

thought it was the National regiment supporting the battery, and ordered the gunners not to fire. Griffin rode forward to ascertain the truth, but learned it too late. It was a Confederate regiment, and when it suddenly leveled its muskets and fired at point-blank range, the battery was completely disabled in an instant, and the surviving horses went dashing wildly down the hill with the caissons. Johnston says: "If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped."

The better ground held by the Confederates, and the concentration of their troops, were already beginning to tell in their favor, when 5000 more of Johnston's men, brought to the Junction on the railroad, were hurried to the field and sent around to the left to form at right angles to the National right and fall upon it. This movement was executed promptly, about four o'clock in the afternoon, and was completely successful. The National right became broken and confused, and retreated in disorder. A panic arose, and the retreat became a rout, and the rout a race for Washington. Arms and accoutrements were thrown away, drivers of army wagons cut the traces, leaped upon the backs of the horses, and rode through the crowd of fugitives, and guns and trains were abandoned. Portions of the army, however, maintained their organization, and partly successful attempts were made to stop the flight. The Confederates had but little cavalry, and were in no condition to pursue. There was a black-horse regiment from Louisiana that undertook it, but came upon the New York Fire Zouaves, and in a bloody fight lost heavily. On the other side Jefferson Davis, riding to the field half an hour after the battle, saw such a stream of Confederate fugitives that he supposed the day had gone against them. "Battles are not won," he remarked, "where two or three unhurt men are seen leading away one that is wounded." Nevertheless, in that instance the battle had been won by an army whose rear presented exactly that appearance.

The loss of the Confederates was about 1900, that of the Nationals about 1500 in killed and wounded, and about as many more in prisoners. Among the officers killed were General Bee and Colonel Bartow on one side, and Colonel Cameron, of the New York Highland Regiment, on the other. He was a brother of the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. Among the prisoners taken to Richmond were many of the civilians that had come out in carriages to witness the contest, including the Hon. Alfred Ely, member of Congress. Colonel Corcoran, of the New York 69th, was a prisoner. A few of the abandoned guns were brought off the next night; but most of the arms, ammunition, and supplies left on the field and in the roads were secured by the Confederates, who remained in possession of the battlefield for weeks.

General Joseph E. Johnston, in many respects the best witness that has spoken on the Southern side, says: "All the military conditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects

of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. . . . Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more than the Federal army lost by defeat." In writing this passage, General Johnston probably took no account of the effect produced in Europe. The early narratives sent there, in which the panic of retreat was made the principal figure, gave the impression that the result arose from constitutional cowardice in Northern men and invincible courage in Southerners. They also gave the impression that the Confederates were altogether superior in generalship; and the effect was deep and long enduring.

At the North, the spectacle of McDowell's army streaming back in disorder to the National capital produced first a shock of surprise, then a sense of disgrace, and then a calm determination to begin the war over again. It was well expressed by a Methodist minister at a camp meeting in Illinois, the Rev. Henry Cox. The news of

will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defence of our rights and those of our brethren." The Governor of North Carolina: "I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina." The Governor of Virginia: "The militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view." Every one of these Governors was a secessionist, with a strong and aggressive party at his back, and yet in each of these States the secessionists were in a minority. It was a serious matter to increase the hostility that beset the National arms on what in another war would have been called neutral ground, and it was also a serious matter to leave the Union element in the northernmost slave States without a powerful support and protection. The problem was worked out differently in each of the States.


At the winter session of the Missouri Legislature an act had been passed that placed the city of St. Louis under the control of Police Commissioners to be appointed by the Governor, Claiborne F. Jackson. Four of his appointees were secessionists, and three of these were leaders of bodies of "minute-men," half-secret armed organizations. The Mayor of the city, who was also one of the Commissioners, was known as a "conditional Union man." Other acts showed plainly the bent of the Legislature. One made it treason to speak against the authority of the Governor, and gave him enlarged powers, while another appropriated \$3,000,000 for military purposes, taking the entire school fund for the year, and the accumulations that were to have paid the July interest on the public debt.

A State convention, called to consider the question of secession, met in February, and proved to be overwhelmingly in favor of Missouri's remaining in the Union, though it also expressed a general sympathy with slavery, assumed that the South had wrongs, deprecated the employment of military force on either side, and repeated the suggestion that had been made many times in other quarters for a National convention to amend the Constitution so as to satisfy everybody. The State convention made its report in March, and adjourned till December.

This proceeding appeared to be a great disappointment to

Governor Jackson, but he failed to take from it any hint to give up his purpose of getting the State out of the Union. He called an extra session of the Legislature, to convene May 2, for the purpose of "adopting measures to place the State in a proper attitude of defence," and he called out the militia on the 3d of May to go into encampment for six days. There was a large store of arms (more than 20,000 stand) in the St. Louis arsenal, but while he was devising a method and a pretext for seizing them, the greater part of them were suddenly removed, by order from Washington, to Springfield, Ill. The Governor applied to the Confederate Government for assistance, and a quantity of arms and ammunition, including several field-guns, was sent to him in boxes marked "marble." He also ordered a general of the State militia to establish a camp of instruction near the city, and gathered there such volunteer companies as were organized and armed.

General Scott had anticipated all this by sending reinforcements to the little company that held



CHARLES WILKES.

the battle came while he was preaching, and he closed his sermon with the words: "Brethren, we'd better adjourn this camp meeting, and go home and drill."

## CHAPTER IV.

## BORDER STATES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.

THE disposition of the border slave States was one of the most difficult problems with which the Government had to deal. When the President issued his call for 75,000 men, the Governors of Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, as well as those of North Carolina and Virginia, returned positive refusals. The Governor of Missouri answered, "It is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with." The Governor of Kentucky said: "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." The Governor of Tennessee: "Tennessee