THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES, AND THE OUTBREAK.

WHEN within a period of eighteen months a Dutch vessel entered James River with a small cargo of African slaves (1619), and the Mayflower landed at Plymouth, Mass., a company of seekers after liberty (1620), the prime conditions were established for one of the mightiest conflicts that the world has ever seen. In 240 years (1860) the descendants of these slaves, and of others who were imported subsequently, had increased to a servile population of 4,000,000, who performed most of the labor in the Southern States, and determined the character of their civil polity. On the other hand, the descendants of the Plymouth pilgrims had established common schools, a free press, the most democratic forms of government and society, and varied manufactures, all of which turned their civilization and their industrial and governmental ideas in a direction different from those of the South. The greatest of the few staples that were raised by slave labor was cotton, and the value of this crop had been enormously increased when Eli Whitney, in 1793, invented the cotton gin, by which 3000 pounds could be cleaned of seed in a day, whereas before it had required a day's labor of a negro woman to clean one pound. This had increased the value of every slave in the country, and probably did more than any one thing toward determining the slaveholders to foster and perpetuate the institution, instead of trying to get rid of it. It became evident after a time to the wiser and more far-seeing men of our country that these two systems of labor could not endure forever under the same government. Abraham Lincoln expressed it tersely, three years before the war, in a speech in which he said, "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half-slave and half-free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved, I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided." There had been repeated threats of secession on the part of the South for about thirty years, followed by various concessions and compromises. By the Missouri Compromise of 1820, it had been agreed that all territories subsequently admitted to the Union north of the latitude of 36° 30′ should be free States, and all south of that line slave States. In 1854, by a bill introduced by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, this compromise was repealed, with the declared purpose of allowing the people of each territory to make such constitution as they pleased. This was looked upon by the greater part of the men in the North as an aggression on the part of the slave power, and an indication of a determination to carry slavery into all the territories; whereas they held that while it should not be meddled with where it was, it should be forbidden to spread any farther, with the expectation that ultimately it would die out, because they looked upon it as being both economically bad and morally wrong. Therefore all who concurred in this view formed at the North the Republican party, whose principal avowed purpose was to prevent the spread of slavery into the territories. Their first presidential candidate (1856) was John C. Fremont, who, though he made a powerful run, was not elected. It was believed that if he had been, the attempt at secession would have taken place then. In 1860 the candidate of this party was Abraham Lincoln, who was elected, and his election was followed



RECEPTION AT CHARLESTON, S. C., OF THE NEWS OF THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN AND HAMLIN, NOVEMBER, 1860.

speedily in the cotton States by ordinances declaring that those States were no longer in the Union. The dates of these ordinances were: South Carolina, December 20, 1860; Mississippi, January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10; Alabama, January 11; Georgia, January 19; Illinois, January 26; Texas, February 1. The delegates from these States met at Montgomery, Ala., early in February, 1861, and organized a general government called the Confederate States of America, with its capital at that place, which three months later was removed to Richmond, Va. Jefferson Davis was made provisional President for one year, and Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President. A year later they were re-elected for a full term of six years. Before the end of May, North Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas and Tennessee had joined the Confederacy. Kentucky refused to join it, and for Maryland and Missouri there was a struggle which terminated in their retention in the Union.

Thus the two sections were arrayed against each other, and as history shows plainly that two sovereign governments cannot exist together in a territory that is all included in one set of natural boundaries, the inevitable result was immediate war.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

"But what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with 10,000 to meet him that cometh against him with 20,000?" This quotation would naturally come to the lips of the student of history if, knowing that the population of all the slave States in 1860 was but 10,000,000, while that of the free States was 20,000,000, he should suddenly come upon the fact of the great civil war. But those who led the secession movement, and most of their followers, thought there were other circumstances to offset the discrepancy in numbers and wealth.

They believed that in the possession of the cotton that was wanted for British looms, and in their readiness to adopt a free-trade policy, they had a guaranty of help from England, if help should be needed. They believed that Southern soldiers would be more than a match, man for man, for Northern ones. They counted also on the enormous advantage that earthworks and arms of precision give to men who are fighting on the defensive. More than all, perhaps, they counted on active assistance in the heart of the North itself; yet this, like the calculations just mentioned, failed them in the test.

The secessionists relied also, for an advantageous start, upon the timidity of President Buchanan and the influence that might be exerted over him by the Southern members of his Cabinet; and in this at least their expectations were fully met.

One supreme consideration ought to have occurred to the statesmen of the South, if not to her people. With the advance of civilization, the whole tendency of mankind has been, not toward division and segregation, but toward union and centralization, wherever geographical conditions have indicated it. Where once was the Heptarchy is now the United Kingdom of Great Britain; France and Spain each gravitated into a similar consolidation, and early in the present century Sweden and Norway became one kingdom. In 1848 the leagued Swiss Cantons set up a central government, making themselves one republic, and the union between Austria and Hungary was perfected. When our war of secession was breaking out, the principalities of Italy had just become one kingdom, which in naval power is now among the first in the world; and since that time we have seen Germany united, the Canadian provinces organized as a Federal Dominion, the States of Central America form a league, and Japan adopt a centralized government. Our own Constitution was substituted for the old Articles of Confederation because our fathers found it desirable "to form a more perfect union."



THE PALMETTO FLAG.



THE FLAG OF THE CONFEDERACY.

Three stripes—the upper and lower red, the central white. Union blue extending to the top of lower stripe, with seven white stars.

The Constitution of the Confederate States of America was a close copy of that of the United States, except that it made the presidential term six years, with ineligibility for a second term, forbade protective tariffs, and was not afraid of the word "slave." It specifically declared that "citizens of each State shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired." It contained no recognition of the right of secession, and in its opening sentence declared that the intention was to "form a permanent federal government." In the most important respect of all, the rights of States were more abridged than they were by the old Constitution. For any amendment of the United States Constitution, a vote of three-fourths of the States is required, but the Confederate Constitution could be amended if two-thirds of the States concurred. Either of these provisions completely destroys the presumption of State sovereignty, for when sovereigns enter into a compact, it can be changed only by unanimous consent. Mr. Stephens, in a speech at Savannah, March 22, 1861, expounding the new Constitution, said, "The prevailing ideas entertained by him (Thomas Jefferson) and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. . . Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea. Its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition."

Commissioners were now sent to Washington, but President Buchanan refused to receive them. Yet all his efforts to stay the progress of secession were paralyzed by the presence of three active secessionists in his Cabinet—John B. Floyd, Howell Cobb and Jacob Thompson. Buchanan was one of those men that are strong enough so long as precedents are not lacking, but pitifully weak in a new emergency. He declared that States had no right to secede, but the Constitution conferred no power to

coerce them, and this curious theory he never got rid of.

Major Robert Anderson, commanding the garrison of Fort Moultrie, Charleston harbor, seeing that he could not hold it against the forces that were being gathered for its capture, on Christmas night, 1860, secretly abandoned it and took position in the stronger Fort Sumter. His men were few, and his stock of provisions was small. The new authorities at Charleston complained of this movement as being virtually the violation of a truce, and requested the Government at Washington to order him back to Moultrie, which was refused. For some time he was permitted to receive his mail as usual, and to buy provisions regularly in the Charleston market. All this time the Confederate forces, commanded by General P. G. T. Beauregard, were erecting batteries for the demolition of Fort Sumter; and yet, whenever any Southern officers or citizens chose to visit it, Anderson received them cordially, allowed them to inspect all his arrangements for defence, and accepted their invitations to dinner. His unaccountable conduct was explained years afterward, when a letter written by him at that time was brought to light in the Confederate archives, in which he said, "I tell you frankly, my heart is not in this war." He was a Kentuckian, and it has been conjectured that he was only waiting to see whether his State would go out of the Union.

At last the privileges of communication were withdrawn by the Confederate authorities, and surrender of the fort was demanded. The question of reinforcing and provisioning the beleaguered garrison then arose, and on this President Buchanan's Cabinet was hopelessly divided and went to pieces. The steamer "Star of the West" was sent in January, 1861, with provisions and troops, but before she could reach the fort she was driven off by the fire of Confederate batteries. Buchanan made no further effort to assert the power and dignity of the government that had been entrusted to him, but only looked anxiously for the close of his term. Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated on the 4th of March, and early in April gave orders that a fleet be sent to the relief of Fort Sumter. Thereupon its surrender was again demanded, and when this was refused the Confederate batteries opened fire upon it, April 12. The fire was returned as long as the guns of the fort were serviceable, and the great artillery duel was kept up for two days; but the red-hot shot burned the buildings inside of the fort, its walls were crumbling under the blows of heavy rifled projectiles, and the garrison at length surrendered, being permitted to march out with the honors of war, Sunday morning, April 14. Not a man within the fort was injured by the hostile fire, and it was also reported officially that the assailants had met with no loss. But the flame of civil war was kindled, the North understood at last that the South was in deadly earnest, and the sections rushed to a conflict in which at least $8,000,000,000 were wasted, American commerce disappeared from every sea, and 500,000 citizens of the Republic perished.

ISAAC W. HAYNE,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MESSENGER TO WASHINGTON WITH SOUTH CAROLINA'S ULTIMATUM TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.

CHAPTER II.

THE BEGINNING OF BLOODSHED.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S inaugural address was one of the ablest State papers recorded in American history. It argued the question of secession in all its aspects—the Constitutional right, the reality of the grievance, the sufficiency of the remedy—and so far as law and logic went it left the secessionists little or nothing to stand on. But neither law nor logic could change in a single day the pre-determined purpose of a powerful combination, or allay the passions that had been roused by years of resentful debate. Some of its sentences read like maxims for statesmen. "The central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy." "Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?" "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?" With all its conciliatory messages it expressed a firm and unalterable purpose to maintain the Union at every hazard.

In closing, he said: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I have the most solemn one to preserve, protect and defend it. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it



THE OLD STATE HOUSE AT COLUMBIA, WHERE THE SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION, DECEMBER 20, 1860.

must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

The loyal people throughout the country received the address with satisfaction. The secessionists bitterly denounced it. Overlooking all its pacific declarations, and keeping out of sight the fact that a majority of the Congress just chosen was politically opposed to the President, they appealed to the Southern people to say whether they would "submit to abolition rule," and whether they were going to look on and "see



INTERIOR VIEW OF FORT MOULTRIE AS ENGAGED IN THE BOMBARDMENT AGAINST FORT SUMTER.

gallant little South Carolina crushed under the heel of despotism."

In spite of all such appeals, there was still a strong Union sentiment at the South.

When Fort Sumter was surrendered, the Confederates had already acquired possession of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie in Charleston harbor, Fort Pulaski at Savannah, Fort Morgan at the entrance of Mobile Bay, Forts Jackson and St. Philip below New Orleans, the navy-yard and Forts McRae and Barrancas at Pensacola, the arsenals at Mount Vernon, Ala., and Little Rock, Ark., and the New Orleans Mint. The largest force of United States regulars was that in Texas, under command of General David E. Twiggs, who surrendered it in February, and turned over to the insurgents $1,250,000 worth of military property.

On the day when Sumter fell, President Lincoln penned a proclamation, issued the next day (Monday, April 15), which declared "that the laws of the United States have been for some time past, and now are, opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law," and called for militia from the several States of the Union to the number of 75,000. It also called a special session of Congress, to convene on July 4.

Mr. Lincoln's faith in the people had always been strong; but the response to this proclamation was probably a surprise even to him, as it certainly was to the secessionists, who had assured the Southern people that the Yankees would not fight.

The whole North was thrilled with military ardor, and moved almost as one man. The national flag was thrown to the breeze from nearly every court-house, school-house, college, hotel, engine-house, railway station, and public building, from the spires of many churches, and from the windows of innumerable private residences. The fife and drum were heard in the streets, and recruiting offices were opened in vacant stores or in tents hastily pitched in the public squares. All sorts and conditions of men left their business and stepped into the ranks, and in a few days the Government was offered several times as many troops as had been called for. Boys of fifteen sat down and wept because they were not permitted to go, but here and there one dried his tears when he was told that he might be a drummer or an officer's servant. Everybody seemed anxious to put forth some expression of loyalty to the National Government and the starry flag. School-girls wrote their letters on white paper and used red and blue ink for the alternate lines; while their mothers made "Havelocks" for the soldiers—a sort of cape attachment to a cap to prevent sunstroke in a hot climate. A considerable percentage of the letters that passed through the mails bore patriotic devices on the envelopes. The designs were numberless, and collections of them are now looked upon as curiosities. A favorite one represented a young blue-jacket, with curly hair streaming in the wind, and rolling clouds about him, clinging by his legs and his left hand to the topmast, while with a hammer in his right he nailed the colors to the mast-head. Beneath was the legend, "If any man tries to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot!"—which was a famous dispatch sent by General John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury in the last days of Buchanan's administration, to a customs officer at New Orleans. The foremost American magazine of that day removed the portrait of a colonial governor that it had borne on its cover from the beginning, and displayed the stars and stripes in its place; and many newspapers put a flag at the head of their columns and kept it there.

The papers were lively with great head-lines and double-leaded editorials; and the local poet filled the spare space—when there was any—with his glowing patriotic effusions. The closing passage of Longfellow's "Building of the Ship," written a dozen years before, beginning:

> "Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
> Sail on, O Union strong and great!
> Humanity with all its fears,
> With all the hopes of future years,
> Is hanging breathless on thy fate!"

was in constant demand, and was recited effectively by nearly every orator that addressed a war-meeting.

Eminent men of all parties and all professions spoke out for the Union. Stephen A. Douglas, who had long been Lincoln's rival and had opposed the policy of coercion, went to the White House the day before Sumter fell, had a long interview with the President, and promised a hearty support of the Administration, which was immediately telegraphed over the country and had a powerful effect. Ex-President Pierce (who had made direful prediction of blood in Northern streets), ex-President Buchanan (who had failed to find any authority for coercion), General Lewis Cass (a Democratic partisan since the war of 1812), Archbishop Hughes (the highest dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church in America), and numerous others, all "came out for the Union," as the phrase went. The greater portion of the Democratic party, which had opposed Lincoln's election, also, as individuals, sustained the Administration in its determination not to permit a division of the country. These were known as "war Democrats," while those that opposed and reviled the Government were called "Copperheads," in allusion to the snake of that name.

Town halls, school-houses, academies, and even churches, were turned into temporary barracks. Village greens and city squares were occupied every day by platoons of men, most of them not yet uniformed, marching and wheeling and countermarching, and being drilled in the manual of arms by officers that knew just a little more than they did, by virtue of having bought a handbook of tactics the day before, and sat up all night to study it. There was great scarcity of arms.

In many of the Northern cities small organizations of uniformed militia had been kept up for years, and many of them were exceedingly well drilled and fairly armed. New interest had been awakened in militia service only the year before (1860), when a young man named Ephraim E. Ellsworth, who had drilled a Chicago regiment to perfection in the zouave tactics, exhibited their skill in most of the large cities. The uniformed militia was first ready to respond to the President's proclamation, and within two days the 6th Massachusetts, Colonel Edward F. Jones, was on its way to Washington. On the 19th (the anniversary of the battle of Lexington) it arrived at Baltimore, where trouble was expected and trouble came. An immense mob of secessionists that had hooted and stoned an unarmed Pennsylvania

regiment passing through the city the previous evening now collected again in greater force and with deadlier purpose. A part of the regiment had been taken across the city in detached cars, when the track was obstructed, and the last four companies attempted to march across. They encountered a riotous procession that was following a secession flag; the crowd closed in around them; such epithets as "abolitionists," "nigger-thieves," and "black Republicans," were freely hurled at them and emphasized with paving-stones; pistol-shots were fired from windows and from the sidewalk; several soldiers were struck, and at length orders were given to fire into the mob, when many of the rioters fell. The mayor of the city pushed through the crowd, and placed himself at the head of the column, hoping that his presence would be some protection. But the rioters still pressed hard upon the little band of soldiers, and the mayor seized a musket and shot one of the foremost of the mob. Soon afterward half a hundred policemen with drawn revolvers were interposed between the mob and the soldiers, who made the remainder of the march without serious difficulty.

The bodies of three militiamen that had been killed were sent home to their native State and deposited in the little hill-side cemeteries—the first of a long procession of young men destined within the next four years to lay down their lives for their country.

The New York 7th Regiment, Colonel Marshall Lefferts, and the Massachusetts 8th, General Benjamin F. Butler, followed close after the 6th in the march to the National capital; but they went by way of Annapolis, avoiding Baltimore by request of the State and municipal authorities. Indeed, the chief of police, immediately after the riot, had burned the bridges north and east of the city, so that no more troops could come through.

This affair intensified the excitement and the patriotic determination at the North. A monster meeting was held in New York City, and a Union Defence Committee was appointed to facilitate the equipment of troops and the furnishing of ships and money. The effect in Maryland was to increase the disunion feeling and create a tremendous excitement. Arms were sent from Richmond to the secessionists of that State, and for a time it seemed probable that she would be lost to the Union, and Washington be surrounded by the territory of the enemy.

Meanwhile the Virginia troops were moving to capture the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the Gosport navy-yard. The commandants of both set the buildings on fire and attempted to destroy the machinery and other property, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Confederates, but only partially succeeded. The loss at the navy-yard, in ships and material, was enormous. All these disasters—Sumter, Baltimore, the secession of Virginia, Harper's Ferry, Gosport—had occurred within one week, April 12–20; but the Administration, though cut off from communication with the friendly North, was not appalled. The various departments of the Government went on regularly with their duties, and the veteran General Winfield Scott made the best possible dispositions, with the force at his command, for the defence of Washington.

Troops in abundance were soon pouring into the city, till the authorities hardly knew what to do with them, and they hardly knew what to do with themselves. They slept on the floors of the Government buildings by night, and swarmed everywhere by day. A regiment of zouaves, recruited from the New York fire department and commanded by Ellsworth, amused themselves and astonished the citizens by scaling the walls of the Capitol, running along the cornices and water-tables, and clambering from window to window. To outward appearance the affair was one vast picnic, and few seemed to realize that desperate and bloody work was to come.

On the 24th of May, in the night, four regiments crossed the Potomac and took possession of Arlington Heights, which commanded Washington, and from which shells might have been thrown into the White House. This was called the first invasion of "the sacred soil of Virginia"—an expression that became a by-word. One regiment, Ellsworth's, went by way of Alexandria, where a secession flag had long been flying over the principal hotel. Ellsworth himself, accompanied by two soldiers, went to the top of the house, tore down the flag, and was returning to the street with it, when the proprietor of the hotel suddenly appeared with a shotgun and killed him on the stairs. The next instant the proprietor himself was shot dead by the foremost soldier. This incident produced another shock at the North, and woke the people a little more to the grim realities of war. Ellsworth's picture was displayed everywhere, eulogies were pronounced upon him, and special regiments were recruited in his name and dedicated themselves to the work of avenging his death. In little more than a fortnight the loss was duplicated in the death of another of the notable young men that had rushed to arms. Theodore Winthrop, a writer of considerable achievement and great promise, had accompanied the New York 7th Regiment to Washington, and published an account of the march that attracted universal attention. Afterward he went to Fort Monroe, on the staff of General Butler. In an ill-planned expedition against a secession force at Big Bethel (June 10), both he and Lieutenant John T. Greble, a young West-Pointer, were killed.



EDMUND RUFFIN, OF VIRGINIA,

WHO BOASTED OF "THE HONOR OF FIRING THE FIRST SHOT AT FORT SUMTER."

In June, 1865, at eighty years of age, he committed suicide by blowing the top of his head off with a gun, saying "I cannot survive the liberties of my country."

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

THE 75,000 troops called for in President Lincoln's proclamation of April 15, were three-months men. On the 3d of May, 1861, he issued another proclamation, calling for 42,000 volunteers for three years, and authorizing the raising of ten new regiments for the regular army. He also called for 18,000 volunteer seamen for the navy. The ports of the Southern coasts had been already (April 19) declared in a state of blockade, and it was not only desirable but absolutely necessary to make the blockade effectual. The Confederate Government had issued letters of marque for privateers almost from the first; and its Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 100,000 volunteers for one year.

When Congress convened on the 4th of July, President Lincoln asked for 400,000 men and $400,000,000, to suppress the insurrection; and in response he was authorized to call for 500,000 men and spend $500,000,000. What he had already done was approved and declared valid; and on the 15th of July the House of Representatives, with but five dissenting votes, passed a resolution (introduced by John A. McClernand, a Democrat), pledging any amount of money and any number of men that might be necessary to restore the authority of the National Government.

For a long time volunteers were pouring into Washington at the rate of 4000 a day; and after a while the press and people began to talk of these raw levies as an army, and to wonder why they were not immediately precipitated upon the enemy. To the objection that they were green and unskilled in the art of war, it was answered that the Confederates were equally green and unskilled. To most people this consideration seemed perfectly satisfactory; they did not take into account the fact that it devolved upon the National forces to take the offensive, and an army marching into hostile territory must have acquired considerable discipline in order to be able to keep together, act together, and meet the contingencies of war. So arose a popular demand for immediate action, which was represented by the catch-word "On to Richmond!" echoed through the newspapers. General Scott was opposed to undertaking any large offensive movement with the three-months men. He thought they should only be used to protect Washington, keep Maryland from seceding, and carry on some operations that had been begun around Harper's Ferry and in western Virginia. But other than strictly military circumstances had to be considered, and a campaign toward Richmond was determined upon.

A Confederate army, commanded by General P. G. T. Beauregard, had been sent to occupy Manassas Junction, which was important as the railroad centre of northern Virginia. Seeing that it was much easier to hold the natural line of defence formed by Bull Run than to construct earthworks around the Junction, he had moved forward to that stream and posted his troops at the various fords between the Alexandria Railroad and the Warrenton Turnpike, thus occupying a line eight miles long, facing toward Washington. He had about 22,000 men. Harper's Ferry had been occupied by a Confederate force under General Joseph E. Johnston, who had destroyed

the works and retired to Winchester on the approach of a superior force of National troops under General Robert Patterson.

General Scott's plan was, to launch an army against Beauregard, turn his right flank, seize the railroads in rear of his position, and defeat him. It was all-important that Johnston's army in the Shenandoah Valley, about 9000 men, should not be permitted to go to the assistance of Beauregard; and General Patterson had strict orders to prevent such a movement, either by getting between the two or by closely following and attacking Johnston. The immediate command was intrusted to General Irvin McDowell, then forty-three years of age, who was a graduate of West Point and had seen service in the Mexican war. The National Government labored under a serious disadvantage at the beginning of the war, which was never wholly done away with in the entire four years of the struggle. Washington was full of spies and secession sympathizers, some of whom were well known, while others never could be detected.

McDowell's army moved on the 16th of July. It was in five divisions commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the line of communication with Washington, and the number that actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns and a battalion of cavalry.

The troops marched by the Warrenton Turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. This was doing pretty well for green soldiers, though McDowell afterward testified his disgust at their want of respect for orders, and their habit of stopping when they pleased, to get water or pick berries. The enemy's outposts had fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford. Tyler had been ordered forward to make a reconnoissance, with instructions not to bring on a battle, as it was only intended to make a feint against that part of Beauregard's line, the real attack to be on the south or right wing. But he exceeded his orders, carried on a brisk artillery duel across the stream, brought up first a regiment and then a brigade to support his battery, became engaged with the enemy's infantry, and finally retired after about 60 men on each side had been killed or wounded. The troops opposed to him were commanded by General James Longstreet, and both his force and Tyler's were somewhat broken up.

McDowell, finding that Beauregard was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads in that direction were not good, changed his plan and determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold Johnston, and he had declared at the outset that he could not, with his present force, defeat the combined armies of Beauregard and Johnston. Scott's confident promise that "if Johnston joined Beauregard he should have Patterson on his heels," had not fully reassured him, and he now planned, by striking the enemy's left flank and turning it, to push forward and seize a point on the Manassas Gap Railroad, which would enable him to prevent such a junction of the enemy's forces. At the same time Beauregard was planning a movement with his right to turn McDowell's left, and was afraid Patterson would join him before the movement could be executed. The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded Patterson and with two-fifths of his forces joined Beauregard on Saturday.

While a part of McDowell's force marched directly along the turnpike to the stone bridge, a heavy column turned to the right and crossed the stream at Sudley Ford, two and a half miles above. This column came down upon the Confederate left and began the fighting, Concerning many of the particulars of what took place thereafter, there is dispute among those who should know best; but the essential facts are well established. The Confederate commanders had actually ordered a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. Hunter's attack, as his columns came down the road from Sudley Ford, was conducted with great skill and bravery, and was met with equal courage and skill. Hunter himself was wounded by a fragment of shell, and had to leave the field, his command then devolving on Andrew Porter. The brigades of Sherman and Keyes, which had struck the stream at the stone bridge, found it fordable half a mile above, crossed there, and took part in the conflict. The battle-ground was a plateau, wooded and broken, crossed by a small stream that flowed into Bull Run. The enemy was steadily driven back for nearly a mile, but only retired step by step, and the fighting was constant and destructive. Every field-officer of the 4th Alabama Regiment was shot down, leaving it without a commander. General Bernard E. Bee, of South Carolina, who was killed later in the day, rallied his wavering men by appealing to them to follow the example of Jackson's brigade, "standing there like a stone wall"—which gave General Thomas J. Jackson the name by which he has since been known.

