

command at Washington (July 12) the troubles in the East became more complicated than ever.


McClellan held a strong position at Harrison's Landing, where, if he accomplished nothing else, he was a standing menace to Richmond, so that Lee dared not withdraw his army from its defence. He wanted to be heavily reinforced, cross the James, and strike at Richmond's southern communications, just as Grant actually did two years later; and he was promised reinforcements from the troops of Burnside and Hunter, on the coast of North and South Carolina. Lee's anxiety was to get McClellan off from the peninsula, so that he could strike out toward Washington. He first sent a detachment to bombard McClellan's camp from the opposite side of the James; but McClellan crossed the river with a sufficient force and easily swept it out of the way. Then Lee sent Jackson to make a demonstration against Pope, holding the main body of his army ready to follow as soon as some erratic and energetic movements of Jackson had caused a sufficient alarm at Washington to determine the withdrawal of McClellan.

of Banks and Sigel at Culpeper. Banks arrived there promptly on the 8th; but Sigel sent a note from Sperryville in the afternoon, asking by what road he should march. "As there was but one road between those two points," says Pope, "and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march." On the morning of the 9th Banks' corps went out alone to meet the enemy at Cedar Mountain. Banks had 8000 men, and attacked an enemy twice as strong. He first struck Jackson's right wing, and afterward furiously attacked the left, rolled up the flank, opened a fire in the rear, and threw Jackson's whole line into confusion. It was as if the two commanders had changed characters, and Banks had suddenly assumed the part that, according to the popular idea, Jackson always played. If Sigel had only known what road to take, that might have been the last of Jackson. But Banks' force had become somewhat broken in its advance through the woods, and at the same time the Confederates

occupying Sulphur Springs and ready to meet him. Meanwhile General James E. B. Stuart, with 1500 cavalymen, in the dark and stormy night of August 22, had ridden around to the rear of Pope's position, to cut the railroad. He struck Pope's headquarters at Catlett's Station, captured 300 prisoners and all the personal baggage and papers of the commander, and got back in safety. These papers informed Lee of Pope's plans and dispositions. On the other hand, a cavalry expedition sent out by Pope a few days before had captured Stuart's adjutant, and with him a letter from Lee to Stuart, which largely revealed Lee's plans to his opponent.

Jackson moved still farther up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossed the headwaters, and turned Pope's right.

Pope knew exactly the size of Jackson's force, and the direction it had taken; for Colonel J. S. Clark, of Banks' staff, had spent a day where he had a plain view of the enemy's moving columns, and carefully counted the regiments and batteries. But from this point the National commander,



DRUMMING OUT THIEVES FROM FORTRESS MONROE.

The unwitting Halleck was all too swift to cooperate with his enemy, and had already determined upon that withdrawal. Burnside's troops, coming up on transports, were not even landed, but were forwarded up the Potomac and sent to Pope. McClellan marched his army to Fort Monroe, and there embarked it by divisions for the same destination.

Pope's intention was to push southward, strike Lee's western and northwestern communications, and cut them off from the Shenandoah Valley. He first ordered Banks (July 14) to push his whole cavalry force to Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads and bridges in that vicinity. But the cavalry commander, General Hatch, took with him infantry, artillery, and a wagon train, and consequently did not move at cavalry speed. Before he could get to Gordonsville, Jackson's advance reached it, and his movement was frustrated.

As soon as Jackson came in contact with Pope's advance, he called upon Lee for reinforcements, and promptly received them. On the 8th of August he crossed the Rapidan, and moved toward Culpeper. Pope, who had but recently taken the field in person, attempted to concentrate the corps

were reinforced, so that Jackson was able to rally his men and check the movement. Banks in turn was forced back a short distance, where he took up a strong position; and Jackson fell back in the night of the 11th to Gordonsville. In this engagement Jackson lost 1300 men, and Banks 1800.

Within a week after the battle of Cedar Mountain, Lee, seeing that McClellan was leaving the peninsula, forwarded Longstreet's division and a part of Hood's to Gordonsville, and prepared to follow with his entire army. Pope had concentrated his forces and advanced his line so that his centre rested on Cedar Mountain, his left on the Rapidan, and his right on Robertson's River; and when Jackson and Longstreet advanced across the Rapidan, he fell back beyond the Rappahannock. By this time he was reinforced by a portion of Burnside's troops, and others were on the way.

When Lee found it impossible to cross the Rappahannock in front of Pope, he sent Jackson to make a flank march westward along that stream, cross it at Sulphur Springs, and come down upon Pope's right. But when Jackson arrived at the crossing, he found a heavy force

who had hitherto done reasonably well, seemed suddenly to become bewildered. Lee, whose grand strategy was correct, had here blundered seriously in his manoeuvres, dividing his army so that the two parts were not within supporting distance of each other, and the united enemy was between. An ordinarily good general, standing in Pope's boots, would naturally have fallen in force upon Jackson, and could have completely destroyed or captured him. But Pope out-blundered Lee, and gave the victory to the Confederates.

He began by sending 40,000 men under McDowell, on the 27th, toward Thoroughfare Gap, to occupy the road by which Lee with Longstreet's division was marching to join Jackson; and at the same time he moved with the remainder of his army to strike Jackson at Bristoe Station. This was a good beginning, but was immediately ruined by his own lack of steadiness. The advance guard had an engagement at that place with Jackson's rear guard, while his main body retired to Manassas Junction. Pope became elated at the prospect of a great success, and ordered a retrograde movement by McDowell. The way was thus left open for Jackson to move out to meet his