

on Cooper's and Kern's battery by single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the 4th Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed." General McCall himself, endeavoring to rally his men at this point, was captured and carried off to Richmond. In Kearney's front a similar charge was made three times; but every time a steady musketry fire drove back the enemy that had closed up its gaps made by the artillery. Darkness put an end to the fighting, and that night McClellan's army continued its retreat to Malvern Hill, where his

could be set for an army, and Lee walked straight into it. To the confidence with which the Southerners began the war was now added the peculiar elation produced by a week's pursuit of a retreating army; and apparently it did not occur to them that they were all mortal.

In the first contact 7000 Confederates, with six guns, struck the left of the position. They boldly advanced their artillery to within 800 yards of the cliff; but before they could get at work a fire of 20 or 30 guns was concentrated upon their battery, which knocked it to pieces in a few minutes; and at the same time huge shells from a gunboat fell among a small detachment of cavalry, threw it into confusion, and turned it back upon the infantry, breaking up the whole attack.


Lee was not ready to assault with his whole army till the afternoon of July 1. An artillery duel was kept up during the forenoon; but the Confederate commander did not succeed in destroying the National batteries; on the contrary,

rison's Landing, on the James, where he had fixed his base of supplies and where the gunboats could protect his position. This retreat is known as the Seven Days, and the losses are figured up at 15,249 on the National side, and somewhat over 19,000 on the Confederate.

## CHAPTER X.

## POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

WHILE McClellan was before Richmond, it was determined to consolidate in one command the corps of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell, which were moving about in an independent and ineffectual way between Washington and the Shenandoah Valley. General John Pope, who had won considerable reputation by his capture of Island No. 10, was given command (June 26, 1862), of the new organization, which was called the Army of Virginia. Frémont



REVIEW OF CONFEDERATE TROOPS EN ROUTE TO VIRGINIA, AS THEY PASS THE PULASKI MONUMENT, SAVANNAH, GA., AUGUST 7, 1861.

advance guard had taken up the strongest position he had yet occupied. The battle just described has several names—Glendale, Frazier's Farm, Charles City Cross-Roads, Newmarket, Nelson's Farm. McClellan here lost 10 guns. The losses in men cannot be known exactly, as the reports group the losses of several days together. Longstreet and the two Hills reported a loss of 12,458 in the fighting from the 27th to the 30th.

The last stand made by McClellan for delivering battle was at Malvern Hill. This is a plateau near Turkey Bend of James River. It is so bordered by streams and swamps as to leave no practicable approach except by the narrow north-west face. Here McClellan had his entire army in position when his pursuers came up. His position was peculiarly favorable for the use of artillery, and his whole front bristled with it. There was no intrenchments to speak of, but the natural inequalities of the ground afforded considerable shelter. It was as complete a trap as

he saw his own disabled. The signal for the infantry attack was to be the usual yell, raised by Armistead's division on the right and taken up by the successive divisions along the line. But the Confederate line was separated by thick woods, there was long waiting for the signal, some of the generals thought they heard it, and some advanced without hearing it. The consequence was a series of separate attacks, some of them repeated three or four times, and every time a concentrated fire on the attacking column and a bloody repulse. There were some brief counter-charges, in one of which the colors were taken from a North Carolina regiment; but in general the National troops only maintained their ground, and though fighting was kept up till nine o'clock in the evening, the line was never for one instant broken or the guns in danger. This battle cost Lee 5000 men, and at its close he gave up the pursuit. The National loss was less than one-third as great. That night McClellan withdrew his army to Har-

declined to serve under a commander who had once been his subordinate, and consequently his corps was given to General Sigel. Pope, on taking command of this force, which numbered all told about 38,000 men, and also of the troops in the fortifications around Washington, had the bad taste to issue a general order that had three capital defects: it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated his enemy, and it contained a bit of sarcasm pointed at General McClellan, the commander of the army with which his own was to co-operate. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act sufficiently in harmony, the President called General Henry W. Halleck from the West to be General-in-Chief, with headquarters at Washington, and command them both. Halleck had perhaps more military learning than any other man in the country, and his patriotic intentions were unquestionably good; but in practical warfare he proved to be little more than a great obstructor; and from the day he took