As the Confederate line fell back, it gained higher and more defensive ground, and also received accessions from the right wing. At the same time, the National army as it advanced became separated and fought in detachments. Batteries were thrown forward, ambushed by sharpshooters, taken, retaken, and lost again. The commander of one of them, James B. Ricketts, lay wounded under the guns while the fighting was going on above him and the battery changed hands three times. It is said that Captain Charles Griffin's battery was surprised by the sudden apparition of a regiment marching down upon it from the right, as openly and regularly as if on parade. The guns were loaded with grape and canister, and could have annihilated the regiment, but Major William F. Barry, chief of artillery,

LANDING REINFORCEMENTS ON SANTA ROSA ISLAND.

thought it was the National regiment supporting the battery, and ordered the gunners not to fire. Griffin rode forward to ascertain the truth, but learned it too late. It was a Confederate regiment, and when it suddenly leveled its muskets and fired at point-blank range, the battery was completely disabled in an instant, and the surviving horses went dashing wildly down the hill with the caissons. Johnston says: "If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped."

The better ground held by the Confederates, and the concentration of their troops, were already beginning to tell in their favor, when 5000 more of Johnston's men, brought to the Junction on the railroad, were hurried to the field and sent around to the left to form at right angles to the National right and fall upon it. This movement was executed promptly, about four o'clock in the afternoon, and was completely successful. The National right became broken and confused, and retreated in disorder. A panic arose, and the retreat became a rout, and the rout a race for Washington. Arms and accoutrements were thrown away, drivers of army wagons cut the traces, leaped upon the backs of the horses, and rode through the crowd of fugitives, and guns and trains were abandoned. Portions of the army, however, maintained their organization, and partly successful attempts were made to stop the flight. The Confederates had but little cavalry, and were in no condition to pursue. There was a black-horse regiment from Louisiana that undertook it, but came upon the New York Fire Zouaves, and in a bloody fight lost heavily. On the other side Jefferson Davis, riding to the field half an hour after the battle, saw such a stream of Confederate fugitives that he supposed the day had gone against them. "Battles are not won," he remarked, "where two or three unhurt men are seen leading away one that is wounded." Nevertheless, in that instance the battle had been won by an army whose rear presented exactly that appearance.

The loss of the Confederates was about 1900, that of the Nationals about 1500 in killed and wounded, and about as many more in prisoners. Among the officers killed were General Bee and Colonel Bartow on one side, and Colonel Cameron, of the New York Highland Regiment, on the other. He was a brother of the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. Among the prisoners taken to Richmond were many of the civilians that had come out in carriages to witness the contest, including the Hon. Alfred Ely, member of Congress. Colonel Corcoran, of the New York 69th, was a prisoner. A few of the abandoned guns were brought off the next night; but most of the arms, ammunition, and supplies left on the field and in the roads were secured by the Confederates, who remained in possession of the battlefield for weeks.

General Joseph E. Johnston, in many respects the best witness that has spoken on the Southern side, says: "All the military conditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. . . . Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more than the Federal army lost by defeat." In writing this passage, General Johnston probably took no account of the effect produced in Europe. The early narratives sent there, in which the panic of retreat was made the principal figure, gave the impression that the result arose from constitutional cowardice in Northern men and invincible courage in Southerners. They also gave the impression that the Confederates were altogether superior in generalship; and the effect was deep and long enduring.

At the North, the spectacle of McDowell's army streaming back in disorder to the National capital produced first a shock of surprise, then a sense of disgrace, and then a calm determination to begin the war over again. It was well expressed by a Methodist minister at a camp meeting in Illinois, the Rev. Henry Cox. The news of the battle came while he was preaching, and he closed his sermon with the words: "Brethren, we'd better adjourn this camp meeting, and go home and drill."

CHARLES WILKES.

CHAPTER IV.

BORDER STATES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.

THE disposition of the border slave States was one of the most difficult problems with which the Government had to deal. When the President issued his call for 75,000 men, the Governors of Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, as well as those of North Carolina and Virginia, returned positive refusals. The Governor of Missouri answered, "It is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with." The Governor of Kentucky said: "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." The Governor of Tennessee: "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000, if necessary, for the defence of our rights and those of our brethren." The Governor of North Carolina: "I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina." The Governor of Virginia: "The militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view." Every one of these Governors was a secessionist, with a strong and aggressive party at his back, and yet in each of these States the secessionists were in a minority. It was a serious matter to increase the hostility that beset the National arms on what in another war would have been called neutral ground, and it was also a serious matter to leave the Union element in the northernmost slave States without a powerful support and protection. The problem was worked out differently in each of the States.

At the winter session of the Missouri Legislature an act had been passed that placed the city of St. Louis under the control of Police Commissioners to be appointed by the Governor, Claiborne F. Jackson. Four of his appointees were secessionists, and three of these were leaders of bodies of "minute-men," half-secret armed organizations. The Mayor of the city, who was also one of the Commissioners, was known as a "conditional Union man." Other acts showed plainly the bent of the Legislature. One made it treason to speak against the authority of the Governor, and gave him enlarged powers, while another appropriated $3,000,000 for military purposes, taking the entire school fund for the year, and the accumulations that were to have paid the July interest on the public debt.

A State convention, called to consider the question of secession, met in February, and proved to be overwhelmingly in favor of Missouri's remaining in the Union, though it also expressed a general sympathy with slavery, assumed that the South had wrongs, deprecated the employment of military force on either side, and repeated the suggestion that had been made many times in other quarters for a National convention to amend the Constitution so as to satisfy everybody. The State convention made its report in March, and adjourned till December.

This proceeding appeared to be a great disappointment to Governor Jackson, but he failed to take from it any hint to give up his purpose of getting the State out of the Union. He called an extra session of the Legislature, to convene May 2, for the purpose of "adopting measures to place the State in a proper attitude of defence," and he called out the militia on the 3d of May to go into encampment for six days. There was a large store of arms (more than 20,000 stand) in the St. Louis arsenal, but while he was devising a method and a pretext for seizing them, the greater part of them were suddenly removed, by order from Washington, to Springfield, Ill. The Governor applied to the Confederate Government for assistance, and a quantity of arms and ammunition, including several field-guns, was sent to him in boxes marked "marble." He also ordered a general of the State militia to establish a camp of instruction near the city, and gathered there such volunteer companies as were organized and armed.

General Scott had anticipated all this by sending reinforcements to the little company that held

JAMES MURRAY MASON.

the arsenal, and with them Captain Nathaniel Lyon, of the regular army, a man that lacked no element of skill, courage or patriotism necessary for the crisis. The force was also increased by several regiments of loyal home guards, organized mainly by the exertions of Francis P. Blair, Jr., and mustered into the service of the United States. When the character and purpose of the force that was being concentrated by Jackson became sufficiently evident—from the fact that the streets in the camp were named for prominent Confederate leaders, and other indications—Lyon determined upon prompt and decisive action. This was the more important since the United States arsenal at Liberty had been robbed, and secession troops were being drilled at St. Joseph. With a battalion of regulars and six regiments of the home guard, he marched out in the afternoon of May 10, surrounded the camp, and trained six pieces of artillery on it, and then demanded an immediate surrender, with no terms but a promise of proper treatment as prisoners of war. The astonished commander, a recreant West-Pointer, surrendered promptly, and he and his brigade were disarmed and taken into the city. All the "marble" that had come up from Baton Rouge and been hauled out to the camp only two days before was captured and removed to the arsenal.

The outward march had attracted attention, crowds had gathered on the route, and when Lyon's command were returning with their prisoners they had to pass through a throng of people, among whom were not a few that were striving to create a riot. The outbreak came at length; stones were thrown at the troops and pistol-shots fired into the ranks, when one regiment leveled their muskets and poured a volley or two into the crowd. Three or four soldiers and about 20 citizens were killed in this beginning of the conflict at the West.

Two days later, General William S. Harney arrived in St. Louis and assumed command of the United States forces. He was a veteran of long experience; but ex-Governor Sterling Price, commanding the State forces, entrapped him into a truce that tied his hands, while it left Jackson and Price practically at liberty to pursue their plans for secession. Thereupon the Government removed him, repudiated the truce, and gave the command to Lyon, now made a brigadier-general. After an interview with Lyon in St. Louis (June 11), in which they found it impossible to deceive or swerve him, Price and Jackson went to the capital, Jefferson City, burning railway bridges behind them, and the Governor immediately issued a proclamation declaring that the State had been invaded by United States forces, and calling out 50,000 of the militia to repel the invasion.

The very next day Lyon had an expedition in motion, which reached Jefferson City on the 15th, took possession of the place, and raised the National flag over the Capitol. At his approach the Governor fled, carrying with him the great seal of the State. Learning that he was with Price, gathering a force at Booneville, 50 miles farther up Missouri River, Lyon at once reembarked the greater part of his command, arrived at Booneville on the morning of the 17th, fought and routed the force there, and captured their guns and supplies. The Governor was now a mere fugitive; and the State convention, assembling again in July, declared the State offices vacant, nullified the secession work of the Legislature, and made Hamilton R. Gamble, a Union man, provisional Governor.

The puzzling part of the difficulty in Missouri was now over, for the contest was well defined. Most of the people in the northern part of the State, and most of the population of St. Louis (especially the Germans), were loyal to the National Government; but the secessionists were strong in its southern part, where Price succeeded in organizing a considerable force, which was joined by men from Arkansas and Texas, under Generals Ben. McCulloch and Gideon J. Pillow. General Franz Sigel was sent against them, and at Carthage (July 5) with 1200 men encountered 5000 and inflicted a heavy loss upon them, though he was obliged to retreat. His soldierly qualities in this and other actions gave him one of the sudden reputations that were made in the first year of the war, but obscured by the greater events that followed. His hilarious popularity was expressed in the common greeting, "You fights mit Sigel? Den you trinks mit me!" Lyon, marching from Springfield, Mo., defeated McCulloch at Dug Spring, and a week later (August 10) attacked him again at Wilson's Creek, though McCulloch had been heavily reinforced. The National troops, outnumbered three to one, were defeated; and Lyon, who had been twice wounded early in the action, was shot dead while leading a regiment in a desperate charge. Major S. D. Sturgis conducted the retreat, and this ended the campaign. It was found that General Lyon, who was a bachelor, had bequeathed all he possessed (about $30,000) to the United States Government, to be used for war purposes.

Governor Beriah Magoffin, of Kentucky, convened the Legislature in January, 1861, and asked it to organize the militia, buy muskets, and put the State in a condition of armed neutrality; all of which it refused to do. After the fall of Fort Sumter he called the Legislature together again, evidently hoping that the popular excitement would bring them over to his scheme. But the utmost that could be accomplished was the passage of a resolution by the lower house (May 16) declaring that Kentucky should occupy "a position of strict neutrality," and approving his refusal to furnish troops for the National army. Thereupon he issued a proclamation (May 20) in which he "notified and warned all other States, separate or united, especially the United and Confederate States, that I solemnly forbid any movement upon Kentucky soil." But two days later the Legislature repudiated this interpretation of neutrality, and passed a series of acts intended to prevent any scheme of secession that might be formed. It appropriated $1,000,000 for arms and ammunition, but placed the disbursement of the money and control of the arms in the hands of Commissioners that were all Union men. It amended the militia law so as to require the State Guards to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and finally the Senate passed a resolution declaring that "Kentucky will not sever connection with the National Government, nor take up arms with either belligerent party." As a last resort, Governor Magoffin addressed a letter to President Lincoln, requesting that Kentucky's neutrality be respected and the National forces removed from the State. Mr. Lincoln, in refusing his request, courteously reminded him that the force consisted exclusively of Kentuckians, and told him that he had not met any Kentuckian except himself and the messengers that brought his letter who wanted it removed. To strengthen the first argument, Robert Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, who was a citizen of Kentucky, was made a general and given the command in the State in September. Two months later, a secession convention met at Russellville, in the southern part of the State, organized a provisional government, and sent a full delegation to the Confederate Congress at Richmond, who found no difficulty in being admitted to seats in that body. Kentucky as a State was saved to the Union, but the line of separation was drawn between her citizens, and she contributed to the ranks of both the great contending armies.

Like the Governor of Kentucky, Governor Thomas H. Hicks, of Maryland, had at first



JOHN SLIDELL.

protested against the passage of troops, and had dreamed of making the State neutral. But, unlike Governor Magoffin, he ultimately came out in favor of the Union. The Legislature would not adopt an ordinance of secession, nor call a convention for that purpose; but it passed a bill establishing a board of public safety, giving it extraordinary authority over the military powers of the State, and appointed as such board six secessionists and the Governor. A tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the State. Reverdy Johnson and other prominent Marylanders were bold and active for the National cause; a popular Union convention was held in Baltimore; General Butler with his troops restored the broken communications and held the important centres; and under a suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* some of the more violent secessionists were imprisoned. In May the Governor called for four regiments of volunteers to fill the requisition of the National Government, but requested that they might be assigned to duty in the State. So Maryland remained in the Union, though a considerable number of her citizens entered the ranks of the Confederate army.

In the mountainous regions of western North Carolina and eastern Tennessee, where few slaves were held, there was a strong Union element. In other portions of those States there were many enthusiastic secessionists. But in each State there was a majority against disunion. North Carolina voted on the question of calling a convention to consider the subject, and by a small majority decided for "no convention." Tennessee, on a similar vote, showed a majority of 50,000 against calling a convention. After the fall of Sumter, Governor John W. Ellis, of North Carolina, seized the branch mint at Charlotte and the arsenal at Fayetteville, and called an extra session of the Legislature. This Legislature authorized him to tender the military resources of the State to the Confederate Government, and called a convention to meet May 20, which passed an ordinance of secession by a unanimous vote. The conservative or Union party of Tennessee issued an address on the 18th of April, in which they declared their approval of the Governor's refusal to furnish troops for the National defence, and condemned both secession and coercion, holding that Tennessee should take an independent attitude. This, with the excitement of the time, was enough for the Legislature. In secret session it authorized Governor Isham G. Harris, who was a strong secessionist, to enter into a military league with the Confederate Government, which he immediately did. It also passed an ordinance of secession, to be submitted to a popular vote on the 8th of June. Before that day came, the State was in the possession of Confederate soldiers, and a majority of over 50,000 was obtained for secession.



BEN McCULLOCH.

That portion of the Old Dominion which lay west of the Alleghany Mountains held in 1860 but one-twelfth as many slaves in proportion to its white population as the remainder of the State. And when Virginia passed her ordinance of secession, all but nine of the 55 votes against it were cast by delegates from the mountainous western counties. The people of these counties, having little interest in slavery and its products, and great interests in iron, coal, and lumber, the market for which was in the free States, while their streams flowed into the Ohio, naturally objected to being dragged into the Confederacy. Like the people of East Tennessee, they wanted to secede from secession, and one of their delegates actually proposed it in the convention. In less than a month (May 13) after the passage of the ordinance, a Union convention was held at Wheeling, in which 25 of the western counties were represented; and ten days later, when the election was held, these people voted against seceding. The State authorities sent recruiting officers over the mountains, but they had little success. Some forces were gathered under the direction of General Robert E. Lee and under the immediate command of Colonel Porterfield, who began burning the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Meanwhile Captain George B. McClellan had been made a general and placed in command of Ohio troops. With four regiments he crossed the Ohio on the 26th and went in pursuit of the enemy. His movement at first was retarded by the burned bridges; but these were repaired, large reinforcements were brought over, and in a series of small but brilliant engagements —at Philippi, at Buckhannon, at Rich Mountain, and at Carrick's Ford—he completely routed the Confederates.

Delegates from the counties west of the Alleghanies met at Wheeling (June 11), pronounced the acts of the Richmond Convention null and void, declared all the State offices vacant, and reorganized the government, with Francis H. Pierpont as Governor. A legislature, consisting of members that had been chosen on the 23d of May, met at Wheeling on the 1st of July, and on the 9th it elected two United States Senators. The new State of Kanawha was formally declared created in August. Its Constitution was ratified by the people in May, 1862, and in December of that year it was admitted into the Union. But meanwhile its original and appropriate name had been exchanged for that of West Virginia.



STERLING PRICE.

France and England had made all haste to recognize the Confederates as belligerents, but had not granted them recognition as an established nation, and never did. There was a constant fear, however, that they would, and the Confederate Government did its utmost to bring about such recognition. Messrs. James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, were sent out by that government, as duly accredited ministers to London and Paris, in 1861. They escaped the blockaders at Charleston, reached Havana, and there embarked on the British mail steamer "Trent" for Europe. But Captain Charles Wilkes was on the watch for them with the United States steam frigate "San Jacinto," overhauled the "Trent" in the Bahama Channel (November 8), took off the Confederate commissioners, and allowed the steamer to proceed on her way. He carried his prisoners to Boston, and they were incarcerated in Fort Warren. This action, for which Wilkes received the thanks of Congress, was denounced as an outrage on British neutrality. The entire British public bristled up as one lion, and their Government demanded an apology and the liberation of the prisoners. The American public was unable to see any way out of the dilemma, and was considering whether it would choose humiliation or a foreign war, when our Secretary of State, William H. Seward, solved the problem in a masterly manner. In his formal reply he discussed the whole question with great ability, showing that such detention of a vessel was justified by the laws of war, and there were innumerable British precedents for it; that Captain Wilkes conducted the search in a proper manner; that the commissioners were contraband of war; and that the commander of the "Trent" knew they were contraband of war when he took them as passengers. But as Wilkes had failed to complete the transaction in a legal manner by bringing the "Trent" into port for adjudication in a prize court, it must be repudiated. In other words, by his consideration for the interests and convenience of innocent persons, he had lost his prize. In summing up, Mr. Seward said: "If I declare this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its most essential policy. . . . We

are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do us." The commissioners were released, and sailed for England in January; but the purpose of their mission had been practically thwarted.

But though danger of intervention was thus for the time averted, and the relations between the British Government and our own remained nominally friendly, so far as moral influence and bitterness of feeling could go the Republic had no more determined enemies in the cotton States than in the heart of England. The aristocratic classes rejoiced at anything that threatened to destroy democratic government or make its stability doubtful. They confidently expected to see our country fall into a state of anarchy like that experienced so often by the Spanish-American republics, and were willing to do everything they safely could do to bring it about. The foremost English journals had been predicting such a disaster ever since the beginning of the century, had usual narrowness of provincials, blind to their own ultimate interests, were in the main more bitterly hostile than the mother country.

Louis Napoleon, then the despotic ruler of France, was unfriendly to the United States, and did his utmost to persuade the English Government to unite with him in a scheme of intervention that would probably have secured the division of the country. How far his plans went beyond that result, can only be conjectured; but while the war was still in progress (1864) he threw a French force into Mexico and established there an ephemeral empire with an Austrian Archduke at its head. That the possession of Mexico alone was not his object, is suggested by the fact that when the rebellion was subdued and the secession cause extinct, he withdrew his troops from Mexico and left the Archduke to the fate of other filibusters.

The Russian Government was friendly to the United States throughout the struggle. The Imperial manifesto for the abolition of serfdom in pass through; but it was gradually rendered more and more effective. Large numbers of blockade-runners were captured or driven ashore and wrecked. The profit on a single cargo that passed either way in safety was very great, and special vessels for blockade-running were built in England. The Confederate Government enacted a law providing that half of every cargo thus brought into its ports must consist of arms or ammunition, otherwise vessel and all would be confiscated. This insured a constant supply; and though the Southern soldier was often barefoot and ragged, and sometimes hungry, he never lacked for the most improved weapons that English arsenals could produce, nor ever was defeated for want of powder. A very large part of the bullets that destroyed the lives and limbs of National troops were cast in England and brought over the sea in blockade-runners. Clothing and equipments, too, for the Confederate armies came from the same source. Often when a burial party went

INDIGNITIES SHOWN A MASSACHUSETTS EDITOR FOR PUBLISHING EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY WITH THE SOUTH.

announced it as in progress when a British force burned Washington in 1814, and now were surer of it than ever. Almost our only friends of the London press were the daily *News* and weekly *Spectator*. The commercial classes, in a country that had fought so many commercial wars, were of course delighted at the crippling of a commercial rival whom they had so long hated and feared, no matter what it might cost in the shedding of blood and the destruction of social order. Among the working classes, though they suffered heavily when the supply of cotton was diminished, we had many firm and devoted friends, who saw and felt, however imperfectly, that the cause of free labor was their own cause, no matter on which side of the Atlantic the battlefield might lie.

A few famous Englishmen—notably John Bright and Goldwin Smith—were true to the cause of liberty, and did much to instruct the laboring classes as to the real nature and significance of the conflict. Henry Ward Beecher, then at the height of his powers, went to England and addressed large audiences, enlightening them as to the real nature of American affairs, concerning which most of them were grossly ignorant, and produced an effect that was probably never surpassed by any orator. The Canadians, with the Russia was issued on March 3, 1861, the day before President Lincoln was inaugurated, and this perhaps created a special bond of sympathy.

CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST UNION VICTORIES.

WHEN the war began, the greater part of the small navy of the United States was in distant waters and for some of the ships to receive the news and return, many months were required. Twelve vessels were at home—four in Northern and eight in Southern ports. The navy, like the army, lost many Southern officers by resignation or dismissal. About 300 who had been educated for its service went over to the Confederacy; but none of them took with them the vessels they had commanded. The Government bought all sorts of merchant craft, mounting guns on some and fitting up others as transports, and had gunboats built on ninety-day contracts. It was a most miscellaneous fleet, whose principal strength consisted in the weakness of its adversary. The first purpose was to complete the blockade of Southern ports. This never was made so perfect that no vessel could out, after a battle, as they turned over one after another of the enemy's slain and saw the name of a Birmingham manufacturer stamped upon his buttons, it seemed that they must have been fighting a foreign foe. To pay for these things, the Confederates sent out cotton, tobacco, rice, and the naval stores produced by North Carolina forests. It was obvious from the first that any movement that would shut off a part of this trade, or render it more hazardous, would strike a blow at the insurrection. Furthermore, Confederate privateers were already out, and before the first expedition sailed 16 captured merchantmen had been taken into the ports of North Carolina.

Vessels could enter Pamlico or Albemarle Sound by any one of several inlets, and then make the port of Newbern, Washington, or Plymouth; and the first of several naval and military expeditions was fitted out for the purpose of closing Hatteras Inlet, 13 miles south of Cape Hatteras. Two forts had been erected on the point at the northern side of this inlet, and the project was to capture them.

The expedition was fitted out in Hampton Roads, and was commanded by Flag-officer Silas H. Stringham. It numbered 10 vessels, carrying 158 guns. Two were transport steamers, having

on board about 900 troops commanded by General Benjamin F. Butler, and two were schooners carrying iron surf-boats. It sailed on the 26th of August, 1861, with sealed orders, and early the next morning an attempt was made to land the troops through the surf, at a point three miles from the inlet, but the heavy surf dashed the clumsy iron boats upon the shore, drenching the men, wetting the powder, and endangering everything. About one-third of the troops, however, were landed, with two field-guns, and remained there under protection of the fire from the ships. The forts were garrisoned by about 600 men, and mounted 25 guns. Stringham's flag-ship, the frigate "Minnesota," led off in the attack, followed by the "Susquehanna" and "Wabash," and the guns of the smaller fort were soon silenced. The frigates were at such a distance that they could drop shells into it with their pivot-guns, while the shot from the fort could not reach them. Afterward the larger work, Fort Hatteras, was bombarded, but with no practical effect. But meanwhile the troops that had landed through the surf had taken possession of Fort Clark. The next morning (the 28th) the frigates anchored within reach of Fort Hatteras, and began a steady bombardment. As before, the shot from the fort fell short of the ships, and neither could that from the smooth-bore broadside guns reach the fort; but the pivot-guns and the rifled pieces of one vessel wrought great havoc. One plunging shell went down through a ventilator and narrowly missed exploding the magazine. At the end of three hours the fort surrendered. Its defenders had sufered a loss of about 50 in killed and wounded. They had been reinforced in the night, but a steamer was seen taking away a load of troops just before the surrender. The 700 prisoners were sent on board the flag-ship and carried to New York. The victors had not lost a man. Here a coaling station was established for the blockading fleet. Two of the frigates remained in the Sound, and within a fortnight half a dozen blockade-runners entered the inlet and were captured.

