

of riotous resistance to a draft. Finally, the Confederate agents in Europe reported that anything like a great Confederate victory would secure immediate recognition, if not armed intervention, from England and France.

Hooker, who had lost a golden opportunity by his aberration or his accident at Chancellorsville, had come to his senses again and was alert, active, and clear-headed. As early as May 28, 1863, he informed the President that something was stirring in the camp on the other side of the river, and that a northward movement might be expected. On the 3d of June Lee began his movement, and by the 8th two of his three corps (those of Ewell and Longstreet) were at Culpeper, while A. P. Hill's corps still held the lines on the Rappahannock.

It was known that the entire Confederate cavalry, under Stuart, was at Culpeper, and Hooker

war. Up to that time the Confederate cavalry had been generally superior to the National; this action—a cavalry fight in the proper sense of the term, between the entire mounted forces of the two armies—was a drawn battle; and thenceforth the National cavalry exhibited superiority in an accelerating ratio, till finally, nothing mounted on Southern horses could stand before the magnificent squadrons led by Sheridan, Custer, Kilpatrick and Wilson.

By the 13th of June, Lee had advanced Ewell's corps beyond the Blue Ridge, and it was marching down the Shenandoah valley, while Hill's was still in the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and Longstreet's was midway between, at Culpeper. Hooker asked to be allowed to interpose his whole army between these widely separated parts of its antagonist and defeat them in detail; but with a man like Halleck for military adviser at Washing-

Potomac, made a raid as far as Chambersburg, and returned with supplies to Ewell. On the 22d, Ewell's corps crossed, at Shepherdstown and Williamsport, and moved up the Cumberland valley to Chambersburg. The Governors of New York and Pennsylvania were called upon for militia, and forwarded several regiments, to be interposed between the enemy's advance and Philadelphia and Harrisburg. The other two corps of Lee's army crossed the Potomac on the 24th and 25th, and Hooker, moving on a line nearer Washington, crossed with his whole army at Edward's Ferry, on the 25th and 26th, marching thence to Frederick. He now proposed to send Slocum's corps to the western side of the South Mountain range, have it unite with a force of 11,000 that lay useless at Harper's Ferry, and throw a powerful column upon Lee's communications, capture his trains, and attack his army in



DESTRUCTION OF GUNS AT THE CONFEDERATE ARSENAL, BEAUFORT, S. C., BY CAPTAIN AMMAN, OF THE U. S. GUNBOAT "SENECA."

sent all his cavalry, under Pleasonton, with two brigades of infantry; to attack it there. The assault was to be made in two converging columns, under Buford and Gregg; but this plan was disconcerted by the fact that the enemy's cavalry, intent upon masking the movement of the great body of infantry and protecting its flank, had advanced to Brandy Station. Here it was struck first by Buford and afterward by Gregg, and there was bloody fighting, with the advantage at first in favor of the National troops, but the two columns failed to unite during the action, and finally withdrew. The loss was over 500 men on each side. Some of the heaviest fighting was for possession of a height known as Fleetwood Hill, and the Confederates name the action the battle of Fleetwood. It is of special interest as marking the turning point in cavalry service during the

war, it was useless to propose any bold or brilliant stroke. Hooker was forbidden to do this, and ordered to keep his army between the enemy and the capital. He therefore moved toward Washington. Ewell moved rapidly down the Shenandoah valley, and attacked Winchester, which was held by General Milroy with about 10,000 men. Milroy made a gallant defence; but after a stubborn fight his force was broken and defeated, and about 4000 of them became prisoners.

The corps of Hill and Longstreet now moved. Hill following Ewell into the Shenandoah valley, and Longstreet skirting the Blue Ridge along its eastern base. Pleasonton's cavalry, reconnoitering these movements, met Stuart's again at Aldie, and had a sharp fight; and there were also cavalry actions at Middleburg and Upperville. Other Confederate cavalry had already crossed the

rear. But again he came into collision with the stubborn Halleck, who would not consent to the abandonment, even temporarily, of Harper's Ferry, though the experience of the Antietam campaign, when he attempted to hold it in the same way and lost its whole garrison, should have taught him better. This new cause of trouble, added to previous disagreements, was more than Hooker could stand, and on the 27th he asked to be relieved. His request was promptly complied with, and the next morning the command was given to General Meade, only four days before a great battle.

The first thing Meade did on assuming command was what Hooker had been forbidden to do; he ordered the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and the movement of its garrison to Frederick as a reserve.