right firmly across the path to Chattanooga. But the



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morning was foggy, Polk was slow, and the fighting did not begin till the middle of the forenoon. Between Polk and Thomas the edge of battle swayed back and forth, and the Confederates could make no permanent impression. Thomas was obliged to call repeatedly for reinforcements, which sometimes reached him and sometimes failed to, but whether they came or not, he held manfully to all the essential portions of his ground.

Rosecrans was constantly uneasy about his right centre, where he knew the line to be weak; and at this point the great disaster of the day began, though in an unexpected manner. It arose from an order that was both mis-written and misinterpreted. This order, addressed to General Thomas J. Wood, who commanded a division, was written by a member of Rosecrans' staff who had not had a military education, and was not sufficiently impressed with the exact meaning of the technical terms. It read: "The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him." It was impossible to obey both clauses of this order; since to

"close up" means to bring the ends of the lines together so that there shall be no gap and they shall form one continuous line, while to "support," in the technical military sense, means to take a position in the rear, ready to advance when ordered. The aide that wrote the order evidently used the word "support" only in the general sense of assist, strengthen, protect, encourage, and did not dream of its conflicting with the command to "close up." General Wood, a West-Point graduate, instead of sending or going to Rosecrans for better orders, obeyed literally the second clause, and withdrew his command from the line to form it in the rear of Reynolds. Opposite to the wide and fatal opening thus left was Longstreet, who instantly saw his advantage and promptly poured six divisions through the gap. This cut off McCook's corps from the rest of the army, and it was speedily defeated and routed. The centre was crumbled, and it looked as if the whole army must be destroyed. Rosecrans, who had been with the defeated right wing, appeared to lose his head completely, and rode back in all haste to Chattanooga to make arrangements for gathering there the fragments of his forces. At nightfall he sent his chief of staff, General James A. Garfield (afterward President) to find what had become of Thomas, and Garfield found Thomas where not even the destruction of three-fifths of the army had moved or daunted him.

When Thomas' right flank was exposed to assault, he swung it back to a position known as Horseshoe Ridge, still covering the road. Longstreet was pressing forward to pass the right of this position, when he was stopped by Gordon Granger, who moved forward to the support of Thomas. The Confederate commander, when complete victory was apparently so near, seemed reckless of the lives of his men, thrusting them forward again and again in futile charges, where Thomas' batteries literally mowed them down with grape and canister, and a steady fire of musketry increased the bloody harvest. About dusk the ammunition was exhausted, and the last charges of the Confederates were repelled with the bayonet. Thomas had fairly won the title of "the rock of Chickamauga." In the night he fell back in good order to Rossville, leaving the enemy in possession of the field, with all the dead and wounded. Sheridan, who had been on the right of the line and was separated by its disruption, kept his command together, marched around the mountain, and before morning joined Thomas at Rossville, whence they fell back the next day to Chattanooga, where order was quickly restored and the defences strengthened.

The National loss in the two-days battle of Chickamauga was 16,336. The Confederate reports are incomplete and unsatisfactory; but estimates of Bragg's loss make it at least 18,000. Tactically it was a victory for Bragg, who was left in possession of the field; but that which he was fighting for, Chattanooga, he did not get. He advanced, however, to positions on Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, and put the town into a state of siege, managing to stop the navigation of the river below and cut off all of Rosecrans' routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road.

A month after the battle of Chickamauga, the National forces in the West were to some extent reorganized. The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans. General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. The troops had been on short rations for some time, and large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could