A much larger expedition sailed from Hampton Roads late in October. It consisted of more than 50 vessels—frigates, gunboats, transports, tugs, steam ferry-boats, and schooners—carrying 22,000 men. The fleet was commanded by Flag-officer Samuel F. Du Pont, the troops by General Thos. W. Sherman (who must not be confounded with General William T. Sherman, famous for his march to the sea). Though the expedition sailed with sealed orders, the information leaked out as usual, and while it was on its way the Confederate Secretary of War telegraphed to the commander at Hilton Head to expect it.

A tremendous gale was encountered on the passage, the fleet was scattered, one transport was wrecked, with a loss of seven lives, one gunboat was obliged to throw her broadside battery overboard, a transport threw over her cargo, and one storeship was lost. When the storm was over, only a single gunboat was in sight from the flag-ship. But the fleet slowly came together again, and was joined by some of the frigates that were blockading Charleston harbor. They arrived off the entrance to Port Royal harbor on the 5th and 6th of November. This entrance was protected by two earthworks—Fort Walker on Hilton Head (the south side), and Fort Beauregard on St. Helena Island (the north side). These forts were about two and a half miles apart, and were garrisoned by South Carolina troops.

On the morning of the 7th the order of battle was formed. The main column consisted of 10 vessels, led by the flag-ship "Wabash," and was ordered to attack Fort Walker. Another column of four vessels was ordered to fire upon Fort Beauregard, pass in, and attack the Confederate craft. All were under way soon after breakfast, and were favored by a tranquil sea. The main column, a ship's length apart, steamed in steadily at the rate of six miles an hour, passing Fort Walker at a distance of 800 yards, and delivering a fire of shells and rifled shot. Every gun in the fort that could be brought to bear was worked as rapidly as possible, in a gallant defence. After the line had passed the fort, it turned and steamed out again, passing this time within 600 yards, and delivering fire from the guns on the other side of the vessels. Three times they thus went around in a long ellipse, each time keeping the fort under fire for about 20 minutes. Then the "Bienville," which had the heaviest guns, sailed in closer yet and delivered a fire that dismounted several pieces and wrought dreadful havoc. Meanwhile two or three gunboats had taken a position from which they enfiladed the work, and the flag-ship came to a stand at short range and pounded away steadily. This was more than anything at that stage of the war could endure, and from the mast-head the troops were seen streaming out of the fort and across Hilton Head Island as if in panic. A flag of truce was sent on shore, but there was no one to receive it, and soon after two o'clock the National colors were floating over the fort. The flanking column of vessels had attacked Fort Beauregard; and when the commander of that work saw that Fort Walker was abandoned, he also retreated with his force. The Confederate vessels escaped by running up a shallow inlet. The loss in the fleet was 8 men killed and 23 wounded; that of the Confederates, as reported by their commander, was 11 killed and 52 wounded or missing. The road across Hilton Head Island to a wharf whence the retreating troops were taken to the main land was strewn with arms and accoutrements, and two howitzers were abandoned. The surgeon of the fort had been killed by a shell and buried by a falling parapet. The troops took possession of both forts, repaired and strengthened the works, formed an intrenched camp, and thus gave the Government a permanent foothold on the soil of South Carolina.

The year 1862 opened with indications of lively and decisive work west of the mountains. One of the most gallant was in the region of the Big Sandy River in eastern Kentucky, where Humphrey Marshall had gathered a Confederate force of about 2500 (mostly Kentuckians) at Paintville. Colonel James A. Garfield (afterward President), in command of 1800 infantry and 300 cavalry, drove him out of Paintville, pursued him beyond Prestonburg, came up with him at noon of January 10, and fought him till night, when Marshall retreated under cover of the darkness, leaving his dead on the field.

In the autumn of 1861 a Confederate force, under General Felix K. Zollicoffer, had been pushed forward by way of Knoxville to eastern Kentucky, but was defeated at Camp Wildcat, October 21, by 7000 men under General Schoepff, and fell back to Mill Springs at the head of navigation on the Cumberland. Zollicoffer soon crossed to the northern bank and fortified in the angle between the river and Fishing Creek. The National forces in the vicinity were commanded by General George H. Thomas, who watched Zollicoffer so closely that when the latter was told by his superiors he should not have crossed the river he could only answer that it was now too late to return. As Zollicoffer was only a journalist, with more zeal than military knowledge, General George B. Crittenden was sent to supersede him. Thomas was slowly advancing through rainy weather, over heavy roads, to drive this force out of the State, and had reached Logan's cross-roads, within 10 miles of the Confederate camp, when Crittenden determined to move out and attack him. The battle began early on the morning of January 19, 1862. Thomas rapidly brought up one detachment after another and threw them into line. The attack was directed mainly against the National left, where the fighting was obstinate and bloody. Here Zollicoffer, thinking the 4th Kentucky was a Confederate regiment firing upon its friends, rode forward to correct the supposed mistake, and was shot dead by its Colonel, Speed S. Fry. When, at length, the right of the Confederate line had been pressed back and broken, a steady fire having been kept up on the centre, the 9th Ohio Regiment made a charge on its left flank, and the whole line was routed. The Confederates took refuge in their intrenchments, where Thomas swiftly pursued and closely invested them. But in the night they managed to cross the river, leaving behind their wounded, 12 guns, all their horses, mules, and wagons, and a large amount of stores. In the further retreat two of the Confederate regiments scattered to their homes, while a large number from other regiments deserted. The National loss in killed and wounded was 246; that of the Confederates, 471. This action is variously called the battle of Fishing Creek and the battle of Mill Springs.

SLEEPING QUARTERS OF THE RHODE ISLAND REGIMENT IN THE PATENT OFFICE, WASHINGTON.

When General Henry W. Halleck was placed in command of the Department of Missouri, in November, 1861, he divided it into districts, giving to General Ulysses S. Grant the District of Cairo, which included Southern Illinois, the counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau, and all of Kentucky that lies west of Cumberland River. Where the Tennessee and the Cumberland enter Kentucky from the south they are about 10 miles apart, and here the Confederates had erected

works to command the rivers—Fort Henry on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland. They had also fortified the high bluffs at Columbus, on the Mississippi, 20 miles below the mouth of the Ohio, and Bowling Green, on the Big Barren. The general purpose was to establish a military frontier with a strong line of defence from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi.

A fleet of iron-clad gunboats had been prepared by the United States Government for service on the Western rivers, some of them being built new, while others were altered freight-boats.

General Grant asked Halleck's permission to capture Fort Henry, and after considerable delay received it on the 30th of January. That work was garrisoned by 3000 men under General Lloyd Tilghman. On the morning of February 2 the fleet of four iron-clad and two wooden gunboats, commanded by Flag-officer Andrew H. Foote, steamed up the Ohio to Paducah, thence up the Tennessee, and by daylight the next morning was within sight of the fort. Grant's land force was to co-operate by an attack in the rear, but it did not arrive in time. The gunboats moved up to within 600 yards, and opened a bombardment, to which the guns of the fort responded, and the firing was kept up for an hour. The "Essex" received a shot in her boiler by which many men were wounded or scalded. Otherwise the fleet, though struck many times, was not seriously injured. On the other hand, the fire from the gunboats knocked the sand-bags about, dismounted seven guns, brought down the flagstaff, and, together with the bursting of a rifled gun in the fort, created a panic. All but about 100 of the garrison fled, leaving General Tilghman with the sick and a single company of artillerists, and after serving a gun with his own hands as long as possible, he surrendered. The regret of the victors at the escape of the garrison was more than counterbalanced by their gratification at the behavior of the gunboats in their first serious trial. After the surrender, three of the gunboats proceeded up Tennessee River to the head of navigation, destroyed the railroad bridge, and captured a large amount of stores.

In consequence of the battle of Mill Springs and the fall of Fort Henry, the Confederate General Simon B. Buckner, who was at Bowling Green with about 10,000 men, abandoned that place and joined his forces to those in Fort Donelson. General Ormsby M. Mitchel, by a forced march, promptly took possession of Bowling Green with National troops; and General Grant immediately made dispositions for the capture of Fort Donelson. This work, situated at a bend of the river, was on high ground, enclosed about 100 acres, and had also a strong water-battery. The land-side was protected by slashed timber and rifle-pits, as well as by the naturally broken ground. The gunboats went down the Tennessee, and up the Cumberland, and with them a portion of Grant's force to be used in attacking the water front. The fort contained about 20,000 men, commanded by General John B. Floyd. Grant's main force left the neighborhood of Fort Henry on the morning of February 12, a portion marching straight on Fort Donelson, while the remainder made a slight detour to the south, to strike the Confederate left. They chose positions around the fort unmolested that afternoon, and the next morning the fighting began. After an artillery duel, an attempt was made to storm the works near the centre of the line, but it was a failure and entailed severe loss. The gunboats and the troops with them had not yet come up, and the attack was suspended for the day. A cold storm set in, with sleet and snow.

Next morning the fleet appeared, landed the troops and supplies three miles below the fort, and then moved up to attack the batteries. It was a desperate fight. The plunging shot from the fort struck the gunboats in their most vulnerable part, and made ugly wounds. But they stood to the work manfully, and had silenced one battery when the steering apparatus of two of the gunboats was shot away, while a gun on another had burst, and the flag-officer was wounded. The flag-ship had been struck 59 times, and the others from 20 to 40, when they all dropped down the stream and out of the fight. They had lost 54 men killed or wounded. But the naval attack had served to prevent an immediate sortie, and so perhaps ultimately saved the victory for Grant.

That night a council of war was held within the fort, and it was determined to attack the besiegers in the morning with the entire force, in hopes either to defeat them completely or at least to turn back their right wing, and thus open a way for retreat. The fighting began early in the morning. Grant's right wing, all but surprised, was pressed heavily and borne back, the enemy passing through and plundering McClernand's camps. Buckner sallied out and attacked on the left with much less vigor and with no success but as a diversion, and the fighting extended all along the line, while the Confederate cavalry were endeavoring to gain the National rear. Grant was imperturbable through it all, and when he saw that the attack had reached its height, he ordered a counter attack on the right, which was executed by the division of Lew Wallace, while that of C. F. Smith stormed the works on the left. Smith rode beside the color-bearer, and in the face of a murderous fire that struck down 400 men, his troops rushed forward over every obstruction, brought up field-guns and enfiladed the works, drove out the defenders, and took possession.

Another bitterly cold night followed, but Grant moved up reinforcements to the positions he had gained, while the wounded were looked after. Within the fort another council of war was held. Floyd declared it would not do for him to fall into the hands of the Government, as he was accused of defrauding it while in office. So he turned over the command to General Gideon J. Pillow. But that General said he also had strong reasons for not wanting to be a prisoner, so he turned it over to General Buckner. With as many of their men as could be taken on two small steamers, Floyd and Pillow embarked in the darkness and went up the river to Nashville. The cavalry, under General N. B. Forrest, also escaped, and a considerable number of men from all the commands managed to steal away unobserved. In the morning Buckner hung out a white flag, and sent a letter to Grant, proposing that commissioners be appointed to arrange terms of capitulation. Grant's answer not only made him famous, but gave an impetus and direction to the whole war: "No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner, in a petulant and ill-considered note, at once surrendered the fort and his entire command. This numbered about 14,000 men; and 400 that were sent to reinforce him were also captured.

General Pillow estimated the Confederate loss in killed and wounded at 2000. No undisputed figures are attainable on either side. Grant began the siege with about 15,000 men, which reinforcements had increased to 27,000 at the time of the surrender. His losses were about 2000, and many of the wounded had perished of cold. The long, artificial line of defence, from the mountains to the Mississippi, was now swept away, and the Confederates abandoned Nashville.

When the news was flashed through the loyal States, and bulletins were posted up with enumeration of prisoners, guns, and small arms captured, salutes were fired, joy-bells were rung, flags were displayed, and people asked one another, "Who is this Grant, and where did he come from?"—for they saw that a new genius had suddenly risen upon the earth.

Both before and after the defeat and death of General Lyon at Wilson's Creek (August, 1861), there was irregular and predatory warfare in Missouri. Among the minor engagements, one at Lexington in September was notable, where 2800 men, commanded by Colonel James A. Mulligan, gallantly held the place against a Confederate force of more than 14,000, commanded by General Price, until the water-supply was cut off and



CAPTAIN GEORGE W. WILLSON'S CO. (E, 2D REGT. N. Y. VOLS.) CARRYING THE BODY OF LIEUTENANT GREBLE FROM THE FIELD, AT BIG BETHEL, AMIDST THE FIRE OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

surrender became inevitable. Price's force then crossed the State, to the southwest corner. General John C. Frémont, who commanded the department, believing that Price was near Springfield, gave orders for the concentration at that place of all the National forces in Missouri. But Price was not there, and in November Frémont was superseded by General Halleck, some of whose subordinate commanders, especially General John Pope, made rapid movements and did good service in capturing newly recruited regiments that were on their way to join Price.

Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of 12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price, who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark mountains, intrenched, and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn was sent to take command of the Confederate force, arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but 14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians, recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike. On March 5, 1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though reinforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch, was more successful; that General was killed and his troops were driven from the field. In the night Curtis re-formed and strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and characteristic manœuvres. To bring his division into its place on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again, till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the enemy's right. Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis' whole line made a curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National loss in this action was over 1300, Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the ground, effective pursuit was impracticable.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER.

The Confederate Government had made a treaty with some of the tribes in the Indian Territory, and had taken into its service more than 4000 Indians, whom the stories of Bull Run and Wilson's Creek had apparently impressed with the belief that they would have little to do but scalp the wounded and rob the dead. At Pea Ridge these red men exhibited their old-time terror of artillery, and though they took a few scalps they were so disgusted at being asked to face half a hundred well-served cannon that they were almost useless to their allies, and thenceforth they took no further part in the war. It is a notable fact that in the wars on this continent the Indians have only been employed on the losing side, which appears to show that, though savages may add to the horrors of war, they cannot determine its results for civilized people; nor can irresponsible guerilla bands, of which there were many at the West, all in the service of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

THE Crescent City was by far the largest and richest in the Confederacy. In 1860 it had a population of nearly 170,000, while Richmond, Mobile, and Charleston together had fewer than two-thirds as many. In 1860–61 it shipped $25,000,000 worth of sugar and $92,000,000 worth of cotton, its export trade in these articles being larger than that of any other city in the world. Moreover, its strategic value in that war was greater than that of any other point in the Southern States. The many mouths of the Mississippi, and the frequency of violent gales in the Gulf, rendered it difficult to blockade commerce between that great river and the ocean; but the possession of this lowest commercial point on the stream would shut it off effectively, and would go far toward securing possession all the way to Cairo. This would cut the Confederacy in two, and make it difficult to bring supplies from Texas and Arkansas to feed the armies in Tennessee and



FEDERAL HILL, BALTIMORE (TAKEN FROM THE NORTH SIDE BASIN), OCCUPIED BY THE TROOPS OF GENERAL BUTLER'S COMMAND.

Virginia. Moreover, a great city is in itself a serious loss to one belligerent and a capital prize to the other.

As soon as it became evident that war was being waged against the United States in dead earnest, and that it was likely to be prolonged, these considerations presented themselves to the Government, and a plan was matured for capture of the largest city in the territory of the insurgents.

The defences consisted of two forts, on either side of the stream, 30 miles above the head of the five great passes, through which it flows to the Gulf. The smaller, Fort St. Philip, on the left bank, was of earth and brick, with flanking batteries, and all its guns were *en barbette*—on the top, in plain sight. These numbered about 40. Fort Jackson, on the right bank, mounted 75 guns, 14 of which were in bomb-proof casemates. Both of these works had been built by the United States Government. They were now garrisoned by about 1500 Confederate soldiers, commanded by General Johnson K. Duncan. Above them lay a Confederate fleet of 15 vessels, including an iron-clad ram and a large floating battery that was covered with railroad iron. Below the forts a heavy chain was stretched across the river, at first supported by a row of enormous logs, which was swept away by a freshet. The logs were then replaced by hulks anchored at intervals across the stream, and the chain ran over their decks, while its ends were fastened to great trees. Sharpshooters patrolled the banks between the forts and the head of the passes.

The idea at Washington was that the forts could be reduced by raining into them a shower of enormous shells, to be thrown high into the air, come down almost perpendicularly, and explode on striking. Accordingly, the first care was to make the mortars and shells, and provide the craft to carry them. Twenty-one mortars were cast, mounted on as many schooners. They threw shells 13 inches in diameter, weighing 285 pounds, and when one of them was discharged, the concussion was so great that no man could stand close by without being deafened. Platforms projecting beyond the decks were therefore provided, for the gunners to step out upon just before firing.

The remainder of the fleet, as finally made up, consisted of six sloops of war, sixteen gunboats, and five other vessels, besides transports carrying 15,000 troops commanded by General B. F. Butler. The whole number of guns was over 200. The flag-ship "Hartford" was a wooden steam sloop of war, 1000 tons burden, with a length of 225 feet, and a breadth of 44 feet. She carried 22 nine-inch guns, two twenty-pounder Parrott guns, and a rifled gun on the forecastle, while her fore and main tops were furnished with howitzers and surrounded with boiler iron. The "Brooklyn," "Richmond," "Pensacola," "Portsmouth," and "Oneida," were similar to the "Hartford." The "Colorado" was larger. The "Mississippi" was a large side-wheel steamer.

This was the most powerful expedition that had ever sailed under the American flag, and the man that was chosen to command it, Captain David G. Farragut, was as unknown to the public as Ulysses S. Grant had been. Farragut was now 60 years of age, being one of the oldest men that took part in the war, and he had been in the navy half a century. He sailed the Pacific with Commodore Porter years before Grant and Sherman were born, and participated in the bloody encounter of the "Essex" and "Phœbe" in the harbor of Valparaiso. He was especially familiar with the Gulf of Mexico.

But it was not till January, 1862, that he was appointed to command the New Orleans expedition. He sailed from Hampton Roads, February 2, in the flag-ship "Hartford." He had no faith in the mortars, and would rather have gone without them; but they had been ordered before he was consulted, and were under the command of his personal friend Porter.

A considerable portion of March was gone before enough of the fleet had reached the rendezvous to begin operations. The first difficulty was to get into the river. The mortar schooners went in by Pass à l'Outre without difficulty; but to get the "Brooklyn," "Mississippi," and "Pensacola" over the bar at Southwest Pass required immense labor and occupied two or three weeks. The "Mississippi" was dragged over with her keel plowing a furrow a foot deep in the river bottom, and the "Colorado" could not be taken over at all.

The masts of the mortar schooners were dressed off with bushes, to render them indistinguishable from the trees on shore. The schooners were then towed up to a point within range, and moored where the woods hid them, so that they could not be seen from the forts. Lieutenant F. H. Gerdes, of the Coast Survey, had made a careful map of that part of the river and its banks, and elaborate calculations by which the mortars were to be fired with a computed aim, none of the gunners being able to see what they fired at. They opened fire on April 18, and in a bombardment of six days and nights, 6000 enormous shells—800 tons of iron—were thrown high into the air, and fell in and around the forts. For nearly a week the garrison saw one of Porter's aerolites dropping upon them every minute and a half. They demolished buildings, they tore up the ground, they cut the levee and let in water, and they killed and mangled men; but they did not render the forts untenable nor silence their guns. The return fire sank one of the mortar boats and disabled a steamer. Within the forts about 50 men were killed or wounded—one for every 16 tons of iron thrown.



EVACUATION OF THE VILLAGE OF HAMPTON, VA., ON THE JAMES RIVER, BY THE FEDERAL TROOPS UNDER GENERAL BUTLER, IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE CONFEDERATES IN FORCE.

The Confederates had prepared flat-boats loaded with dry wood smeared with tar and turpentine; and they now set fire to them one after another, and let them float down the stream. But Farragut sent out boats' crews, who grappled them with hooks and either towed them ashore or conducted them past the fleet and let them float out to sea.

In his General Orders Farragut gave so many minute directions that it would seem as if he must have anticipated every possible contingency, and in addition to his own suggestions he called upon his men to exercise their wits for the occasion, and the crews originated many wise precautions. Farragut's plan was to run by the forts, damaging them as much as possible by a rapid fire as he passed, then destroy or capture the Confederate fleet, and proceed up the river and lay the city under his guns.

The time fixed upon for starting was just before moonrise (3.30 o'clock) in the morning of April 24. On the night of the 20th two gunboats went up the river, and a boat's crew from one of them, under Lieutenant Charles H. B. Caldwell, boarded one of the hulks and cut the chain, under a heavy fire, making an opening sufficient for the fleet to pass through. Near midnight of the 23d the Lieutenant went up again in a gunboat, to make sure that the passage was still open; and this time the enemy not only fired on him but sent down blazing rafts and lighted enormous piles of wood near the ends of the chain. The question of moonrise was no longer of the slightest importance, since it was as light as day for miles around. At half-past three the whole fleet was in motion.

The sloop "Portsmouth" and Porter's gunboats moved up to a point where they could engage the water-battery of Fort Jackson while the fleet was going by. The first division of eight vessels, commanded by Captain Theodorus Bailey, passed through the opening, unmindful of a fire from third. The "Pensacola" steamed slowly by the forts, doing great execution with her rifled guns, and in turn sustaining the heaviest loss in the fleet—37 men. The "Mississippi" sailed up in handsome style, encountered the Confederate ram "Manassas," and received a blow that disabled her machinery. But in turn she riddled the ram and set it on fire, so that it drifted away and blew up. The other vessels of this division, with various fortune, passed the forts and participated in the naval battle.

The second division consisted of three sloops of war, the flag-ship leading. The "Hartford" received and returned a heavy fire from the forts, got aground on a shoal while trying to avoid a fire-raft, and a few minutes later had another raft pushed against her, which set her on fire. A portion of the crew was detailed to extinguish the flames, and all the while her guns were loaded and fired as steadily as if nothing had happened. Presently she was got afloat again, and proceeded up the river, when suddenly through the smoke, as it was lighted by the flashes of the guns, she steamboats and drove another ashore before they came up with the advance divisions of the fleet. The entire loss had been 37 killed and 147 wounded.

Captain Bailey, in the "Cayuga," still keeping the lead, found a regiment encamped at Quarantine Station, and compelled its surrender. On the morning of the 25th the Chalmette batteries, three miles below the city, were silenced by a fire from the sloops, and a little later the city itself was at the mercy of their guns. At noon Captain Bailey, accompanied only by Lieutenant George H. Perkins, with a flag of truce, went ashore, passed through an excited crowd, and demanded of the Mayor that the city be surrendered unconditionally and the Louisiana State flag at once hauled down from the staff on the City Hall. Bailey raised the Stars and Stripes over the Mint; but the Mayor at first refused to strike his colors, and set out upon an elaborate course of letter-writing, which was of no consequence except as it furnished another instance of the fatuity that grasps at a shadow after the substance is gone.



THE WINANS STEAM GUN, CAPTURED BY GENERAL BUTLER'S COMMAND NEAR THE RELAY HOUSE, MD.

Fort Jackson, ran over to the east bank and poured grape and canister into Fort St. Philip as they sailed by, and ten minutes afterward found themselves engaged at close quarters with 11 Confederate vessels. Bailey's flag-ship, the "Cayuga," was attacked by three at once, all trying to board her. He sent an 11-inch shot through one of them, and she ran aground and burst into a blaze. With the swivel gun on his forecastle he drove off the second; and he was preparing to board the third when the "Oneida" and "Varuna" came to his assistance. The "Oneida" ran at full speed into one Confederate vessel, cutting it nearly in two and in an instant making it a shapeless wreck. She fired into others, and then went to the assistance of the "Varuna," which had been attacked by two, rammed by both of them, and was now at the shore, where she sank in a few minutes. But she had done effective work before she perished, crippling one enemy so that she surrendered to the "Oneida," driving another ashore, and exploding a shell in the boiler of a saw a steamer filled with men bearing down upon her. But a ready gun planted a huge shell in the mysterious stranger, which exploded, and she disappeared. The "Brooklyn," after getting out of her course and running upon one of the hulks, finally got through, met a large Confederate steamer and gave it a broadside that set it on fire, and then poured such a rain of shot into St. Philip that the bastions were cleared in a minute, and in the flashes the gunners could be seen running to shelter. A Confederate gunboat that attacked her received 11 shells from her, all of which exploded; and it then ran ashore in flames. The "Richmond" sailed through steadily and worked her guns regularly, meeting with small loss.

The third division consisted of six gunboats. Two of them became entangled among the hulks, and failed to pass. Another received a shot in her boiler, which compelled her to drop down stream and out of the fight. The other three went through in gallant style, and burned two

A letter written by Lieutenant Perkins gave a vivid description of this incident, which is interesting in that it exhibits the effect upon the first people of the South who realized the possibility of their being conquered. "Among the crowd were many women and children, and the women were shaking rebel flags and being rude and noisy. As we advanced, the mob followed us in a very excited state. They gave three cheers for Jeff. Davis and Beauregard, and three groans for Lincoln. Then they began to throw things at us, and shout 'Hang them! Hang them!' We reached the City Hall in safety, and there found the Mayor and Council. They seemed in a very solemn state of mind; though I must say, from what they said, they did not impress me as having much mind about anything. The Mayor said he had nothing to do with the city, as it was under martial law, and we were obliged to wait till General Lovell could arrive. In about half an hour this gentleman appeared. He was very pompous in his manner, and silly and airy in his remarks.

He had about 15,000 troops under his command, and said he would 'never surrender,' but would withdraw his troops from the city as soon as possible, when the city would fall into the hands of the Mayor, and he could do as he pleased with it. The mob outside had by this time become perfectly infuriated. They kicked at the doors, and swore they would have us out and hang us. Every person about us who had any sense of responsibility was frightened for our safety. As soon as the mob found out that General Lovell was not going to surrender, they swore they would have us out any way; but Pierre Soule and some others went out and made speeches to them, and kept them on one side of the building, while we went out at the other and were driven to the wharf in a close carriage. The Mayor told the flag-officer this morning that the city was in the hands of the mob, and was at our mercy, and that he might blow it up or do with it as he chose."

Farragut appointed an hour for prayer and thanksgiving on the 26th, and while the services were being conducted in the fleet four citizens mounted to the roof of the Mint, tore down the United States flag, and dragged it through the streets. The leader in this exploit was afterward tried for it, by order of General Butler, and hanged.

On the night of the 24th, by order of the authorities in the city, the torch was applied to everything, except buildings, that could be of use to the victors, and 15,000 bales of cotton, heaps of coal and wood, dry-docks, a dozen steamboats, and as many cotton-ships, and an unfinished iron-clad ram, were all burned. Barrels were rolled out and broken open, the levee ran with molasses, and the poor people carried away the sugar in their baskets and aprons. The Governor called upon the people of the State to burn their cotton, and 250,000 bales were destroyed.

Butler had witnessed the passage of the forts, and he now hurried over his troops and invested St. Philip on the land side, while Porter sent some of his mortar boats to a bay in the rear of Fort Jackson, and in a few days both works were surrendered. Farragut sent 250 marines into the city to take formal possession and guard the public buildings. Butler arrived there with his forces on the 1st of May, and it was then turned over to him, and it remained in Federal possession throughout the war.

At the first news of this achievement the people of the North hardly appreciated what had been accomplished. But as they gradually learned the particulars, and saw that in fighting obstructions, fire-rafts, forts, rams, and fleet, and conquering them all, Farragut had done what neither Nelson nor any other great admiral had ever done before, they felt that the country had produced a worthy companion for the victor of Donelson.

MAJOR TAYLOR, OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY, ESCORTED BACK THROUGH THE LINES AFTER HIS DELIVERY, UNDER A FLAG OF TRUCE, OF LETTERS FROM GENERAL BEAUREGARD TO GENERAL SCOTT, AND FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN, JULY 8, 1861.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC.

WHILE the great naval expedition was approaching New Orleans, the waters of Hampton Roads, from which it had sailed, were the scene of a battle that revolutionized the naval armaments of the world. When at the outbreak of the war the navy-yard at Norfolk, Va., was abandoned, with an attempt at its destruction, the steam-frigate "Merrimac" was set on fire at the wharf. Her upper works were burned, and her hull sank. There had been long hesitation about removing any of the valuable property from this navy-yard, because the action of Virginia was uncertain, and it was hoped that a mark of confidence in her people would tend to keep her in the Union. The day that Sumter was fired upon, peremptory orders had been issued for the removal of the "Merrimac" to Philadelphia, and steam was raised and every preparation made for her sailing. But the officer in command, would not permit her to move, and two days later she was burned. The Confederates raised the hull, repaired the machinery, and covered it with a steep roof of wrought iron five inches thick, with a lining of oak seven inches thick. The sides were also plated with iron, and the bow was armed with an iron ram, something like a huge plowshare. In the water she had the appearance of a house submerged to the eaves, with an immense gun looking out at each of 10 dormer windows.

But it was March, 1862, before she was ready for action. The command was given to Franklin Buchanan, who had resigned a commission in the United States navy. On the 8th of March, accompanied by two gunboats, she went out to raise the blockade of James and Elizabeth rivers by destroying the wooden war-vessels in Hampton Roads. Her first victim was the frigate "Cumberland," which gave her a broadside that would have riddled a wooden vessel through and through.

Some of the shot entered her open ports, killed or wounded 19 men, and broke two of her guns; but all that struck the armor bounded off like peas. Rifled shot from the "Merrimac" raked the "Cumberland," and then she ran into her so that her iron prow cut a great gash in the side. The "Cumberland" at once began to settle; but the crew stood by their guns, firing broadside after broadside without producing any impression on the iron monster, and receiving in return shells and solid shot that made sickening havoc. The commander, Lieutenant Morris, refused to surrender; and at the end of 45 minutes, when the water was at the gun-deck, the crew leaped overboard and with the help of the boats got ashore, while the frigate heeled over and sank. Her topmasts projected above the surface, and her flag was flying. While this was going on, three Confederate steamers came down and attacked the "Congress" with such effect that her commander tried to run her ashore. Having finished the "Cumberland," the "Merrimac" came up and opened a deliberate attack on the "Congress," and finally set her on fire, when the crew escaped in their boats. She burned for several hours, and in the night blew up. Of the other National vessels in the Roads, one got aground in water too shallow for the "Merrimac" to approach her, and the others were not drawn into the fight.

The next morning the "Merrimac" came down from Norfolk to finish up the fleet, but found that a new antagonist had arrived. When they first saw it, her men called it "a cheese box on a raft." The idea of a revolving tower or turret for heavy guns was at least half a century old, and had been set forth by several inventors. But it was never put into practical use till the National Government contracted with John Ericsson to build an iron-clad with such a turret and a deck rising hardly more than a foot above the water. She was built in about a hundred days, at Brooklyn, N. Y., was named "Monitor," and was placed under the command of Captain John L. Worden. He hurried her down to Hampton Roads, in a stormy and dangerous passage, and on the very morning after his arrival met and fought the "Merrimac." Buchanan had been wounded in the action of the previous day, and Lieutenant Jones now commanded the Confederate iron-clad. The "Monitor" placed herself between the wooden ships and their enemy, and a fight of four hours ensued. The shot of the "Merrimac" glanced off as harmlessly from the "Monitor's" turret and decks as the "Cumberland's" broadsides had from hers. One shell, however, struck the little square pilot-house at an instant when Captain Worden had his eyes at the sight-hole. The explosion temporarily blinded him, and the command fell upon Lieutenant Greene. It was not known how much damage, if any, the great guns, fired sometimes when the vessels almost touched each other, had inflicted upon the "Merrimac;" but she withdrew that afternoon to Norfolk, and did not come down to fight again. It was said that she had broken off her prow when she rammed the "Cumberland," and but for this she might have proved a more formidable antagonist; though the "Monitor" had the advantage of drawing less water, and in some parts of the Roads could steam quite around the "Merrimac."

In May, when Norfolk was captured, an attempt was made to take the "Merrimac" up James River; but she got aground, and was finally abandoned and blown up. When the Confederates refitted her they re-christened her "Virginia," but the original name sticks to her in history. In December of that year the "Monitor" attempted to go to Beaufort, N. C., towed by a steamer; but she foundered in a gale off Cape Hatteras and went to the bottom, carrying with her a dozen of the crew.

THE FIRST MICHIGAN REGIMENT AND THE ELLSWORTH ZOUAVES IN THE INTRENCHMENTS AT ALEXANDRIA, VA.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

WHEN the first line that the Confederates had attempted to establish from the mountains to the Mississippi was broken by the battle of Mill Springs and the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, their forces at Columbus were withdrawn down the river to the historic latitude of 36° 30′. Here the Mississippi makes a great sigmoid curve.

In the first bend is Island No. 10 (the islands are numbered from the mouth of the Ohio southward); and at the second bend, on the Missouri side, is New Madrid. Both of these places were fortified, under the direction of General Leonidas Polk. A floating dock was brought up from New Orleans, converted into a floating battery, and anchored near the island; and there were also eight gunboats commanded by Commodore George N. Hollins. The works on the island were supplemented by batteries on the Tennessee shore, back of which were impassable swamps. Thus the Mississippi was sealed, and a position established for the left (or western extremity) of a new line of defence.

Early in March, 1862, a National army commanded by General John Pope moved down the west bank of the Mississippi against New Madrid. A reconnoissance in force demonstrated that the place could be carried by storm, but could not be held, since the Confederate gunboats were able (the river being then at high water) to enfilade both the works and the approaches. General Pope went into camp two miles from the river, and sent to Cairo for siege-guns, meanwhile sending three regiments and a battery, under General J. B. Plummer, around to a point below New Madrid, where in the night they sunk trenches for the field-guns and placed sharpshooters at the edge of the bank, and next day opened a troublesome fire on the passing gunboats and transports. Four guns were forwarded promptly from Cairo, and that night Pope's forces placed them in position. The enemy's first intimation of what was going on was obtained from a bombardment that opened at daylight. The next night, in the midst of a heavy storm, New Madrid was evacuated. The National forces took possession, and immediately changed the positions of the guns so as to command the river. On the 16th five Confederate gunboats attacked these batteries; but after one boat had been sunk and some of the others damaged, they drew off. On the 16th and 17th the National fleet of gunboats, under Commodore Andrew H. Foote, engaged the batteries on Island No. 10, and a hundred heavy guns were in action at once. The artillery men stood to their work manfully, many of them in water ankle deep, and though enormous shells exploded within the forts, and one gun burst and another was dismounted, the works were not reduced. A gun that burst in the fleet killed or wounded 14 men. The attack was renewed from day to day, but with no decisive effect.

At the suggestion of General Schuyler Hamilton, a canal was cut across the peninsula above New Madrid. This task was confided to a regiment of engineers commanded by Colonel Josiah W. Bissell, and was completed in 19 days. The length of the canal was 12 miles, and half of the distance lay through a thick forest standing in deep water. A channel 50 feet wide and 4 feet deep was secured, through which transports could be passed.

On the night of April 4 the gunboat "Carondelet," Commander Henry Walke, ran down past the batteries of Island No. 10, escaping serious damage, and in the night of the 6th the "Pittsburgh" performed the same feat. With the help of these to silence the batteries on the opposite shore, Pope crossed in force on the 7th, and moved rapidly down the little peninsula. The greater part of the Confederate troops that had been holding the island now attempted to escape southward, but were caught between Pope's army and an impassable swamp, and surrendered. General Pope's captures in the entire campaign were 3 generals, 273 officers, and 6700 men, besides 158 guns, 7000 muskets, 1 gunboat, a floating battery, 6 steamers, and a considerable quantity of stores.

On the very day of this bloodless victory, a little log church in southwestern Tennessee gave name to the bloodiest battle that has been fought west of the Alleghanies—Chickamauga being rather *in* the mountains. At Corinth, in northern Mississippi, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad crosses the Mobile and Ohio. This gave that point strategic importance, and it was fortified accordingly and held by a large Confederate force, which was commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston (who must not be confounded with the Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston). General Grant, who had nearly 40,000 men, and was about to be joined by General Don Carlos Buell coming from Nashville with as many more, proposed to move against Corinth and capture the place.

On Sunday, April 6, Grant's main force was at Pittsburgh Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, 20 miles north of Corinth. One division under General Lew Wallace was at Crump's Landing, five miles farther north. The advance division of Buell's army had reached the river, opposite the landings, and the remainder was a march behind. For some days Johnston had been moving northward, and early on the morning of the 6th he made a sudden and heavy attack. Grant's line was about two miles long, the left resting on Lick Creek, an impassable stream that flows into the Tennessee above Pittsburgh Landing, and the right on Owl Creek, which flows in below. General Benjamin M. Prentiss' division was on the left, General John A. McClernand's in the centre, and General William T. Sherman's on the right. General Stephen A. Hurlbut's was in reserve on the left, and General C. F. Smith's (now commanded by W. H. L. Wallace) on

WILLIAM SPRAGUE,
THE WAR GOVERNOR OF RHODE ISLAND.

the right. There were no intrenchments. The ground was undulating, with patches of woods alternating with cleared fields, some of which were under cultivation and others abandoned and overgrown with bushes. A ridge, on which stood Shiloh Church, formed an important key-point in Sherman's front.

General Grant, in his headquarters at Savannah, down the river, heard the firing while he was at breakfast, and hurried up to Pittsburgh Landing. He had expected to be attacked, if at all, at Crump's Landing, and he now ordered Lew Wallace with his 5000 men to leave that place and march at once to the right of the line at Shiloh; but Wallace took the wrong road, and did not arrive till dark. Neither did General William Nelson's advance division of General Buell's army cross the river till evening.

The attack began at daybreak, and was made with tremendous force and in full confidence of success. The nature of the ground made regularity of movement impossible, and the battle was rather a series of assaults by separate columns. The heaviest attacks fell upon Sherman and McClernand, whose men stood up to the work with unflinching courage. But they were driven back by overwhelming numbers, which the Confederate commanders poured upon them without the slightest regard to losses. The 6th Mississippi Regiment lost 300 men out of its total of 425, and the 18th Louisiana lost 207. Sherman's men lost their camps in the morning, and retired upon one new line of defence after another, till they had been crowded back more than a mile; but all the while they clung to the road and bridge by which they were expecting Lew Wallace. General Grant says of an open field on this part of the line, over which repeated charges were made, that it was "so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates."

Many of the troops were under fire for the first time; but Sherman's wonderful military genius largely made up for this deficiency. One bullet struck Sherman in the hand, another grazed his shoulder, another went through his hat, and several of his horses were killed. A bullet shattered the scabbard of General Grant's sword. General W. H. L. Wallace was mortally wounded. On the other side, Generals Adley H. Gladden and Thomas C. Hindman were killed; and about half-past two o'clock General Johnston, placing himself at the head of a brigade that was reluctant to attempt another charge, was struck in the leg by a minie ball. The wound need not have been mortal; but he would not leave the field, and after a time bled to death. The command then devolved upon General Beauregard.

In the afternoon a gap occurred between General Prentiss' division and the rest of the line, and the Confederates were prompt to take advantage of it. Rushing with a heavy force through this gap, and at the same time attacking his left, they doubled up both his flanks, and captured that General and 2200 of his men. On this part of the field the day was saved by Colonel J. D. Webster, of General Grant's staff, who rapidly got 20 guns into position and checked the Confederate advance. They then attempted to come in on the extreme left, along the river, by crossing a ravine. But more guns were brought up, and placed on a ridge that commanded this ravine, and at the same time the gunboats "Tyler" and "Lexington" moved up to a point opposite and enfiladed it with their fire. The result to the Confederates was nothing but a useless display of valor and a heavy loss.

With the exception of the break when Prentiss was captured, Grant's line of battle was maintained all day, though it was steadily forced back and 30 guns were lost.

Beauregard discontinued the attack at nightfall, when his right was repelled at the ravine, intending to renew it and finish the victory in the morning.

Lew Wallace was now in position on the right, and Nelson on the left, and all night long the boats were plying across the Tennessee, bringing over Buell's army.

At daylight Grant assumed the offensive, the fresh troops on his right and left moving first to the attack. Beauregard made a stubborn fight, mainly for the purpose of holding the road that ran by Shiloh Church, by which alone he could conduct an orderly retreat.

The fighting was of the same general description as on the previous day, except that the advantage was now with the National troops. Sherman was ordered to advance his command

and recapture his camps. As these were about Shiloh Church, and that was the point that Beauregard was most anxious to hold, the struggle there was intense and bloody. About the same time, early in the afternoon, Grant and Beauregard did the same thing: each led a charge by two regiments that had lost their commanders. Beauregard's charge was not successful; Grant's was, and the two regiments that he launched with a cheer against the Confederate line broke it, and began the rout. Beauregard posted a rear guard in a strong position, and withdrew his army, leaving his dead on the field, while Grant captured about as many guns on the second day as he had lost on the first. There was no serious attempt at pursuit, owing mainly to the heavy rain and the condition of the roads. On the National side the official figures of the losses are: 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, 2885 missing; total 13,047. On the Confederate side they are: 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, 957 missing; total 10,699. General Grant says: "This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than are here reported, and 4000 was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field."

After the battle, General Halleck took command in person, and proceeded to lay siege to Corinth. Both he and Beauregard were reinforced, till each had about 100,000 men. Halleck gradually closed in about the place, till in the night of May 29 Beauregard evacuated it, and on the morning of the 30th Sherman's soldiers entered the town.



THE UNITED STATES HOSPITAL AT GEORGETOWN, D. C., FORMERLY THE UNION HOTEL.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

WITHIN twenty-four hours after the defeat of McDowell's army at Bull Run (July 21, 1861), the Administration called to Washington the only man that had thus far accomplished much or made any considerable reputation in the field. This was General George B. McClellan. He had done good work in northwestern Virginia in the early summer, and now at the age of 35 was commissioned major-general in the regular army of the United States, and given command of all the troops about Washington.

For the work immediately in hand, this was probably the best selection that could have been made. Washington needed to be fortified, and he was a master of engineering; both the army that had just been defeated and the new recruits that were pouring in needed organization, and he proved pre-eminent as an organizer. Three months after he took command of 50,000 uniformed men at the capital, he had an army of more than 100,000, well organized in regiments, brigades, and divisions, with the proper proportion of artillery, with quartermaster and commissary departments going like clockwork, and the whole fairly drilled and disciplined. Everybody looked on with admiration, and the public impatience that had precipitated the disastrous "On to Richmond" movement was now replaced by a marvelous patience. The summer and autumn months went by, and no movement was made; but McClellan, in taking command, had promised that the war should be "short, sharp, and decisive," and the people thought, if they only allowed him time enough to make thorough preparation, his great army would at length swoop down upon the Confederate capital and finish everything at one blow. At length, however, they began to grow weary of the daily telegram, "All quiet along the Potomac," and the monotonously repeated information that "General McClellan rode out to Fairfax Court House and back this morning." The Confederacy was daily growing stronger, the Potomac was being closed to navigation by the erection of hostile batteries on its southern bank, the enemy's flag was flying within sight from the capital, and the question of foreign interference was becoming exceedingly grave. On the 1st of November General Scott, then 75 years of age, retired, and McClellan succeeded him as General-in-Chief of all the armies.

Soon after this his plans appear, from subsequent revelations, to have undergone important modification. He had undoubtedly intended to attack by moving straight out toward Manassas, where the army that had won the battle of Bull Run was still encamped, and was still commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston. He now began to think of moving against Richmond by some more easterly route, discussing among others the extreme easterly one that he finally took. But, whatever were his thoughts and purposes, his army appeared to be taking root. The people began to murmur, Congress began to question, and the President began to argue and urge. All this did not signify; nothing could move McClellan. He wanted to wait till he could leave an enormous garrison in the defences of Washington, place a strong corps of observation along the Potomac, and then move out with a column of 150,000 men against an army that he believed to be as numerous as that, though in truth it was then less than half as large. It is now known that, from the beginning to the end of his career in that war, General McClellan constantly overestimated the force opposed to him. Meanwhile General Johnston quietly removed his stores, and on the 8th of March placed his army before Richmond. This reconciled the President to McClellan's plan of campaign, which he had never liked.

The order for the transportation of McClellan's army was issued on the 27th of February, and 400 vessels were required; for there were actually transported 121,000 men, 14,000 animals, 44 batteries, and all necessary ambulances and baggage-wagons, pontoons, and telegraph material. Just before the embarkation, the army was divided into four corps, the commands of which were given to Generals McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Erasmus D. Keyes.

Another element of the highest importance had also entered into the problem with which the nation was struggling. This was the appointment (January 21, 1862), of Edwin M. Stanton to succeed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton, then 47 years of age, was a lawyer by profession, a man of great intellect, unfailing nerve, and tremendous energy. He had certain traits that often made him personally disagreeable to his subordinates; but it was

impossible to doubt his thorough loyalty, and his determination to find or make a way to bring the war to a successful close as speedily as possible, without the slightest regard to the individual interests of himself or anybody else. He was probably the ablest war minister that ever lived —with the possible exception of Carnot, the man to whom Napoleon said, "I have known you too late."

One division of the army embarked on the 17th of March, and the others followed in quick succession. General McClellan reached Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, by which time 58,000 men and 100 guns had arrived, and immediately moved with this force on Yorktown, the place made famous by the surrender of Cornwallis 80 years before. The Confederates had fortified this point, and thrown a line of earthworks across the narrow peninsula to the deep water of Warwick River. These works were held by General Magruder with 13,000 effective men.

McClellan, supposing that Johnston's entire army was in the defences of Yorktown, sat down before the place and constructed siege works, approaching the enemy by regular parallels. As the remaining divisions of his army arrived at Fort Monroe, they were added to his besieging force; but McDowell's entire corps and Blenker's division had been detached at the last moment and retained at Washington, from fears on the part of the Administration that the capital was not sufficiently guarded, though McClellan had already left 70,000 men there or within call. The fears were increased by the threatening movements of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, where, however, he was defeated by General James Shields near Winchester, March 13.

General Johnston had to contend with the same difficulty that McClellan complained of. He wanted to bring together before Richmond all the troops that were then at Norfolk and in the Carolinas and Georgia, and with the large army thus formed suddenly attack McClellan after he should have marched 75 miles up the peninsula from his base at Fort Monroe. But in a council of war General Lee and the Secretary of War opposed this plan, and Mr. Davis adopted their views and rejected it. Johnston therefore undertook the campaign with the army that he had, which he says consisted of 50,000 effective men.

McClellan spent nearly a month before Yorktown, and when he was ready to open fire with his siege guns, May 3, he found the enemy had quietly departed, leaving "Quaker guns" (wooden logs on wheels) in the embrasures. There was no delay in pursuit, and the National advance came up with the Confederate rear guard near Williamsburg. Here, May 4, brisk skirmishing began, which gradually became heavier, till reinforcements were hurried up on the one side and sent back on the other, and the skirmish was developed into a battle. The place had been well fortified months before. The action on the morning of the 5th was opened by the divisions of Generals Hooker and William F. Smith. They attacked the strongest of the earthworks, pushed forward the batteries, and silenced it. Hooker was then heavily attacked by infantry, with a constant menace on his left wing. He sustained his position alone nearly all day, though losing 1700 men and five guns, and was at length relieved by the arrival of General Philip Kearney's division. Later in the day, Hancock's brigade made a wide circuit on the right, discovered some unoccupied redoubts, and took possession of them. When the Confederates advanced their left to the attack, they ran upon these redoubts, which their commanding officers knew nothing about, and were repelled with heavy loss. Hancock's 1600 men suddenly burst over the crest of the works, and bore down upon the enemy with fixed bayonets, routing and scattering them. McClellan brought up reinforcements, and in the night the Confederates moved off to join their main army. The National loss had been about 2200, the Confederate about 1800.

General William B. Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had now been sent to McClellan, and immediately after the battle of Williamsburg he moved it on transports to White House, at the head of York River, where it established a base of supplies. As soon as possible, also, the main body of the army was marched to White House, reaching that place on the 16th of May. From this point McClellan moved westward toward Richmond, expecting to be joined by 40,000 men under McDowell, which was to move from Fredericksburg. On reaching the Chickahominy, McClellan threw his left wing across that stream, and sweeping around with his right fought small battles at Mechanicsville and Hanover Junction, by which he cleared the way for McDowell to join him. But at this critical point of time Stonewall Jackson suddenly made another raid down the Shenandoah Valley, and McDowell was called back to go in pursuit of him.

Johnston resolved to strike the detached left wing of the National army, which had advanced to within half a dozen miles of Richmond, and his purpose was seconded by a heavy rain on the night of May 30, which swelled the stream and swept away some of the bridges. The attack,



RECRUITING IN PHILADELPHIA FOR THE FAMOUS BUCKTAIL REGIMENT.

May 31, fell first upon General Silas Casey's division of Keyes' corps, which occupied some half-finished works. It was bravely made and bravely resisted, and the Confederates suffered heavy losses before these works, where they had almost surprised the men with the shovels in their hands. But after a time a Confederate force made a detour and gained a position in the rear of the redoubts, when of course they could no longer be held. Meanwhile, McClellan ordered Sumner to cross the river and join in the battle. Sumner had anticipated such an order as soon as he heard the firing, and when the order came it found him with his corps in line, drawn out from camp, and ready to cross instantly. He was the oldest officer there (66), and the most energetic. There was but one bridge that could be used, many of the supports of this were gone, the approaches were under water, and it was almost a wreck. But he unhesitatingly pushed on his column. The frail structure was steadied by the weight of the men; and though it swayed and undulated with their movement and the rush of the water, they all crossed in safety.

Sumner was just in time to meet a flank attack, which was commanded by Johnston in person. The successive charges of the Confederates were all repelled, and at dusk a counter-charge drove off the last of them in confusion. In this fight General Johnston received wounds that compelled him to retire from the field, and laid him up for a long time. The battle—which is called both Fair Oaks and Seven Pines—cost the National army over 5000 men, and the Confederate nearly 7000.

For some time after the battle of Fair Oaks heavy rains made any movement almost impossible. General Alexander S. Webb says: "The ground, which consisted of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, had turned into a vast swamp, and the guns in battery sank into the earth by their own weight." McClellan kept his men at work, strengthening his position, while he himself seems to have been constantly occupied in writing dispatches to the President and the Secretary of War, alternately promising an almost immediate advance on Richmond and calling for reinforcements. His position was in several respects very bad. The Chickahominy was bordered by great swamps, whose malarial influences robbed him of almost as many men as fell by the bullets of the enemy. His base was at White House, on the Pamunkey; and the line thence over which his supplies must come, instead of being at right angles with the line of his front and covered by it, was almost a prolongation of it. It was impossible to maintain permanent bridges over the Chickahominy. He could threaten Richmond only by placing a heavy force on the right bank of the river; he could render his own communications secure only by keeping a large force on the left bank. He therefore determined to change his base of supplies and operations to James River.

When General Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at Fair Oaks, the command devolved upon General G. W. Smith; but two days later General Robert E. Lee was given the command of the Confederate forces in Virginia, which he retained continuously till his surrender brought the war to a close. The plan that he had opposed, and caused Mr. Davis to reject, when Johnston was in command—of bringing large bodies of troops from North Carolina, Georgia, and the Shenandoah Valley, to form a massive army and fall upon McClellan—he now adopted and proceeded at once to carry out. Johnston enumerates reinforcements that were given him aggregating 53,000 men, and says he had then the largest Confederate army that ever fought. The total number is given officially at 80,762. This probably means the number of men actually carrying muskets, and excludes all officers, teamsters, musicians, and mechanics; for the Confederate returns were generally made in that way. McClellan's total effective force, including every man that drew pay the last week in June, was 92,500.

Wishing to know the extent of McClellan's earthworks on the right wing, Lee, on June 12. sent a body of 1200 cavalry, with two light guns, to reconnoitre. It was commanded by General J. E. B. Stuart, who used to dress in gay costume, with yellow sash and black plume, wore gold spurs, and rode a white horse. He was only ordered to go as far as Hanover Old Church; but at that point he had a fight with a small body of cavalry, and as he supposed dispositions would be made to cut him off, instead of returning, made the entire circuit of McClellan's army, rebuilding a bridge to cross the lower Chickahominy, and reached Richmond in safety. The actual amount of damage that he had done was small; but the raid alarmed the National commander for the safety of his communications.

Stonewall Jackson, if not Lee's ablest lieutenant, was certainly his swiftest, and the one that threw the most uncertainty into the game by his rapid movements and unexpected appearances. At a later stage of the war his erratic strategy, if persisted in, would probably have brought his famous corps of "foot cavalry" (as they were called from their quick marches) to sudden destruction.

ADVANCE OF GENERAL ROSECRAN'S DIVISION THROUGH THE FORESTS, TO ATTACK THE CONFEDERATES AT RICH MOUNTAIN.

The topography of Virginia is favorable to an army menacing Washington, and unfavorable to one menacing Richmond. The fertile valley of the Shenandoah was inviting ground for soldiers. A Confederate force advancing down the valley came at every step nearer to the National capital, while a National force advancing up the valley was carried at every step farther away from the Confederate capital.

Soon after Stuart's raid, Lee began to make his dispositions to attack McClellan and drive him from the peninsula. To convey the impression that Jackson was to move in force down the valley, Lee drew two brigades from his own army, placed them on the cars in Richmond in plain sight of some prisoners that were about to be exchanged, and sent them off to Jackson. Of course the released prisoners carried home the news. But Jackson returned with these reinforcements and Ewell's division of his corps, joined Lee, and on the 25th of June concerted a plan for immediate attack. Secretary Stanton appears to have been the only one that saw through the game; for he telegraphed to McClellan that while neither Banks nor McDowell nor Frémont could ascertain anything about Jackson's movements, his own belief was that he was going to Richmond.

On the 25th McClellan had pushed back the Confederates on his left, taken a new position there, and advanced his outposts to a point only four miles from Richmond. But he began his movements too late, for the Confederates were already in motion. Leaving about 30,000 men in the immediate defences of Richmond, Lee crossed the Chickahominy with about 35,000 under Generals A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, intending to join Jackson's 25,000, and with this enormous force make a sudden attack on the 20,000 National troops north of the river, commanded by General Fitz John Porter, destroy them before help could reach them, and seize McClellan's communications with his base. Jackson, who was to have appeared on the field at sunrise of the 26th, was for once behind time. At midday A. P. Hill's corps drove the small National force out of Mechanicsville, and advanced to McCall's strong position on Beaver Dam Creek. This they dared not attack in front; but they made desperate attempts on both flanks, and the result was an afternoon of fruitless fighting, in which they were literally mown down by the well-served artillery and lost upward of 3000 men, while McCall maintained his position at every point and lost fewer than 300.

That night, in pursuance of the plan for a change of base, the heavy guns were carried across the Chickahominy, together with a large part of the baggage train. On the morning of the 27th Porter fell back somewhat to a position on a range of low hills, where he could keep the enemy in check till the stores were removed to the other side of the river, which was now his only object, and McClellan sent him 5000 more men in the course of the day.

On the morning of the 27th Porter had 18,000 infantry, 2500 artillerymen, and a small force of cavalry, with which to meet the attack of at least 55,000. Longstreet and the Hills had followed the retreat closely, but, warned by the experience of the day before, were not willing to attack until Jackson should join them. The fighting began about two o'clock in the afternoon, when A. P. Hill assaulted the centre of Porter's position, and in a two-hours struggle was driven back with heavy loss. Two attacks on the right met with no better success. The effect on the new troops that had been hurried up from the coast was complete demoralization. The Confederate General Whiting says in his report: "Men were leaving the field in every direction, and in great disorder. Two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner."

But at length Jackson's men arrived, and a determined effort was made on all parts of the line at once. Even then it seemed for a time as if

THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN, VA.—THE UNITED STATES TROOPS UNDER GENERAL ROSECRANS, OF GENERAL McCLELLAN'S COMMAND; THE CONFEDERATES UNDER GENERAL PEGRAM.—THE THIRTEENTH INDIANA CAPTURE A GUN.

victory might rest with the little army on the hills, and in all probability it would, if they had had such intrenchments as the men afterward learned how to construct very quickly; but their breastworks were only such as could be made from hastily felled trees, a few rails, and heaps of knapsacks. The Confederates had the advantage of thick woods in which to form and advance. As they emerged and came on in heavy masses, with the Confederate yell, they were answered by the Union cheer. Volley responded to volley, guns were taken and re-taken, and cannoniers that remained after the infantry supports retired were shot down; but it was not till sunset that the National line was fairly disrupted, at the left centre, when the whole gave way and slowly retired. Two regiments were captured, and 22 guns fell into the hands of the enemy. In the night Porter crossed the river with his remaining force, and destroyed the bridges. This was called by the Confederates the battle of the Chickahominy; but it takes its better known name from two mills (Gaines') near the scene of action. The total National loss was 6000 men. The Confederate loss was never properly ascertained, which renders it probable that it was much larger. This action is sometimes called the first battle of Cold Harbor.



BRAXTON BRAGG.

Lee and Jackson believed that they had been fighting the whole of McClellan's forces, and another mistake that they made secured the safety of that army. They took it for granted that the National Commander, driven from his base at White House, would retreat down the peninsula, taking the same route by which he had come. Consequently they remained with their large force on the left bank of the Chickahominy, and even advanced some distance down the stream, which gave McClellan 24 hours of precious time to get through the swamp roads with his immense trains. He had 5000 loaded wagons, and 2500 head of cattle. General Silas Casey's division, in charge of the stores at White House, loaded all they could upon transports, and destroyed the remainder. Trains of cars filled with supplies were put under full speed and run off the tracks into the river. Hundreds of tons of ammunition, and millions of rations, were burned or otherwise destroyed.

When General Magruder, who had been left in the defences of Richmond, found that the National army was retreating to the James, he moved out and struck the rear guard at Allen's farm. His men made three assaults, and were three times repelled.

The National troops fell back to Savage's Station, where later in the day Magruder attacked them again. But there was an ample force to oppose him, and it stood unmoved by his successive charges. About sunset he advanced his whole line with a desperate rush in the face of a continuous fire; but it was of no avail, and half an hour later his own line was broken by a counter-charge that closed the battle. He admitted a loss of 4000 men. Sumner and Franklin, at a cost of 3000, had thus maintained the approach to the single road through White Oak Swamp, by which they were to follow the body of the army that had already passed.

Jackson, after spending a day in building bridges, crossed the Chickahominy, and attempted to follow McClellan's rear guard through White Oak Swamp; but when he got to the other side he found a necessary bridge destroyed and National batteries commanding its site, so that it was impossible for his forces to emerge from the swamp. But meanwhile Hill and Longstreet had crossed the river farther up stream, marched around the swamp, and struck the retreating army near Charles City Cross-Roads on the 30th. There was terrific fighting all the afternoon. There were brave charges and bloody repulses, masses of men moving up steadily in the face of batteries that tore great gaps through them at every discharge, crossed bayonets, and clubbed muskets. Only on that part of the line held by McCall did the Confederates, with all their daring, succeed in breaking through. McCall, in his report, describes the successful charge: "A most determined charge was made on Randol's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had been previously made

THE FEDERAL WAR STEAMER "SOUTH CAROLINA" SHELLING THE BATTERIES AT GALVESTON, TEXAS, AUGUST 5, 1861.

on Cooper's and Kern's battery by single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the 4th Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed." General McCall himself, endeavoring to rally his men at this point, was captured and carried off to Richmond. In Kearney's front a similar charge was made three times; but every time a steady musketry fire drove back the enemy that had closed up its gaps made by the artillery. Darkness put an end to the fighting, and that night McClellan's army continued its retreat to Malvern Hill, where his advance guard had taken up the strongest position he had yet occupied. The battle just described has several names—Glendale, Frazier's Farm, Charles City Cross-Roads, Newmarket, Nelson's Farm. McClellan here lost 10 guns. The losses in men cannot be known exactly, as the reports group the losses of several days together. Longstreet and the two Hills reported a loss of 12,458 in the fighting from the 27th to the 30th.

The last stand made by McClellan for delivering battle was at Malvern Hill. This is a plateau near Turkey Bend of James River. It is so bordered by streams and swamps as to leave no practicable approach except by the narrow northwest face. Here McClellan had his entire army in position when his pursuers came up. His position was peculiarly favorable for the use of artillery, and his whole front bristled with it. There was no intrenchments to speak of, but the natural inequalities of the ground afforded considerable shelter. It was as complete a trap as could be set for an army, and Lee walked straight into it. To the confidence with which the Southerners began the war was now added the peculiar elation produced by a week's pursuit of a retreating army; and apparently it did not occur to them that they were all mortal.

In the first contact 7000 Confederates, with six guns, struck the left of the position. They boldly advanced their artillery to within 800 yards of the cliff; but before they could get at work a fire of 20 or 30 guns was concentrated upon their battery, which knocked it to pieces in a few minutes; and at the same time huge shells from a gunboat fell among a small detachment of cavalry, threw it into confusion, and turned it back upon the infantry, breaking up the whole attack.

Lee was not ready to assault with his whole army till the afternoon of July 1. An artillery duel was kept up during the forenoon; but the Confederate commander did not succeed in destroying the National batteries; on the contrary, he saw his own disabled. The signal for the infantry attack was to be the usual yell, raised by Armistead's division on the right and taken up by the successive divisions along the line. But the Confederate line was separated by thick woods, there was long waiting for the signal, some of the generals thought they heard it, and some advanced without hearing it. The consequence was a series of separate attacks, some of them repeated three or four times, and every time a concentrated fire on the attacking column and a bloody repulse. There were some brief counter-charges, in one of which the colors were taken from a North Carolina regiment; but in general the National troops only maintained their ground, and though fighting was kept up till nine o'clock in the evening, the line was never for one instant broken or the guns in danger. This battle cost Lee 5000 men, and at its close he gave up the pursuit. The National loss was less than one-third as great. That night McClellan withdrew his army to Harrison's Landing, on the James, where he had fixed his base of supplies and where the gunboats could protect his position. This retreat is known as the Seven Days, and the losses are figured up at 15,249 on the National side, and somewhat over 19,000 on the Confederate.

REVIEW OF CONFEDERATE TROOPS EN ROUTE TO VIRGINIA, AS THEY PASS THE PULASKI MONUMENT, SAVANNAH, GA., AUGUST 7, 1861.

CHAPTER X.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

WHILE McClellan was before Richmond, it was determined to consolidate in one command the corps of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell, which were moving about in an independent and ineffectual way between Washington and the Shenandoah Valley. General John Pope, who had won considerable reputation by his capture of Island No. 10, was given command (June 26, 1862), of the new organization, which was called the Army of Virginia. Frémont declined to serve under a commander who had once been his subordinate, and consequently his corps was given to General Sigel. Pope, on taking command of this force, which numbered all told about 38,000 men, and also of the troops in the fortifications around Washington, had the bad taste to issue a general order that had three capital defects: it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated his enemy, and it contained a bit of sarcasm pointed at General McClellan, the commander of the army with which his own was to co-operate. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act sufficiently in harmony, the President called General Henry W. Halleck from the West to be General-in-Chief, with headquarters at Washington, and command them both. Halleck had perhaps more military learning than any other man in the country, and his patriotic intentions were unquestionably good; but in practical warfare he proved to be little more than a great obstructor; and from the day he took

command at Washington (July 12) the troubles in the East became more complicated than ever.

McClellan held a strong position at Harrison's Landing, where, if he accomplished nothing else, he was a standing menace to Richmond, so that Lee dared not withdraw his army from its defence. He wanted to be heavily reinforced, cross the James, and strike at Richmond's southern communications, just as Grant actually did two years later; and he was promised reinforcements from the troops of Burnside and Hunter, on the coast of North and South Carolina. Lee's anxiety was to get McClellan off from the peninsula, so that he could strike out toward Washington. He first sent a detachment to bombard McClellan's camp from the opposite side of the James; but McClellan crossed the river with a sufficient force and easily swept it out of the way. Then Lee sent Jackson to make a demonstration against Pope, holding the main body of his army ready to follow as soon as some erratic and energetic movements of Jackson had caused a sufficient alarm at Washington to determine the withdrawal of McClellan.

DRUMMING OUT THIEVES FROM FORTRESS MONROE.

The unwitting Halleck was all too swift to cooperate with his enemy, and had already determined upon that withdrawal. Burnside's troops, coming up on transports, were not even landed, but were forwarded up the Potomac and sent to Pope. McClellan marched his army to Fort Monroe, and there embarked it by divisions for the same destination.

Pope's intention was to push southward, strike Lee's western and northwestern communications, and cut them off from the Shenandoah Valley. He first ordered Banks (July 14) to push his whole cavalry force to Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads and bridges in that vicinity. But the cavalry commander, General Hatch, took with him infantry, artillery, and a wagon train, and consequently did not move at cavalry speed. Before he could get to Gordonsville, Jackson's advance reached it, and his movement was frustrated.

As soon as Jackson came in contact with Pope's advance, he called upon Lee for reinforcements, and promptly received them. On the 8th of August he crossed the Rapidan, and moved toward Culpeper. Pope, who had but recently taken the field in person, attempted to concentrate the corps of Banks and Sigel at Culpeper. Banks arrived there promptly on the 8th; but Sigel sent a note from Sperryville in the afternoon, asking by what road he should march. "As there was but one road between those two points," says Pope, "and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march." On the morning of the 9th Banks' corps went out alone to meet the enemy at Cedar Mountain. Banks had 8000 men, and attacked an enemy twice as strong. He first struck Jackson's right wing, and afterward furiously attacked the left, rolled up the flank, opened a fire in the rear, and threw Jackson's whole line into confusion. It was as if the two commanders had changed characters, and Banks had suddenly assumed the part that, according to the popular idea, Jackson always played. If Sigel had only known what road to take, that might have been the last of Jackson. But Banks' force had become somewhat broken in its advance through the woods, and at the same time the Confederates were reinforced, so that Jackson was able to rally his men and check the movement. Banks in turn was forced back a short distance, where he took up a strong position, and Jackson fell back in the night of the 11th to Gordonsville. In this engagement Jackson lost 1300 men, and Banks 1800.

Within a week after the battle of Cedar Mountain, Lee, seeing that McClellan was leaving the peninsula, forwarded Longstreet's division and a part of Hood's to Gordonsville, and prepared to follow with his entire army. Pope had concentrated his forces and advanced his line so that his centre rested on Cedar Mountain, his left on the Rapidan, and his right on Robertson's River; and when Jackson and Longstreet advanced across the Rapidan, he fell back beyond the Rappahannock. By this time he was reinforced by a portion of Burnside's troops, and others were on the way.

When Lee found it impossible to cross the Rappahannock in front of Pope, he sent Jackson to make a flank march westward along that stream, cross it at Sulphur Springs, and come down upon Pope's right. But when Jackson arrived at the crossing, he found a heavy force occupying Sulphur Springs and ready to meet him. Meanwhile General James E. B. Stuart, with 1500 cavalrymen, in the dark and stormy night of August 22, had ridden around to the rear of Pope's position, to cut the railroad. He struck Pope's headquarters at Catlett's Station, captured 300 prisoners and all the personal baggage and papers of the commander, and got back in safety. These papers informed Lee of Pope's plans and dispositions. On the other hand, a cavalry expedition sent out by Pope a few days before had captured Stuart's adjutant, and with him a letter from Lee to Stuart, which largely revealed Lee's plans to his opponent.

Jackson moved still farther up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossed the headwaters, and turned Pope's right.

Pope knew exactly the size of Jackson's force, and the direction it had taken; for Colonel J. S. Clark, of Banks' staff, had spent a day where he had a plain view of the enemy's moving columns, and carefully counted the regiments and batteries. But from this point the National commander, who had hitherto done reasonably well, seemed suddenly to become bewildered. Lee, whose grand strategy was correct, had here blundered seriously in his manœuvres, dividing his army so that the two parts were not within supporting distance of each other, and the united enemy was between. An ordinarily good general, standing in Pope's boots, would naturally have fallen in force upon Jackson, and could have completely destroyed or captured him. But Pope out-blundered Lee, and gave the victory to the Confederates.

He began by sending 40,000 men under McDowell, on the 27th, toward Thoroughfare Gap, to occupy the road by which Lee with Longstreet's division was marching to join Jackson; and at the same time he moved with the remainder of his army to strike Jackson at Bristoe Station. This was a good beginning, but was immediately ruined by his own lack of steadiness. The advance guard had an engagement at that place with Jackson's rear guard, while his main body retired to Manassas Junction. Pope became elated at the prospect of a great success, and ordered a retrograde movement by McDowell. The way was thus left open for Jackson to move out to meet his

friends, and Jackson promptly planted himself on the high land around Groveton, near the battle-field of Bull Run. Here King's division of McDowell's corps came suddenly in contact with the enemy, and a sharp fight, with severe loss on either side, ensued. In the night, King's men fell back to Manassas; and Ricketts' division, which McDowell had left to delay Longstreet when he should attempt to pass through Thoroughfare Gap, was also retired.

All apprehensions on the part of the lucky Jackson were now at an end. The cut of an abandoned railroad formed a strong, ready-made intrenchment, and along this he placed his troops, his right flank being on the turnpike and his left at Sudley Mill.

Longstreet reached the field in the forenoon of the 29th, and took position at Jackson's right, on the other side of the turnpike, covering also the Manassas Gap Railroad. He was confronted by Fitz John Porter's corps, which with Hooker's had exposing his own flank to Longstreet. About six o'clock, when he imagined Porter's attack must have begun, Pope ordered another attack on the Confederate left. It was gallantly made, and in the first rush was successful. Jackson's extreme left was doubled up and broken by Kearney's men, who seized the cut and held it for a time. Again the Confederates, undisturbed on their right, hurried across reinforcements to their imperiled left; and Kearney's division was driven back. This day's action is properly called the battle of Groveton.

Pope got his forces together that night, reformed his lines, and prepared to renew the attack the next day. Lee at the same time drew back his left somewhat, advanced and strengthened his right, and prepared to take the offensive. Each intended to attack the other's left flank.

When Pope moved out the next day (August 30) to strike Lee's left, and found it withdrawn, he imagined that the enemy was in retreat, and brigades of Meade and Seymour, and the army was withdrawn in order from the field whence it had retired so precipitously a year before. After dark it crossed the stone bridge over Bull Run, and encamped on the heights around Centreville.

The corps of Sumner and Franklin here joined Pope, and the whole army fell back to Fairfax Court House and Germantown. Lee meanwhile ordered Jackson to make another of the flank marches that he was so fond of, with a view of striking Pope's right. It was the evening of September 1st when he fell heavily upon Pope's flank. He was stoutly resisted, and finally repelled by the commands of Hooker and Reno, and a part of those of McDowell and Kearney. General Stevens, of Reno's corps, was killed, and his men, having used up their ammunition, fell back. General Kearney sent Birney's brigade into the gap, and brought up a battery. He then rode forward to reconnoitre, came suddenly upon

TAKING AWAY THE COLORS OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH NEW YORK REGIMENT FOR MUTINY, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 14, 1861.

arrived from McClellan's army. McDowell says he ordered Porter to move out and attack Longstreet; Porter says he ordered him simply to hold the ground where he was. At 3 p. m. Pope ordered Hooker to attack Jackson directly in front. Hooker, who was never loath to fight where there was a prospect of success, remonstrated; but Pope insisted, and the attack was made. Hooker's men charged with the bayonet, had a terrific hand-to-hand fight in the cut, and actually ruptured Jackson's seemingly impregnable line; but reinforcements were brought up, and the assailants were at length driven back. Kearney's division was sent to support Hooker, but too late, and it also was repelled. An hour or two later, Pope, who did not know that Longstreet had arrived on the field, sent orders to Fitz John Porter to attack Jackson's right, supposing that was the right of the whole Confederate line. There is a dispute as to the hour at which this order reached Porter. But it was impossible for him to obey it, since he could not move upon Jackson's flank without immediately ordered McDowell to follow it up and "press the enemy vigorously the whole day." Porter's corps—the advance of McDowell's force—had no sooner begun this movement than it struck the foe in a strong position, and was subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Then a cloud of dust was seen to the south, and it was evident that Lee was pushing a force around on the flank. McDowell sent Reynolds to meet and check it. Porter then attempted to obey his orders. He advanced against Jackson's right in charge after charge, but was met by a fire that repelled him every time with bloody loss. Moreover, Longstreet found an eminence that commanded a part of his line, promptly took advantage of it by placing a battery there, and threw in an enfilading fire. It was impossible for anything to withstand this, and Porter's corps in a few minutes fell back defeated. The whole Confederate line was advanced, and an attempt was made, by still further extending their right, to cut off retreat; but key-points were firmly held by Warren's brigade and the a squad of Confederates, and in attempting to ride away was shot dead.

Lee made no further attempt upon Pope's army, and on September 2, by Halleck's orders, it was withdrawn to the fortifications of Washington, where it was merged in the Army of the Potomac. The losses in the campaign are unknown.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

GENERAL Lee now pushed northward into Maryland with his whole army. His advance arrived at Frederick City on the 8th, and from his camp near that place he issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland, in which he recited the wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the National Government, and told them "the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable

rights of freemen and restore the independence and sovereignty of your State.'' At the same time he opened recruiting offices, and appointed a provost marshal of Frederick. But the Confederate chieftain was sadly disappointed in the effect of his proclamation and his presence. When his army marched into the State singing "My Maryland," they were received with closed doors, drawn blinds, and the silence of a graveyard. In Frederick all the places of business were shut. The Marylanders did not flock to his recruiting offices to the extent of more than two or three hundred, while on the other hand he lost many times that number from straggling, as he says in his report.

On the 2d of September the President asked General McClellan to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles' force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it.

As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. Nearly every house displayed the National flag, the streets were thronged with people, all the business places were open, and everybody welcomed the Boys in Blue.

But this flattering reception was not all. On his arrival in the town, General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. By this order, Jackson was directed to march through Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, capture the force at Martinsburg, and assist in the capture of that at Harper's Ferry; Longstreet was directed to halt at Boonsboro with the trains; McLaws was to march to Harper's Ferry, take possession of the heights commanding it, and capture the force there; Walker was to invest that place from the other side and assist McLaws; D. H. Hill's division was to form the rear guard. All the forces were to be united again at Boonsboro or Hagerstown. General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed the plan with which he set out as to send back a large party of his army to capture those places.

On the approach of Jackson's corps, General White evacuated Martinsburg and with his garrison of 2000 men joined Miles at Harper's Ferry. That town, in the fork of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, can be bombarded with the greatest ease from the heights on the opposite sides of those streams. Miles, instead of taking possession of the heights with all his men, sent a feeble detachment to those on the north side of the Potomac, and stupidly remained in the trap with the rest. McLaws sent a heavy force to climb the mountain at a point three or four miles north, whence it marched along the crest and attacked three or four regiments that Miles had posted there. This force was soon driven away, while Jackson was approaching the town from the other side, and a bombardment the next day compelled a surrender. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation. A body of 2000 cavalry, commanded by Colonel Davis, escaped the night before, crossed the Potomac, and reached Greencastle, Pa. On the way they captured Longstreet's ammunition train of 50 wagons. Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the surrender to A. P. Hill, hurried to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th.

The range known as the South Mountain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about 1000 feet high. The two

A DETACHMENT OF THE NEW YORK RIFLES FIRING UPON CAPTAIN CRESTO'S COMPANY OF THE SAME REGIMENT, SEPTEMBER 9, 1861.

principal gaps are Turner's and Crampton's, each about 400 feet high.

When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and pass on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under Burnside, he moved to Turner's Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton's.

Turner's Gap was flanked by two old roads

that crossed the mountain a mile north and south of it; and using these, the National troops worked their way slowly to the crests, opposed at every step by Confederate riflemen behind the trees and ledges. Reno assaulted the southern crest, and Hooker the northern, while Gibbon's brigade gradually pushed along up the turnpike into the Gap itself. Reno was opposed by the Confederate brigade of Garland, and both these commanders were killed. There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, at dark the field was won. The Confederates withdrew during the night, and in the morning the victorious columns passed through to the western side of the mountain. This battle cost McClellan 1500 men. Among the wounded was the lieutenant-colonel in command of the 23d Ohio regiment—Rutherford B. Hayes, afterward President—who was struck in the arm by a rifle-ball. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about 1500, and in addition 1500 were made prisoners. The fight at Crampton's Gap—to defend which McLaws had sent back a part of his force from Harper's Ferry—was quite similar to that at Turner's, and had a similar result. These two actions (fought September 14, 1862), are designated as the battle of South Mountain.

Lee withdrew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and Sharpsburg. His right, under McLaws, crossed the Potomac at that place, recrossed it at Shepherdstown, and came promptly into position. Lee now had his army together and strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000 combatants. Lee complained bitterly that his army was "ruined by straggling," and General Hill wrote in his report, "Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan's army would have been completely crushed or annihilated. Thousands of thievish poltroons had kept away from sheer cowardice." The men that Lee did have, however, were those exclusively that had been able to stand the hard marching and resist the temptation to straggle, and were consequently the flower of his army; and they now awaited battle in a chosen position.

The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the 16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. Indeed, this was obviously almost the only practicable plan. All day long an artillery duel was kept up, in which, as General Hill says, the Confederate batteries proved no match for their opponents. It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they were. If Lee could have been in any doubt before, he was now told plainly what was to be the form of the contest, and he had all night to make his dispositions for it. The only change he thought it necessary to make was to put Jackson's fresh troops in the position on his left. Before morning McClellan sent Mansfield's corps across the Antietam to join Hooker, and he had Sumner's in readiness to follow at an early hour. Meanwhile, all but 2000 of Lee's forces had come up. So the 17th of September dawned in that peaceful little corner of the world with everything in readiness for a great struggle in which there could be no surprises, and which was to be scarcely anything more than wounds for wounds and death for death.

In the vicinity of the little Dunker church, the road running northward from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown was bordered on both sides by woods, and here the battle began when Hooker assaulted Jackson at sunrise. There was hard fighting for an hour, during which Jackson's lines were not only heavily pressed by Hooker in front, but at length enfiladed by a fire from the batteries on the eastern side of the Antietam. This broke them and drove them back; but when Hooker attempted to advance his lines far enough to hold the road and seize the woods west of it, he in turn was met by fresh masses of troops and a heavy artillery fire, and was checked. Mansfield's corps was moving up to his support when its commander was mortally wounded. Nevertheless it moved on, got a position in the woods west of the road and held it, though at heavy cost. At this moment General Hooker was seriously wounded and borne from the field, while Sumner crossed the stream and came up with his corps. His men drove back the defeated divisions of the enemy without much difficulty and occupied the ground around the church. His whole line was advancing to apparent victory, when two fresh divisions were brought over from the Confederate right, and were immediately thrust into a wide gap in Sumner's line. Sedgwick, whose division formed the right of the line, was thus flanked on his left, and was easily driven back out of the woods, across the clearing and into the eastern woods, after which the Confederates retired to their own position. Fighting of this sort went on all the forenoon. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's Gap and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right.

SCENE IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, WALL STREET, NEW YORK CITY.—BUYING GOVERNMENT BONDS.

At 8 a. m. Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front, cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But it was 1 o'clock before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from Harper's Ferry, 2000 strong, united with the other forces on his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, but not more than two-thirds of McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army

was not annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent reader. It was not because Lee, with his army divided for three days in presence of his enemy, had not invited destruction, nor because the 70,000 acting in concert, could not have overwhelmed the 40,000, even when they were united. It was not for any lack of courage, or men, or arms, or opportunity, or daylight. It was simply because the attack was made in driblets, instead of by heavy masses on both wings simultaneously; so that at any point of actual contact Lee was almost always able to present as strong a force as that which assailed him.

The losses on both sides were fully equal to those of Shiloh. Whatever had been the straggling on the march, none of the commanders complained of any flinching after the fight began. They saw veterans taking, relinquishing, and retaking ground that was soaked with blood and covered with dead; and they saw green regiments "go to their graves like beds." Lawton's Confederate brigade went in with 1150 men, and lost 554, including five out of its six regimental commanders, while Hays' lost 323 out of 550, including every regimental commander and all the staff officers. Three Confederate generals were killed, and eight were wounded. General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1567 killed and 8724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1842 killed, 9399 wounded, and 2292 missing—total, 13,533. If McClellan's report is correct, even this statement falls short of the truth.

Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on the 19th, he found that his enemy had crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the capture of more than 6000 prisoners, 13 guns and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a color.

CAPTURE OF LIEUTENANT H. J. SEGAL, OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY, NEAR FALLS CHURCH, VA., BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WINSLOW AND CAPTAIN SHATTUCK, OF THE NEW YORK THIRTY-SEVENTH.

CHAPTER XII.

EMANCIPATION.

THE war had now (September, 1862) been in progress almost a year and a half; and nearly 20,000 men had been shot dead on the battlefield, and upward of 80,000 wounded, while an unknown number had died of disease contracted in the service, or been carried away into captivity. The money that had been spent by the United States Government alone amounted to about one billion dollars. All this time there was not an intelligent man in the country but knew the cause of the war, and yet more than 100,000 American citizens were killed or mangled before a single blow was delivered directly at that cause.

Mr. Lincoln had hated slavery ever since, when a young man, he made a trip on a flatboat to New Orleans, and there saw it in some of its more hideous aspects.

It seems a singular fact that throughout the war there was no insurrection of the slaves. They were all anxious enough for liberty, and ran away from bondage whenever they could; but, except by regular enlistment in the National army, there never was any movement among them to assist in the emancipation of their race.

Congress passed a law (approved August 6, 1861), wherein it was enacted that property, including slaves, actually employed in the service of the rebellion with the knowledge and consent of the owner, should be confiscated, and might be seized by the National forces wherever found. But it cautiously provided that slaves thus confiscated were not to be manumitted at once, but to be held subject to some future decision of the

United States courts or action of Congress. On the 6th of March, 1862, the President, in a special message to Congress, recommended the adoption of a joint resolution to the effect that the United States ought to co-operate with, and render pecuniary aid to, any State that should enter upon a gradual abolition of slavery; and Congress passed such a resolution by a large majority.

On the 14th of July the President recommended to Congress the passage of a bill for the payment, in United States interest-bearing bonds, to any State that should abolish slavery, of an amount equal to the value of all slaves within its borders according to the census of 1860; and at the same time he asked the Congressional representatives of the border States to use their influence with their constituents to bring about such action in those States. The answer was not very favorable; but Maryland did abolish slavery before the close of the war, in October, 1864.

On July 22, 1862, all the National commanders were ordered to employ as many negroes as could be used advantageously for military and naval purposes, paying them for their labor and keeping a record as to their ownership, "as a basis on which compensation could be made in proper cases."

Many of the Federal generals had assumed that whatever other damage was done to the enemy the slaves' property must be in no wise interfered with. This was set forth with great clearness in a proclamation issued by General McClellan when he first took the field in western Virginia. Some of them, however, had a radically different view. General B. F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe, declared in May, 1861, that as the slaves could be made very useful to the enemy, and were being so used, they were contraband of war; and all that came within his lines should be confiscated as such. In August, General Frémont, commanding in Missouri, proclaimed the whole State under martial law, and declared the slaves free. In April, 1862, General Hunter, commanding on the coast of South Carolina, made a similar proclamation concerning the slaves in his District. But President Lincoln countermanded the proclamation of Frémont and Hunter, so far as they referred to slaves, declaring that he reserved the question of emancipation to himself.

The President was contemplating emancipation as a war measure, and in the summer of 1862 he prepared his preliminary proclamation; but he did not wish to issue it till it could follow a triumph of the National arms. McClellan's success at Antietam, though not the decisive victory that was wanted, appeared to be as good an opportunity as was likely soon to present itself, and five days later (September 22, 1862) the proclamation was issued. It declared that the President would, at the next session, renew his suggestion to Congress of pecuniary aid to the States disposed to abolish slavery gradually or otherwise, and gave notice that on the 1st of January, 1863, he would declare forever free all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof should then be in rebellion against the United States. On that day he issued the final and decisive proclamation, as promised, in which he also announced that black men would be received into the military and naval service of the United States.



Union Troops. Union Artillery. Confederate Sharpshooters.

ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE TROOPS ON THE VIRGINIA SIDE OF THE POTOMAC, OPPOSITE EDWARDS' FERRY, OCTOBER 22, 1861.

CHAPTER XIII.

BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the battle of the Antietam, Lee withdrew to the neighborhood of Winchester, where he was reinforced till at the end of a month he had about 68,000 men. McClellan followed as far as the Potomac, and ten days after he defeated Lee on the Antietam, he wrote to the President that he intended to stay where he was, and attack the enemy if they attempted to re-cross into Maryland!

On the 1st of October the President visited General McClellan at his headquarters, and made himself acquainted with the condition of the army. Five days later he ordered McClellan to "cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south." The dispatch added, "Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men." Nevertheless, McClellan did not stir. Instead of obeying the order, he inquired what sort of troops they were that would be sent to him, and how many tents he could have, and said his army could not move without fresh supplies of shoes and clothing. While he was thus paltering, the Confederate General Stuart, who had ridden around his army on the Peninsula, with a small body of cavalry rode entirely around it again, eluding all efforts for his capture. On the 13th the President wrote a long, friendly letter to General McClellan, in which he gave him much excellent advice that he, as a trained soldier, ought not to have needed. Twelve days more of fine weather were frittered away in renewed complaints, and such inquiries as whether the President wished him to move at once or wait for fresh horses, for the General said his horses were fatigued and had sore tongue. Here the President began to show some impatience, and wrote: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" October 26, McClellan began to cross the Potomac; but it was ten days (partly owing to heavy rains) before his army was all on the south side of the river, and meanwhile he had brought up new questions for discussion and invented new excuses for delay.

McClellan was a sore puzzle to the people of the loyal States. But large numbers of his men still believed in him, and—as is usual in such cases—intensified their personal devotion in proportion as the distrust of the people at large was increased. After crossing the Potomac, he left a corps at Harper's Ferry, and was moving southward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, while Lee moved in the same direction on the western side, when, on November 7, the President solved the riddle that had vexed the country, by relieving him of the command. His successor was Ambrose E. Burnside.

At this time the right wing of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was near Culpeper, and the left, under Jackson, was in the Shenandoah Valley. Their separation was such that it would require two days for one to march to the other. McClellan said he intended to endeavor to get between them and either beat them in detail or force them to unite as far south as Gordonsville. Burnside

not only did not continue this plan, but gave up the idea that the Confederate army was his true objective, assumed the city of Richmond to be such, and set out for that place by way of the north bank of the Rappahannock and the city of Fredericksburg, after consuming ten days in reorganizing his army into three grand divisions, under Sumner, Hooker and Franklin. On the 15th of November he began the march from Warrenton; the head of his first column reached Falmouth on the 17th, and by the 20th the whole army was there. By some blunder (it is uncertain whose) the pontoon train that was to have met the army at this point, and afforded an immediate crossing, did not arrive till a week later; and by this time Lee had placed his army on the heights south and west of Fredericksburg. His line was about five and a half miles long, and was as strong as a good natural position, earthworks,

RETREAT OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS FROM THE VIRGINIA SHORE ACROSS A CANAL BOAT BRIDGE AT EDWARDS' FERRY, ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 23, 1861.

and an abundance of artillery could make it. He could not prevent Burnside from crossing the river; for the heights on the left bank rose close to the stream, commanding the intermediate plain, and on these heights Burnside had 147 guns. It was the 10th of December before the National commander was ready to attempt the passage of the stream. He planned to lay down five bridges —three opposite the city and the others two miles below—and depended upon his artillery to protect the engineers.

Before daybreak on the morning of the 11th, in a thick fog, the work was begun; but the bridges had not spanned more than half the distance when the sun had risen and the fog lifted sufficiently to reveal what was going on. A detachment of Mississippi riflemen had been posted at every point where a man could be sheltered on the south bank; and now the incessant crack of their weapons was heard, picking off the men that were laying the bridges. At the lower bridges the sharpshooters, who there had no shelter but rifle-pits in the open field, were dislodged after a time, and by noon those bridges were completed. But the work on the three upper bridges came to a standstill. Burnside tried bombarding the town, threw 70 tons of iron into it, and set it on fire; but still the sharpshooters clung to their hiding-places. At last General Hunt, chief of artillery, suggested a solution of the difficulty. Four regiments that volunteered for the service—the 7th Michigan, the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 89th New York—crossed in pontoon boats, under the fire of the sharpshooters, landed quickly, and drove them out of their fastness, capturing a hundred of them, while the remainder escaped to the hills. The bridges were then completed, and the crossing was begun.

On the morning of the 13th, Burnside was ready to attack, and Lee was more than ready to be attacked. He had concentrated his whole army on the fortified heights, Longstreet's corps forming his left wing and Jackson's his right, with every gun in position and every man ready and knowing what to expect. The weak point of the line, if it had any, was on the right, where the ground was not so high, and there was plenty of room for the deployment of the attacking force. Here Franklin commanded, with about half of the National army; and here, according to Burnside's first plan, the principal assault was to be made. But when the hour for action arrived Franklin was ordered to send forward a division or two, and hold the remainder of his force ready for "a rapid movement down the old Richmond road," while Sumner on the right was ordered to send out two divisions to seize the heights back of the city. Exactly what Burnside expected to do next, if these movements had been successful, nobody appears to know.

The division chosen to lead Franklin's attack was Meade's. This advanced rapidly, preceded by a heavy skirmish line, while his batteries shelled the heights, crossed the railroad under a heavy fire, that had been withheld till they were within close range, penetrated between two divisions of the first Confederate line, doubling back the flanks of both and taking many prisoners and some battle-flags, scaled the heights, and came upon the second line. By this time the momentum of the attack was spent, and the fire of the second line drove them back. The divisions of Gibbon and Doubleday had followed in support, which relieved the pressure upon Meade; and when all three were returning unsuccessful and in considerable confusion, Birney's moved out and stopped the pursuing enemy. Sumner's attack was made with the divisions of French and Hancock, which moved through the town and deployed in columns under the fire of the Confederate batteries. This was very destructive, but was not the deadliest thing that the men had to meet. Marye's Hill was skirted near its base by an old sunken road, at the outer edge of which was a stone wall, and in this road were two brigades of Confederate infantry. It could hardly be seen at a little distance, that there was a road at all. When French's charging columns had rushed across the open ground under an artillery fire that ploughed through and through their ranks, they suddenly confronted a sheet of flame and lead from the rifles in the sunken road. The Confederates here were so numerous that each one at the wall had two or three behind to load muskets and hand them to him, while he had only to lay them flat across the

wall and fire them as rapidly as possible, exposing scarcely more than his head. Nearly half of French's men were shot down and the remainder fell back. Hancock's 5000 charged in the same manner, and some of them approached within 20 yards of the wall; but within a quarter of an hour they also fell back, leaving 2000 of their number on the field. Three other divisions advanced to the attack, but with no better result; and all remained in a position where they were just out of reach of the rifles in the sunken road, but were still played upon by the Confederate artillery.

Burnside now grew frantic and ordered Hooker to attack. That officer moved out with three divisions, made a reconnoissance, and went back to tell Burnside it was useless and persuade him to give up the attempt. But the commander insisted, and so Hooker's 4000 rushed forward with fixed bayonets, and presently came back like the rest, leaving 1700 on the field.

The entire National loss in this battle was 12,353 in killed, wounded or missing, though some of the missing afterward rejoined their commands. Hancock's division lost 156 officers, and one of his regiments lost two-thirds of its men. The Confederate loss was 5309. Burnside planned to make a fresh attempt the next day, with the Ninth Corps (his old command), which he proposed to lead in person; but General Sumner dissuaded him. In the night of the 15th, in a storm, the army was withdrawn to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and the campaign was ended.

CHAPTER XIV.

ROSECRANS AND HOOKER.

THE year 1863 began with several events of the first importance. On December 31st and January 2d there was a great battle in the West. On New Year's day the final proclamation of emancipation was issued, and measures were taken for the immediate enlistment of black troops. On that day, also, in the State of New York, which furnished one sixth of all the men called into the National service, the executive power passed into hands unfriendly to the Administration.

The Confederate Congress in 1862 passed a sweeping conscription act, forcing into the ranks every man of military age. Even boys of sixteen were taken out of school and sent to camps of instruction. This largely increased their forces in the field, and at the West especially they exhibited a corresponding activity. General Beauregard, whose health had failed, was succeeded by General Braxton Bragg, a man of more energy than ability, who, with 40,000 men, marched into eastern Kentucky, defeating a National force near Richmond, and another at Mumfordsville. He then assumed that Kentucky was a State of the Confederacy, appointed a provisional Governor, forced Kentuckians into his army, and robbed the farmers, not only of their stock and provisions, but of their wagons for carrying away the plunder, paying them in worthless Confederate money. He carried with him 20,000 muskets, expecting to find that number of Kentuckians who would enroll themselves in his command; but he confessed afterward that he did not even secure enough recruits to take up the arms that fell from the hands of his dead and wounded. With the supplies collected by his army of "liberators," as he called them, in a wagon-train said to have been 40 miles long, he was moving slowly back into Tennessee, when General Buell, with about 58,000 men, marched in pursuit.

Braggs turned and gave battle at Perryville (October 8), and the fight lasted nearly all day. At some points it was desperate, with hand-to-hand fighting, and troops charging upon batteries where the gunners stood to their pieces and blew them from the very muzzles. The National left, composed entirely of raw troops, was crushed by a heavy onset; but the next portion of the line, commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan, not only held its ground and repelled the assault, but followed up the retiring enemy with a counter attack.

When night fell, the Confederates had been repelled at all points, and a portion of them had been driven through Perryville, losing many wagons and prisoners. Buell prepared to attack at daylight, but found that Bragg had moved off in the night with his whole army, continuing his retreat to east Tennessee, leaving 1000 of his wounded on the ground. He also abandoned 1200 of his men in hospital at Harrodsburg, with large quantities of his plunder, and made all haste to get away. Buell reported his loss in the battle as 4348, which included Generals James S. Jackson and William R. Terrill killed. Bragg's loss was probably larger, though he gave considerably smaller figures. General Halleck, at Washington, now planned for Buell's army a campaign in east Tennessee; but as that was more than 200 miles away, and the communications were not provided for, Buell declined to execute it. He was then removed from command, and General William S. Rosecrans succeeded him.

In September, a Confederate army of about 40,000 men, under Generals Price and Van Dorn, had crossed from Arkansas into Mississippi, with the purpose of capturing Grant's position at Corinth. Price seized Iuka, southwest of Corinth, and Grant sent out against him a force under Rosecrans. They fought a battle, on September 19, with a loss of about 700 men on each side, and in the night Price retreated and joined Van Dorn. The combined force afterward (October 3) attempted the capture of Corinth, where Rosecrans was in immediate command with about 20,000 men. The place was especially tempting to the Confederates because of the enormous amount of supplies in store there. Rosecrans had taken a position three miles from the city, and in the first day's fighting the enemy forced him back to his intrenchments and captured two guns. Van Dorn, early the next morning, assaulted the intrenchments. His men were fearfully cut down by grape and canister, but succeeded in breaking through the line of works, and even made their way into the city, where there was desperate fighting in the streets. Reinforcements were brought up for Rosecrans, the tide was turned, and the Confederates were driven out again and repelled all along the line, after which they retreated in great haste. Their loss was about 6000; that of the National forces was 2359. The retreat began about noon; but Rosecrans did not begin pursuit till the next morning, when it was too late, and then he took the wrong road. Grant had expected him to gain a victory, and ordered him in that event to pursue without the loss of an hour; and to make sure of crushing Van Dorn's army, Grant at the same time sent a force to strike it in flank. He was greatly displeased at the dilatoriness of Rosecrans, the more so as it was an exact repetition of a mistake made at Iuka, and for this reason that general was soon relieved from further service under Grant.

FIGHT OF DUFFIE'S CAVALRY, NEAR HUNTER'S HOUSE, CHARLESTOWN, VA., COVERING THE RETREAT OF THE FEDERAL FORCES.

When Rosecrans superseded Buell, his army—thenceforth called the Army of the Cumberland—was at Bowling Green, slowly pursuing Bragg. Rosecrans sent a portion of it to the relief of Nashville, which was besieged by a Confederate force, and employed the remainder in repairing the railroad from Louisville. This done, about the end of November he united his forces at Nashville. At the same time, Bragg was ordered to move forward again, and went as far as Murfreesboro, 40 miles from Nashville, where he fortified a strong position on Stone River, a shallow stream, fordable at nearly all points.

Rosecrans, leaving Nashville with 43,000 men, in a rainstorm, the day after Christmas, encamped on the 30th within sight of Bragg's intrenchments. He intended to attack the next day; but Bragg crossed the river before sunrise, concealed by a thick fog, reached the woods on the right of the National line, and burst out upon the bank in overwhelming force. McCook's command was crumbled and thrown back, losing several guns and many prisoners. Sheridan's command, next in line, made a stubborn fight till its ammunition was nearly exhausted, and then slowly retired.

Thomas' command, which formed the centre, now held the enemy back till Rosecrans established a new line, nearly at right angles to the first, with artillery advantageously posted, when Thomas fell back to this and maintained his ground. Through the forenoon the Confederates had seemed to have everything their own way. But here, as usual, the tide was turned. The first impetuous rush of the Southern soldier had spent itself, and the superior staying qualities of his Northern opponent began to tell. Bragg hurled his men again and again upon the new line; but as they left the cedar thickets and charged across the open field they were mercilessly swept down by artillery and musketry fire, and every effort was fruitless. Even when 7000 fresh men were drawn over from Bragg's right and thrown against the National centre, the result was still the same. The day ended with Rosecrans immovable in his position; but he had been driven from half of the ground that he held in the morning, and had lost 28 guns and many men, while the enemy's cavalry was upon his communications. The next day there was no evidence of any disposition on either side to attack. Both sides were correcting their lines, constructing rifle-pits, caring for their wounded, and preparing for a renewal of the fight.

This came on the second day of the new year, when there was some desultory fighting, and Rosecrans advanced a division across the stream to strike at Bragg's communications. Breckenridge's command attacked this division and drove it back to the river, when Breckenridge suddenly found himself subjected to a terrible artillery fire and lost 2000 men in 20 minutes. Following this a charge by National infantry drove him back with a loss of four guns and many prisoners, and this ended the great battle of Stone River, or Murfreesboro. After the repulse of Breckenridge, Rosecrans advanced his left again, and that night occupied with some of his batteries high ground, from which Murfreesboro could be shelled. The next day there was a heavy rainstorm, and in the ensuing night the Confederate army quietly retreated. Rosecrans reported his loss in killed and wounded as 8778, and in prisoners as somewhat fewer than 2800. Bragg acknowledged a loss of over 10,000 and claimed that he had taken over 6000 prisoners.

After Burnside's failure at Fredericksburg, he was superseded, January 25, 1863, by General Joseph Hooker, who had commanded one of his grand divisions. In giving the command to Hooker, President Lincoln accompanied it with a remarkable letter, which not only exhibits his own peculiar genius, but suggests some of the complicated difficulties of the military and political situation. He wrote: "I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, were he alive again, could get any good out of any army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness! But with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."

Hooker restored the discipline of the Army of the Potomac, reorganized it in corps, and opened the spring campaign with every promise of success. The army was still on the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and he planned to cross over and strike Lee's left. Making a demonstration with Sedgwick's corps below the town, he moved a large part of his army up stream, crossed quickly, and had 46,000 men at Chancellorsville before Lee guessed what he was about. This "ville" was only a single house. Eastward, between it and Fredericksburg, there was open country; west of it was the great thicket known as The Wilderness, in the depths of which, a year later, a bloody battle was fought.

Instead of advancing into the open country at once, and striking the enemy's flank, Hooker lost a day in inaction, which gave Lee time to learn what was going on and to make dispositions to meet the emergency. Leaving a small force to check Sedgwick, who had carried the heights of Fredericksburg, he moved toward Hooker with nearly all his army, May 1, and attacked at various points, endeavoring to ascertain Hooker's exact position. By nightfall of this same day, Hooker appears to have lost confidence in the plans with which he set out, and to have been deserted by his old-time audacity; for instead of maintaining a tactical offensive, he drew back from some of his more advanced positions, formed his army in a semicircle, and awaited attack. His left and his centre were strongly posted and to some extent intrenched; but his right, consisting of Howard's corps, was "in the air," and moreover, it faced the Wilderness. When this weak spot was discovered by the enemy, on the morning of the 2d, Lee sent Jackson with 26,000 men to make a long detour, pass into the Wilderness, and, emerging suddenly from its eastern edge, take Howard by surprise. Jackson's men were seen and counted as they passed over the crest of a hill, they were even attacked by detachments from Sickles' corps, and Hooker sent orders to Howard to strengthen his position, advance his pickets, and not allow himself to be surprised. But Howard appears to have disregarded all precautions, and in the afternoon the enemy came down upon him, preceded by a rush of frightened wild animals driven from their cover in the woods by the advancing battle-line.

WILSON'S CAVALRY FORAGING IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
FROM SKETCHES BY J. E. TAYLOR.

Howard's corps was doubled up, thrown into confusion, and completely routed. The enemy was coming on exultingly, when General Sickles sent General Alfred Pleasonton with two regiments of cavalry and a battery to occupy an advantageous position at Hazel Grove, which was the key-point of this part of the battlefield. Pleasonton arrived just in time to see that the Confederates were making toward the same point and were likely to secure it. There was but one way to save the army, and Pleasonton quickly comprehended it. He ordered Major Peter Keenan, with the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry regiment, about 400 strong, to charge immediately upon the 10,000 Confederate infantry. "It is the same as saying we must be killed," said Keenan, "but we'll do it." This charge, in which Keenan and most of his command were slain, astonished the enemy and stopped their onset, for they believed there must be some more formidable force behind it. In the precious minutes thus gained, Pleasonton brought together 22 guns, loaded them with double charges of canister, and had them depressed enough to make the shot strike the ground half-way between his own line and the edge of the woods where the enemy must emerge. When the Confederates resumed their charge they were struck by such a storm of iron as nothing human could withstand, other troops were brought up to the support of the guns, and what little artillery the Confederates had advanced to the front was knocked to pieces.*

Here, about dusk, General Jackson rode to the front to reconnoitre. As he rode back again with his staff, some of his own men, mistaking the horsemen for National cavalry, fired a volley, by which several were killed. Another volley inflicted three wounds upon Jackson; and as his frightened horse dashed into the woods, the General was thrown violently against the limb of a tree and injured still more. Afterward, when his men were bearing him off, a National battery opened fire down the road, one of the men was struck, and the General fell heavily to the ground. He finally reached the hospital, and his arm was amputated, but he died at the end of a week. Jackson's corps renewed its attack, under General A. P. Hill, but without success, and Hill was wounded and borne from the field.

The next morning, May 3, it was renewed again under Stuart, the cavalry leader, and at the same time Lee attacked in front with his entire force. The Confederates had sustained a serious disaster in the loss of Jackson; but now a more serious one befell the National army, for General Hooker was rendered insensible by the shock from a cannon-ball that struck a pillar of the Chancellor house against which he was leaning. After this there was no plan or organization to the battle on the National side—though each corps commander held his own as well as he could, and the men fought valiantly—while Lee was at his best. The line was forced back to some strong intrenchments that had been prepared the night before, when Lee learned that Sedgwick had defeated the force opposed to him, captured Fredericksburg heights, and was promptly advancing upon the Confederate rear. Trusting that the force in his front would not advance upon him, Lee drew off a large detachment of his army and turned upon Sedgwick, who after a heavy fight was stopped, and with some difficulty succeeded in crossing the river after nightfall. Lee then turned again upon Hooker; but a great storm suspended operations for 24 hours, and the next night the National army all recrossed the Rappahannock, leaving on the field 14 guns, thousands of small-arms, all their dead, and many of their wounded. In this series of battles, the National loss was about 17,000 men, the Confederate about 13,000. Hooker had commanded about 113,500 to Lee's 62,000 (disregarding the different methods of counting in the two armies); but as usual they were not in action simultaneously; many were hardly in the fight at all, and at every point of actual contact, with the exception of Sedgwick's first engagement, the Confederates were superior in numbers.

* The story of Keenan's charge is here told as General Pleasonton tells it. But some of the survivors of the charge tell it quite differently.

SAMUEL FRANCIS DU PONT.



PLAN OF THE NAVAL BATTLE, PORT ROYAL HARBOR.

CHAPTER XV.

GETTYSBURG.

AFTER the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, public opinion in the South began to demand that the army under Lee should invade the North, or at least make a bold movement toward Washington. Public opinion is not often very discriminating in an exciting crisis; and on this occasion public opinion failed to discriminate between the comparative ease with which an army in a strong position may repel a faultily planned or badly managed attack, and the difficulties that must beset the same army when it leaves its base, launches forth into the enemy's country, and is obliged to maintain a constantly lengthening line of communication. The Southern public could not see why, since the Army of Northern Virginia had won two victories on the Rappahannock, it might not march forward at once, lay New York and Philadelphia under contribution, and dictate peace and Southern independence in the Capitol at Washington. Whether the Confederate Government shared this feeling or not, it acted in accordance with it; and whether Lee approved it or not, he obeyed. Yet, in the largest consideration of the problem, this demand for an invasion of the North was correct, though the result proved disastrous. For experience shows that purely defensive warfare will not accomplish anything. Lee's army had received a heavy reinforcement by the arrival of Longstreet's corps, its regiments had been filled up with conscripts, it had unbounded confidence in itself, and this was the time, if ever, to put the plan for independence to the crucial test of offensive warfare. Many subsidiary considerations strengthened the argument. About 30,000 of Hooker's men had been enlisted in the spring of 1861, for two years, and their term was now expiring. Vicksburg was besieged by Grant, before whom nothing had stood as yet; and its fall would open the Mississippi and cut the Confederacy in two, which might seal the fate of the new government unless the shock were neutralized by a great victory in the East. Volunteering had fallen off in the North, conscription was resorted to, the Democratic party there had become more hostile to the Government and loudly abusive of President Lincoln and his advisers, and there were signs

of riotous resistance to a draft. Finally, the Confederate agents in Europe reported that anything like a great Confederate victory would secure immediate recognition, if not armed intervention, from England and France.

Hooker, who had lost a golden opportunity by his aberration or his accident at Chancellorsville, had come to his senses again and was alert, active, and clear-headed. As early as May 28, 1863, he informed the President that something was stirring in the camp on the other side of the river, and that a northward movement might be expected. On the 3d of June Lee began his movement, and by the 8th two of his three corps (those of Ewell and Longstreet) were at Culpeper, while A. P. Hill's corps still held the lines on the Rappahannock.

It was known that the entire Confederate cavalry, under Stuart, was at Culpeper, and Hooker war. Up to that time the Confederate cavalry had been generally superior to the National; this action—a cavalry fight in the proper sense of the term, between the entire mounted forces of the two armies—was a drawn battle; and thenceforth the National cavalry exhibited superiority in an accelerating ratio, till finally, nothing mounted on Southern horses could stand before the magnificent squadrons led by Sheridan, Custer, Kilpatrick and Wilson.

By the 13th of June, Lee had advanced Ewell's corps beyond the Blue Ridge, and it was marching down the Shenandoah valley, while Hill's was still in the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and Longstreet's was midway between, at Culpeper. Hooker asked to be allowed to interpose his whole army between these widely separated parts of its antagonist and defeat them in detail; but with a man like Halleck for military adviser at Washington, it was useless to propose any bold or brilliant stroke. Hooker was forbidden to do this, and ordered to keep his army between the enemy and the capital. He therefore moved toward Washington. Ewell moved rapidly down the Shenandoah valley, and attacked Winchester, which was held by General Milroy with about 10,000 men. Milroy made a gallant defence; but after a stubborn fight his force was broken and defeated, and about 4000 of them became prisoners.

The corps of Hill and Longstreet now moved. Hill following Ewell into the Shenandoah valley, and Longstreet skirting the Blue Ridge along its eastern base. Pleasonton's cavalry, reconnoitering these movements, met Stuart's again at Aldie, and had a sharp fight; and there were also cavalry actions at Middleburg and Upperville. Other Confederate cavalry had already crossed the Potomac, made a raid as far as Chambersburg, and returned with supplies to Ewell. On the 22d, Ewell's corps crossed, at Shepherdstown and Williamsport, and moved up the Cumberland valley to Chambersburg. The Governors of New York and Pennsylvania were called upon for militia, and forwarded several regiments, to be interposed between the enemy's advance and Philadelphia and Harrisburg. The other two corps of Lee's army crossed the Potomac on the 24th and 25th, and Hooker, moving on a line nearer Washington, crossed with his whole army at Edward's Ferry, on the 25th and 26th, marching thence to Frederick. He now proposed to send Slocum's corps to the western side of the South Mountain range, have it unite with a force of 11,000 that lay useless at Harper's Ferry, and throw a powerful column upon Lee's communications, capture his trains, and attack his army in

DESTRUCTION OF GUNS AT THE CONFEDERATE ARSENAL, BEAUFORT, S. C., BY CAPTAIN AMMAN, OF THE U. S. GUNBOAT "SENECA."

sent all his cavalry, under Pleasonton, with two brigades of infantry; to attack it there. The assault was to be made in two converging columns, under Buford and Gregg; but this plan was disconcerted by the fact that the enemy's cavalry, intent upon masking the movement of the great body of infantry and protecting its flank, had advanced to Brandy Station. Here it was struck first by Buford and afterward by Gregg, and there was bloody fighting, with the advantage at first in favor of the National troops, but the two columns failed to unite during the action, and finally withdrew. The loss was over 500 men on each side. Some of the heaviest fighting was for possession of a height known as Fleetwood Hill, and the Confederates name the action the battle of Fleetwood. It is of special interest as marking the turning point in cavalry service during the

the rear. But again he came into collision with the stubborn Halleck, who would not consent to the abandonment, even temporarily, of Harper's Ferry, though the experience of the Antietam campaign, when he attempted to hold it in the same way and lost its whole garrison, should have taught him better. This new cause of trouble, added to previous disagreements, was more than Hooker could stand, and on the 27th he asked to be relieved. His request was promptly complied with, and the next morning the command was given to General Meade, only four days before a great battle.

The first thing Meade did on assuming command was what Hooker had been forbidden to do; he ordered the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and the movement of its garrison to Frederick as a reserve.

At this time one portion of Lee's army was at Chambersburg, or between that place and Gettysburg, another at York and Carlisle, and a part of his cavalry was within sight of the spires of Harrisburg. The main body of the cavalry had gone off on a raid, Stuart having an ambition to ride a third time around the Army of the Potomac. This absence of his cavalry left Lee in ignorance of the movements of his adversary. When suddenly he found his communications in danger, he called back Ewell from York and Carlisle, and ordered the concentration of all his forces at Gettysburg. Many converging roads lead into that town, and its convenience for such concentration was obvious. Meade was also advancing his army toward Gettysburg, though with a more uncertain step—as was necessary, since his object was to find Lee's army and fight it. His cavalry, under Pleasonton, was doing good service, and that General advanced a division under Buford on the 29th to Gettysburg, with orders to delay the enemy till the army could come up. The First Corps, under General John F. Reynolds, advanced rapidly to Gettysburg, and on the 1st of July encountered west of the town a portion of the enemy coming in from Chambersburg. Lee had about 73,500 men (infantry and artillery), and Meade about 82,000, while the cavalry numbered about 11,000 on each side, and both armies had more cannon than they could use.*

When Reynolds advanced his own corps and determined to hold Gettysburg, he ordered the Eleventh (Howard's) to come up to his support. The country about Gettysburg is broken into ridges, mainly parallel and running north and south. On the first ridge west of the village stood a theological seminary, which gave it the name of Seminary Ridge. Between this and the next is a small stream called Willoughby Run, and here the first day's battle was fought. Buford held the ridges till the infantry arrived, climbing into the belfry of the seminary and looking anxiously for their coming. The Confederates were advancing by two roads that met in a point at the edge of the village, and Reynolds disposed his troops, as fast as they arrived, so as to dispute the passage on both roads. The key-point was a piece of high ground, partly covered with woods, between the roads, and the advance of both sides rushed for it. Here General Reynolds, going forward to survey the ground, was shot by a sharpshooter and fell dead. The command devolved upon General Abner Doubleday. The Confederate force contending for the woods was Archer's brigade; the National was Meredith's "Iron Brigade." Archer's men had been told that they would meet nothing but Pennsylvania militia, which they expected to brush out of the way with little trouble; but when they saw the Iron Brigade some of them were heard saying: "'Taint no militia; there are the —— black-hatted fellows again; it's the Army of the Potomac!" The result here was that Meredith's men not only secured the woods, but captured General Archer and a large part of his brigade, and then advanced to the ridge west of the run.

On the right of the line there had been bloody fighting, with unsatisfactory results. Whether any commander on either side intended to bring on a battle at this point, is doubtful. But both sides were rapidly and heavily reinforced, and both fought with determination. The struggle for the Chambersburg road was obstinate, especially after the Confederates had planted several guns to sweep it. A division of Ewell's corps soon arrived from Carlisle, wheeled into position, and struck the right of the National line. Robinson's division, resting on Seminary Ridge, was promptly brought forward to meet this new peril, and was so skilfully handled that it presently captured three North Carolina regiments.

General Oliver O. Howard, being the ranking officer, assumed command when he arrived on this part of the field; and when his own corps came up, about one o'clock, he placed it in position on the right, prolonging the line of battle far around to the north of the town. This great extension made it weak at many points; and as fresh divisions of Confederate troops were constantly arriving, under Lee's general order to concentrate on the town, they finally became powerful enough to break through the centre, rolling back the right flank of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh, and throwing into confusion everything except the left of the First Corps, which retired in good order, protecting artillery and ambulances. Of the fugitives that swarmed through the town, about 5000 were made prisoners. But this had been affected only at heavy cost to the Confederates. At one point Iverson's Georgia brigade had rushed up to a stone fence behind which Baxter's brigade was sheltered, when Baxter's men suddenly rose and delivered a volley that struck down 500 of Iverson's in an instant, while the remainder, who were subjected also to a cross-fire, immediately surrendered—all but one regiment, which escaped by raising a white flag.

In the midst of the confusion General Winfield S. Hancock arrived, under orders from General Meade to supersede Howard in the command of that wing of the army. He had been instructed also to choose a position for the army to meet the great shock of battle. Steinwehr's division was in reserve on Cemetery Ridge, and Buford's cavalry was on the plain between the town and the ridge; and with these standing fast Hancock stopped the retreat and rapidly formed a line along that crest.

The ridge begins in Round Top, a high, rocky hill; next north of this is Little Round Top, smaller but still bold and rugged; and thence it is continued at a less elevation, with gentler slopes, northward within half a mile of the town, where it curves around to the east and ends at Rock Creek. The whole length is about three miles. Seminary Ridge is a mile west of this, and nearly parallel with its central portion. Hancock without hesitation chose this line, placed all the available troops in position, and then hurried back to headquarters at Taneytown. Meade at once accepted his plan, and sent forward the remaining corps. The Third Corps, commanded by Sickles, being already on the march, arrived at sunset. The Second (Hancock's) marched 13 miles and went into position. The Fifth (Sykes') was 23 miles away, but marched all night and arrived in the morning. The Sixth (Sedgwick's) was 36 miles away, but was put in motion at once.

It is said by General Longstreet that Lee had promised his corps commanders not to fight a battle during this expedition, unless he could take a position and stand on the defensive; but the excitement and confidence of his soldiers, who felt themselves invincible, compelled him. While he was waiting for his divisions to arrive, Sedgwick's corps arrived on the other side, and the National troops were busy constructing rude breastworks.

Between the two great ridges there is another ridge, situated somewhat like the diagonal portion of a capital N. The order of the corps, beginning at the right, was this: Slocum's, Howard's, Hancock's, Sickles', with Sykes' in reserve on



GOVERNMENT WORKS ERECTED ON HILTON HEAD ISLAND, S. C., BY THE FEDERAL FORCES UNDER T. W. SHERMAN.

*Various figures and estimates are given as representing the strength of the two armies, some of which take account of detachments absent on special duty, and some do not. The figures here given denote very nearly the forces actually available for the battle.

the left and Sedgwick's on the right. Sickles, thinking to occupy more advantageous ground, advanced to the diagonal ridge, and on this hinged the whole battle of the second day. For there was nothing on which to rest his left flank, and he was obliged to "refuse" it—turn it sharply back toward Round Top. This presented a salient angle (always a weak point) to the enemy; and here, when the action opened at four o'clock in the afternoon, the blow fell. The angle was at a peach-orchard, and the refused line stretched back through a wheat field; Birney's division occupying this ground, while the right of Sickles' line was held by Humphreys.

Longstreet's men attacked the salient vigorously, and his extreme right, composed of Hood's division, stretched out toward Little Round Top, where it narrowly missed winning a position that would have enabled it to enfilade the whole National line. Little Round Top had been occupied only by signal men, when General Warren saw the danger, detached Vincent's brigade from a division that was going out to reinforce Sickles, and ordered it to occupy the hill at once. One regiment of Weed's brigade (the 140th New York) also went up, dragging and lifting the guns of Hazlett's battery up the rocky slope; and the whole brigade soon followed. They were just in time to meet the advance of Hood's Texans, and engage in one of the bloodiest hand-to-hand conflicts of the war. At length the Texans were hurled back and the position secured. General Weed was mortally wounded; General Vincent was killed; Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke, of the 140th, a recent graduate of West Point, of brilliant promise, was shot dead at the head of his men; and Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett was killed as he leaned over General Weed to catch his last words: "I would rather die here," said Weed, "than that the rebels should gain an inch of this ground!" Hood's men made one more attempt, by creeping up the ravine between the two Round Tops, but were repelled by a bayonet charge, executed by Chamberlain's 20th Maine Regiment, and 500 of them were made prisoners.

Meanwhile terrific fighting was going on at the salient in the peach-orchard. Several batteries were in play on both sides, and made destructive work; a single shell from one of the National guns killed or wounded 30 men in a company of 37. Here General Zook was killed, Colonel Cross was killed, General Sickles lost a leg, and the Confederate General Barksdale was mortally wounded and died a prisoner. Sickles was constantly reinforced, and Lee, being under the impression that this was the flank of the main line, kept hammering at it till his men finally possessed the peach-orchard, advanced their lines, assailed the left flank of Humphreys, and finally drove back the National line, only to find that they had forced it into its true position, from which they could not dislodge it by any direct attack, while the guns and troops that now crowned the two Round Tops showed any flank movement to be impossible. About sunset Ewell's corps assailed the Union right, and at heavy cost gained a portion of the works near Rock Creek.

While the actions of the first two days were complicated, that of the third was extremely simple. Lee had tried both flanks, and failed. He now determined to attempt piercing the centre of Meade's line. Longstreet, wiser than his chief, protested, but in vain. On the other hand, Meade had held a council of war the night before, and in accordance with the vote of his corps commanders determined to stay where he was and fight it out. Lee's first intended movement was to push the success gained at the close of the second day by Ewell on the National right; but Meade anticipated him, attacking early in the morning and driving Ewell out of his works. In preparation for a grand charge, Lee placed more than 100 guns in position on Seminary Ridge, converging their fire on the left centre of Meade's line, where he intended to send his storming column. Eighty guns (all there was room for) were placed in position on Cemetery Ridge to reply, and at one o'clock the firing began. This was one of the most terrific artillery duels ever witnessed. There was a continuous and deafening roar, which was heard 40 miles away. The shot and shells ploughed up the ground, shattered gravestones in the cemetery and sent their fragments flying among the troops, exploded caissons, and dismounted guns.

At the end of two hours General Henry J. Hunt, Meade's chief of artillery, ordered the firing to cease, both to cool the guns and to save the ammunition for use in repelling the infantry charge. Lee supposed that his object—which was to demoralize his enemy and cause him to exhaust his artillery—had been effected. Fourteen thousand of his best troops—including Pickett's division, which had not arrived in time for the previous day's fighting—now came out of the woods, formed in heavy columns, and moved forward steadily to the charge. Instantly the National guns reopened fire, and the Confederate ranks were ploughed through and through; but the gaps were closed up, and the columns did not halt. There was a mile of open ground for them to traverse, and every step was taken under heavy fire. As they drew nearer, the batteries used grape and canister, and an infantry force posted in advance of the main line rose to its feet and fired volleys of musketry into the right flank. Now the columns began visibly to break up and melt away; and the left wing of the force changed its direction somewhat, so that it parted from the right, making an interval and exposing a new flank, which the National troops promptly took advantage of. But Pickett's diminishing ranks still pushed on, till they passed over the outer lines, fought hand-to-hand at the main line, and even leaped the breastworks and thought to capture the batteries. The point where they penetrated



GENERAL NATHANIEL P. BANKS AND STAFF.

was marked by a clump of small trees on the edge of the hill, at that portion of the line held by the brigade of General Alexander S. Webb, who was wounded; but his men stood firm against the shock, and, from the eagerness of all to join in the contest, men rushed from every side to the point assailed, mixing up all commands, but making a front that no such remnant as Pickett's could break. General Lewis A. Armistead, who led the charge and leaped over the wall, was shot down as he laid his hand on a gun, and his surviving soldiers surrendered. On the slope of the hill many of the assailants had thrown themselves upon the ground and held up their hands for quarter; and an immediate sally from the National lines brought in a large number of prisoners and battle-flags. Of that magnificent column which had been launched out so proudly, only a broken fragment ever returned. Nearly every officer in it, except Pickett, had been either killed or wounded. Armistead, a prisoner and dying, said to an officer who was bending over him, "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and have wronged my country." He had been opposed to secession, but the pressure of his friends and relatives had at length forced him into the service. Hancock had been wounded and borne from the field, and among the other wounded on the National side were Generals Doubleday, Gibbon, Warren, Butterfield, Stannard, Barnes, and Brook. General Farnsworth was killed, and General Gabriel R. Paul lost both eyes. Among the killed on the Confederate side, beside those already mentioned, were Generals Garnett, Pender, and Semmes; and among the wounded Generals Hampton, Jenkins, Kemper, Scales, J. M. Jones, and G. T. Anderson.

While this movement was in progress, Kilpatrick with his cavalry rode around the mountain and attempted to pass the Confederate right and capture the trains, while Stuart with his cavalry made a simultaneous attempt on the National right. Each had a bloody fight, but neither was successful. This closed the battle.

That night Lee made preparations for retreat, and the next day—which was the 4th of July—the retreat was begun. General Imboden, who conducted the trains and the ambulances, describes it as one of the most pitiful and heartrending scenes ever witnessed. A heavy storm had come up, the roads were in bad condition, few of the wounded had been properly cared for, and as they were jolted along in agony they were groaning, cursing, babbling of their homes, and calling upon their friends to kill them and put them out of misery. But there could be no halt, for the Potomac was rising, and an attack was hourly expected from the enemy in the rear.

Meade, however, did not pursue for several days, and then to no purpose; so that Lee's crippled army escaped into Virginia, but it was disabled from ever doing anything more than prolonging the contest. Gettysburg was essentially the Waterloo of the war. The National loss was 23,190—killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederate losses were never officially reported, but estimates place them at nearly 30,000. Lee left 7000 of his wounded among the unburied dead, and 27,000 muskets were picked up on the field.



THIRTEEN-INCH SHELL MORTAR AS USED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.—WEIGHT OF MORTAR, 17,000 POUNDS.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

IN the autumn of 1862, after the battles of Iuka and Corinth, the National commanders in the West naturally began to think of further movements southward into Mississippi, and of opening the great river and securing unobstructed navigation from Cairo to the Gulf. The project was slow in execution, principally from division of authority. At this time General Grant hardly knew what were the limits of his command, or whether indeed he really had any command at all.

Vicksburg is on a high bluff overlooking the Mississippi where the river makes a sharp bend enclosing a long, narrow peninsula. The railroad from Shreveport, La., reaches the river at this point, and connects by ferry with the railroad running east from Vicksburg through Jackson, the State capital. The distance between the two cities is 45 miles. About 100 miles below Vicksburg is Port Hudson, similarly situated as to river and railways. Between these two points the great Red River flows into the Mississippi. As the Confederates drew a large part of their supplies from Texas and the country watered by the Red River, it was of the first importance to them to retain control of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

After taking New Orleans, in April, 1862, Farragut had gone up the river with some of his ships, in May, and demanded the surrender of Vicksburg; but though the place was then but slightly fortified, the demand was refused, and without a land force he could not take the city, as it was too high to be damaged by his guns.

The fortification of Port Hudson was made almost as strong as Vicksburg.

On the 12th of November, 1862, General Grant received a dispatch from General Halleck placing him in command of all troops sent to his department, and telling him to fight the enemy where he pleased. Four days later Grant and Sherman had a conference at Columbus, and a plan was arranged and afterward modified, by which Grant (who then had about 30,000 men under his personal command) was to move southward and confront an equal force, commanded by General John C. Pemberton, on the Tallahatchie; while Sherman, with 30,000, was to move from Memphis down the eastern bank of the Mississippi, and, assisted by Porter and his gunboats, attempt the capture of Vicksburg from the rear.

Sherman and Porter, with their usual energy, went to work with all speed to carry out their part of the programme. Grant moved more slowly, because he did not wish to force his enemy back upon Vicksburg, but to hold him as far north as possible. He established his depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and waited for Sherman's movement. But the scheme was ruined by the activity of two Confederate cavalry detachments under Generals Van Dorn and Forrest. On the 20th of December Van Dorn made a dash at Holly Springs and captured the place and its garrison. Grant had more than two million dollars' worth of supplies there, and as Van Dorn could not remove them he burned them all, together with the storehouses and railroad buildings. Forrest, making a wide detour, tore up a portion of the railroad between Jackson, Tenn., and Columbus, Ky., so that Grant's army was cut off from all communication with the North for more than a week. It had not yet occurred to



SOLDIERS OF THE TWELFTH MASSACHUSETTS DRAGGING THEIR BAGGAGE-TRAIN DURING A STORM.

anybody that a large army could leave its communications and subsist on supplies gathered in the enemy's country; so Grant gave up this part of his plan and moved back toward Memphis.

But Sherman and Porter, not hearing of the disaster at Holly Springs, had proceeded with their preparations, embarked the troops, and gone down the river in a long procession, the gunboats being placed at intervals in the line of transports.

The expedition arrived at Milliken's Bend on Christmas, where a division was left, and whence a brigade was sent to break the railroad from Shreveport. The next day the boats, with the three remaining divisions, ascended the Yazoo to a point opposite the bluffs north of Vicksburg, where the troops were landed. The bluffs were crowned with artillery, and along their base was a deserted bed of the Yazoo. Most of the bridges were destroyed, and the whole district was subject to inundation. It was ugly ground for the operations of an army; but Sherman, confident that Grant was holding Pemberton, felt sure there could not be a heavy force on the heights, and resolved to capture them without delay. The 27th and 28th were spent in reconnoitering, selecting points for attack, and placing the troops. On the 29th, while the gunboats made a diversion at Haines' Bluff, and a part of Steele's division made feint on the right, near Vicksburg, the main force crossed the intervening bayous at two points and attacked the centre of the position. The battle was begun by a heavy artillery fire, followed by musketry, and then the rush of the men. They had to face guns, at the foot of the bluff, that swept the narrow approaches, and at the same time endure a cross-fire from the heights. Blair's brigade reached the base of the hills, but was not properly supported by Morgan's and had to fall back again. The 6th Missouri regiment, at another point, had also gone forward unsupported, reached the bluff, and could not return. The men quickly scooped niches in the bank with their hands and sheltered themselves in them, while many of the enemy came to the edge of the hill, held out their muskets vertically at arm's length, and fired down at them. These men were not able to get back to their lines till nightfall.

This assault cost Sherman 1848 men, and inflicted upon the Confederates a loss of but 200. The next day a rain set in. Sherman observed the water-marks on the trees ten feet above his head, and he saw whole brigades of reinforcements marching into the enemy's intrenchments. He knew then that something must have gone wrong with Grant's co-operating force, and so he re-embarked his men and munitions, and steamed down to the mouth of the Yazoo.

INCIDENT IN THE MARCH OF GENERAL BANKS' DIVISION IN WESTERN MARYLAND.

On the 4th of January, 1863, General McClernand assumed command of the two corps that were commanded by Generals Sherman and George W. Morgan. It was known that there was a Confederate garrison of 5000 men at Fort Hindman, or Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas. It occurred to Sherman that there could be no safety for boats on the Mississippi near the mouth of the Arkansas till this post was captured or broken up; and accordingly he asked McClernand to let him attack it with his corps, assisted by some of the gunboats. McClernand concluded to go himself with the entire army, and Porter also accompanied in person. They landed on the 10th below the fort, and drove in the pickets. That night the Confederates toiled all night to throw up a line of works reaching from the fort northward to an impassable swamp. On the 11th the whole National force moved forward simultaneously to the attack, the gunboats steaming up close to the fort and sweeping its bastions with their fire, while Morgan's corps moved against its eastern face, and Sherman's against the new line of works. The men advanced steadily, so annoying the artillerymen with their sharpshooting that the guns could not be well served. When the gunboats arrived abreast of the fort and enfiladed it, the gunners ran down into the ditch, a man with the white flag appeared on the parapet, and presently white flags and rags were fluttering all the line. Firing was stopped at once, and the fort was surrendered. About 150 of the garrison had been killed, and the remainder, numbering 4800, were made prisoners. The National loss was about 1000. The fort was dismantled and destroyed, and the stores taken on board the fleet.

In accordance with instructions from Washington, Grant now took personal command of the operations on the Mississippi, dividing his entire force into four corps, to be commanded by McClernand, Sherman, Stephen A. Hurlbut and James B. McPherson. Hurlbut's corps was left to hold the lines east of Memphis, while the other troops, with reinforcements from the North, were united in the river expedition.

McClernand and Sherman went down to the peninsula enclosed in the bend of the river opposite Vicksburg, and with immense labor dug a canal across it. Much was hoped from this, but the river would not flow through it. Furthermore, there were bluffs commanding the river below Vicksburg, and the Confederates had already begun to fortify them.

Grant was surveying the country in every

direction, for some feasible approach to the flanks of his enemy. On the eastern side of the Mississippi there had once been an opening, known as Yazoo Pass, but it had been closed by a levee. Grant blew up the levee, and tried this approach. But the Confederates had information of every movement, and took prompt measures to thwart it. The banks of the streams where his boats had to pass were heavily wooded, and great trees were felled across the channel. Worse than this, after the boats had passed in and removed many of the obstructions, it was found that the enemy were felling trees across the channel behind them. Earthworks also were thrown up at the point where the Yallabusha and Tallahatchie unite to form the Yazoo, and heavily manned. Reinforcements arrived under General Isaac F. Quinby, who assumed command, and began operations for crossing the Yallabusha and rendering the Confederate fortification useless, when he was recalled by Grant, who had found that the necessary light-draft boats for carrying his whole force through to that point could not be had.

One more attempt in this direction was made before the effort to flank Vicksburg on the north was given up. It was proposed to ascend the Yazoo a short distance from its mouth, turn into Steel's bayou, ascend this, and get into Big Sunflower River, and then descend that stream into the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff. Porter and Sherman took the lead in this expedition, and encountered all the difficulties of the Yazoo Pass project. Porter at one time was on the point of abandoning his boats; but finally all were extricated, though some of them had to back out through the narrow pass for 30 miles.

In March, Farragut with his flagship and one gunboat had run by the batteries at Port Hudson, but the remainder of his fleet had failed to pass. Several boats had run by the batteries at Vicksburg; and Grant now turned his attention to a project for moving an army by transports through bayous west of the Mississippi to a point below the city, where Porter, after running by the batteries with his ironclads, was to meet him and ferry the troops across to the eastern bank. The use of the bayous was finally given up, and the army marched by the roads. The fleet ran by the batteries on the night of April 16.

Bridges had to be built over bayous, and a suitable place discovered for crossing the Mississippi. Grant moved his transports down stream under cover of darkness, and at daylight on the 30th began the crossing at Bruinsburg. McClernand's corps was in the advance, and marched on Port Gibson that night. At dawn the enemy was found in a strong position three miles west of that place. There was sharp fighting all day, the Confederate force numbering about 8000, and contesting every foot of the ground; but the line was finally disrupted, and at nightfall they made an orderly retreat, burning bridges behind them. The National loss had been 849 men; the Confederate about 1000.

The fortifications at Grand Gulf were abandoned, Porter took possession of them, and Grant established his base there. A bridge had to be rebuilt at Port Gibson, and then Crocker's division pushed on in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, came up with them at Willow Springs, and drove them across the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry. There was a slight delay, for Sherman's corps and the supplies to arrive, and then Grant pressed on resolutely with his whole army. He had with him about 41,000 men, subsequently increased to 45,000; and Pemberton at this time had about 50,000.

Grant moved northeasterly, toward Jackson, and on the 12th of May found a hostile force near Raymond. It numbered but 3000, and was soon swept away, though not until it had lost 500 men and inflicted a loss of 432. Believing there was a considerable force at Jackson, Grant marched on that place, and the next conflict occurred there, May 14. General Joseph E. Johnston had just been ordered by the Confederate Government to take command of all the forces in Mississippi, and arrived at Jackson in the evening of the 13th, finding there about 12,000 men subject to his orders. Pemberton was at Edwards Station, 30 miles westward, and Grant was between them. Johnston telegraphed to Richmond that he was too late, but took what measures he could for defence. It rained heavily that night, and the next morning, when the corps of Sherman and McPherson marched against the city, they traveled roads that were a foot under water. McPherson came up on the west, and Sherman on the southwest and south. The enemy was met two miles out, and driven in with heavy skirmishing. While manœuvring was going on before the intrenchments, the Union commanders seeking for a suitable point to assault, it was discovered that the



IRVIN McDOWELL.

enemy was evacuating the place, and Grant and his men went in at once and hoisted the National colors. They had lost 290 men in the skirmishing; the enemy 845, mostly captured. Seventeen guns were taken, but the Confederates burned most of their stores.

Leaving Sherman at Jackson to destroy the railroad and the factories that were turning out goods for the Confederacy, which he did very thoroughly, Grant ordered all his other forces to concentrate at Bolton, 20 miles west. Marching thence westward, keeping the corps well together, and ordering Sherman to send forward an ammunition-train—Grant found Pemberton with 23,000 men waiting to receive him at Champion's Hill, on high ground well selected for defence, which covered the three roads leading westward. The battle, May 15, lasted four hours, and was the bloodiest of the campaign. The brunt of it, on the National side, was borne by the divisions of Hovey, Logan, and Crocker; and Hovey lost more than one-third of his men. Logan's division pushed forward on the right, passed Pemberton's left flank, and held the only road by which the enemy could retreat. But this was not known to the Union commander, and when Hovey, hard pressed, called for help, Logan was drawn back to his assistance, and the road uncovered. A little later Pemberton was in full retreat toward the crossing of the Big Black River, leaving his dead and wounded and 30 guns on the field. Grant's loss in the action was 2441. Pemberton's was over 3000 killed and wounded, besides nearly as many captured.

The enemy was next found at the Big Black River, where he had placed his main line on the high land west of the stream, and stationed his advance (or, properly speaking, his rear guard) along the edge of a bayou that ran through the low ground on the east. This position was attacked vigorously on the 17th, and when Lawler's brigade flanked it on the right, the whole line gave way, and Pemberton resumed his retreat, burning the bridge behind him and leaving his men in the lowland to their fate. Some swam the river, some were drowned, and 1750 were made prisoners. Eighteen guns were captured here. The National loss was 279.

Sherman now came up with his corps, and Grant ordered the building of three bridges. Sherman's troops made a fourth bridge farther up the stream, and that night he and Grant sat on a log and watched the long procession of blue-coated men with gleaming muskets marching across the swaying structure by the light of pitchpine torches. All the bridges were finished by morning, and that day, the 18th, the entire army was west of the river.

Pemberton marched straight into Vicksburg, which had a long line of defences on the land side as well as on the water front, and shut himself up there. Grant, invested the place on the 19th. Sherman, holding the right of the line, was at Haines' Bluff. Here, on the Yazoo, Grant established a new base for supplies. McPherson's corps was next to Sherman's on the left, and McClernand's next, reaching to the river below the city. An assault in the afternoon of the 19th gained the National troops some advantage in the advancement of the line to better ground. Grant's army had been living for three weeks on five days' rations, with what they could pick up in the country they passed through, and his first care was to construct roads in the rear of his line, so that supplies could be brought up from the Yazoo rapidly and regularly. He had now about 30,000 men, the line of defences before him was eight miles long, and he expected an attack from Johnston in the rear. At ten o'clock on the 22d, therefore he ordered a grand assault. But though the men at several points reached the breastworks and planted their battle-flags on them, it was found impossible to take them. McClernand falsely reported that he had carried two forts at his end of the line, and asked for reinforcements, which were sent to him, and a renewal of the assault was made to help him. This caused additional loss of life, and shortly afterward that general was relieved of his command, which was given to General E. O. C. Ord.

After this assault, which had cost him nearly 2500 men, Grant settled down to a siege by regular approaches. The work went on day by day, with the usual incidents. There was mining and counter-mining, and two large mines were exploded under angles of the works, but without any practical result. The great guns were booming night and day, throwing thousands of shells into the city. Caves were dug in the banks where the streets had been cut through the clayey hills, and in these the people found refuge from the shells. All the while the besiegers were digging away, bringing their trenches closer to the defences, till the soldiers of the hostile lines bandied jests across the narrow intervening space. At the end of 47 days the works arrived at the point where a

grand assault must be the next thing, and at the same time famine threatened and the National holiday was at hand. After some negotiation General Pemberton unconditionally surrendered the city and his army of 31,600 men on the 4th of July, 1863, one day after Lee's defeat at Gettysburg.

Port Hudson, which Banks with 12,000 men and Farragut with his fleet had besieged for weeks, was surrendered with its garrison of 6000 men five days after the fall of Vicksburg. The Mississippi River was now open and the Confederacy was cut in two.

As soon as the surrender was effected, the famished Confederate army was liberally supplied with food, Grant's men taking it out of their own haversacks. All the prisoners at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were immediately paroled and furnished with transportation and supplies, under the supposition that they would go to their homes and remain there till properly exchanged.



COLLISION BETWEEN THE STEAM-TRANSPORTS "STAR OF THE SOUTH" AND THE "PEERLESS," IN THE GREAT STORM OF NOVEMBER 2, 1861.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON.

As Charleston was the cradle of secession, there was a special desire on the part of the Northern people that it should undergo the heaviest penalties of war. They wanted poetic vengeance to fall upon the very men that had taught disunion, fired upon Sumter, and kindled the flames of civil strife. And there were not a few at the South who shared this sentiment, believing that they had been dragged into ruin by the politicians of South Carolina. But there was a better than sentimental reason for directing vigorous operations against Charleston. Its port was exceedingly useful to the Confederates for shipping their cotton to Europe and receiving in return the army clothing, rifles, and ammunition that were produced for them by English looms and arsenals. Early in the war the Government attempted to close this port with obstructions. Several old whale-ships were loaded with stone, towed into the channel, and sunk. But the strong currents at Charleston soon swept them away or buried them in the sand, and a dozen war-vessels had to be sent there to maintain the blockade. This was exceedingly difficult. The main channel ran for a long distance near the shore of Morris Island, and was protected by batteries. The westward-bound blockade-runners commonly went first to the British port of Nassau, in the West Indies, and thence with a pilot sailed for Charleston. After the main channel had been closed in consequence of the occupation of Morris Island by National troops, steamers of very light draft, built in England for this special service, slipped in by the shallower passes. A great many were captured—for the blockaders developed remarkable skill in detecting their movements—but the practice was never wholly broken up till the city was occupied by the National forces in February, 1865.

In January, 1863, two Confederate iron-clads steamed out of the harbor, on a hazy morning, and attacked the blockading fleet. Two vessels, by shots through their steam-drums, were disabled, and struck their colors; but the remainder of the fleet came to their assistance, and the iron-clads were driven back, leaving their prizes behind.

This affair increased the desire to capture the port. Accordingly a powerful fleet was fitted out and placed under the command of Rear-Admiral S. F. Du Pont. It consisted of seven monitors, an iron-clad frigate, an iron-clad ram, and several wooden gunboats. On the 7th of April, 1863, favored by smooth water, Du Pont steamed in to attack the forts. But most extraordinary precautions had been taken to defend the city. The special desire of the Northern people was to capture it was offset by an equally romantic determination on the part of the secessionists not to part with the cradle in which their pet theory had been rocked for thirty years. Besides the batteries that had been erected for the reduction of Fort Sumter, they had established others, and they occupied that fort itself. All these works had been strengthened, and new guns mounted, including some specially powerful ones of English manufacture. All the channels were obstructed with piles and chains, with innumerable torpedoes, some of which were to be fired by electric wires from the forts, while others were arranged to explode whenever a vessel should run against them. The main channel, between Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter, was crossed by a heavy cable supported on empty barrels, with which was connected a network of smaller chains. In the south channel their was a tempting opening in the row of piles; but beneath this were some tons of powder waiting for the electric spark.

The monitor "Weehawken" led the way, pushing a raft before her to explode the torpedoes, Not a man was to be seen on any of the decks, and the forts were ominously silent. But when the "Weehawken" had reached the network of chains, and had become somewhat entangled therein with her raft, the batteries opened all around, and she and the other monitors that came to her assistance were the target for a terrible concentric fire of bursting shells and solid bolts. The return fire was directed principally upon Sumter, and was kept up steadily for half an hour, but seemed to have little effect; and after trying both the main and the south channel, the fleet retired. The monitor "Keokuk," which had made the nearest approach to the enemy, was struck nearly a hundred times. Shots passed through both of her turrets, and there were 19 holes in her hull. That evening she sank in an inlet. Most of the other vessels were injured, and some of the monitors were unable to revolve their turrets because of the bending of the plates.

Du Pont's defeat was offset two months later, when the Confederate iron-clad "Atlanta" started out from Savannah on her first cruise. Du Pont sent two monitors to watch her. On the 17th of June, early in the morning, she dropped down the channel, followed by two steamers loaded with citizens, including many ladies, who anticipated a great deal of pleasure in seeing their powerful iron-clad sink the monitors. These came up to meet her, the "Weehawken," Captain Rodgers, taking the lead. Rodgers fired just five shots, from his enormous 11 inch and 15 inch guns. One struck the shutter of a porthole and broke it, another knocked off the "Atlanta's" pilot-house, another struck the edge of the deck and opened the seems between the plates, and another penetrated the iron armor, splintered the heavy wooden backing, and disabled 40 men. Thereupon the "Atlanta" hung out a white flag and surrendered, while the pleasure-seekers hastened back to Savannah.

Charleston, between its two rivers, with its well-fortified harbor, bordered by miles of swampy land, was exceedingly difficult for an enemy to reach. General Quincy A. Gillmore, being sent with a large force to take it, chose the approach by way of Folly and Morris islands, where the monitors could assist him. Hidden by a fringe of trees, he first erected powerful batteries on Folly Island. On the northernmost point of Morris Island (Cummings Point) was the Confederate battery Gregg. South of this was Fort Wagner, and still farther south were other works. On the morning of July 10th, Gillmore suddenly cut down the trees in his front and opened fire upon the most southerly works on Morris Island, while the fleet commanded by Admiral Dahlgren,

who had succeeded Du Pont, bombarded Fort Wagner. Under cover of this fire, troops were landed, and the earthworks were quickly taken.

The day being terribly hot, the advance on Fort Wagner was postponed till the next morning, and then it was a failure. A week later a determined assault was made with a force of 6000 men, the advance being led by the first regiment of colored troops (the 54th Massachusetts) that had been raised under the authorization that accompanied the Emancipation Proclamation. They marched out under a concentrated fire from all the Confederate batteries, then met sheets of musketry fire that blazed out from Wagner, then crossed the ditch waist-deep in water, while hand-grenades were thrown from the parapet to explode among them, and even climbed up to the rampart. But here the surviving remnant met a stout resistance and were hurled back. General Strong, Colonel Chatfield, Colonel Putnam, and Robert G. Shaw, the young commander of the black regiment, were all killed, and a total loss was sustained of 1500 men, while the Confederates lost but about 100.

In burying the dead the Confederates threw the body of Colonel Shaw into the bottom of a trench, and heaped upon it the bodies of black soldiers, whose valor, no less than their color, had produced an uncontrollable frenzy in the Confederate mind. When it was inquired for, under flag of truce, word was sent back: "We have buried him with his niggers." Those who had thus tried to cast contempt upon the boyish colonel were apparently not aware that he was braver than any of his foes. In advancing along that narrow strip of land, every foot of which was swept by a deadly fire, crossing the ditch, and mounting the parapet, Colonel Shaw exhibited a physical courage that it was impossible to surpass; while in organizing and leading men of the despised race that was now struggling toward liberty, he showed a moral courage such as the rebels neither shared nor comprehended.

General Gillmore now resorted to regular approaches for the reduction of Fort Wagner, and the work was pushed as rapidly as the nature of the grouud would admit. As the task proceeded the difficulty increased, for the strip of land grew narrower as Fort Wagner was approached, and the men in the trenches were subjected to cross-fire from a battery on James Island, as well as from sharpshooters and from the fort itself. A dozen breaching batteries of enormous rifled guns were established, most of the work being done at night, and on the 17th of August they opened fire. The shot and shell were directed mainly against Fort Sumter, and in the course of a week its barbette guns were dismounted, its walls were knocked into a shapeless mass of ruins, and its value as anything but a rude shelter for infantry was gone.

When the parallels had arrived so near that it was impossible for the men to work under ordinary circumstances, the fort was subjected to a bombardment with shells fired from mortars and dropping into it almost vertically, while the great rifled guns were trained upon its bomb-proof at short range, and the iron-clad frigate "New Ironsides" came close in shore and added her quota in the shape of 11 inch shells. Calcium lights had been prepared, so that there was no night there, and the bombardment went on incessantly. At the end of two days, three columns of infantry were ready to storm the work, when it was discovered that the Confederates had abandoned it. Battery Gregg, was also evacuated. The next night a few hundred sailors from the fleet went to Fort Sumter in row-boats and attempted its capture. But they found it exceedingly difficult to climb up the ruined wall; most of their boats were knocked to pieces by the Confederate batteries, they met an unexpected fire of musketry and hand-grenades, and 200 of them were disabled or captured.

While all this work was going on, General Gillmore thought to establish a battery near enough to Charleston to subject the city itself to bombardment A site was chosen on the western side of Morris Island, and the necessary orders were issued. But the ground was soft mud, 16 feet deep. Piles were driven, a platform was laid upon them, and a parapet was built with bags of sand, 15,000 being required—all of which had to be done after dark, and occupied 14 nights. Then, with great labor, an eight-inch rifled gun was dragged across the swamp and mounted on this platform. It was nearly five miles from Charleston, but being fired at a high elevation was able to reach the lower part of the city. The soldiers named this gun the "Swamp Angel." Late in August it was ready for work, and, after giving notice for the removal of non-combatants, General Gillmore opened fire. A few shells fell in the streets and produced great consternation, but at the thirty-sixth discharge the Swamp Angel burst, and it never was replaced.

As Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg were nearer the city by a mile than the Swamp Angel, Gillmore repaired them, turned their guns upon Charleston, and kept up a destructive bombardment for weeks.



UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT OF THE CONFEDERATE TROOPS TO DESTROY DAM NO. 5, NEAR WILLIAMSPORT, MD.
FROM A SKETCH BY CAPTAIN HARRY BACON.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

WHILE Grant's army was pounding at the gates of Vicksburg, those of Rosecrans and Bragg were watching each other at Murfreesboro. General Grant and the Secretary of War wanted Rosecrans to advance upon Bragg, lest Bragg should reinforce Johnston. But Rosecrans refused to move, on the ground that it was against the principles of military science to fight two decisive battles at once, and that the surest method of holding back Bragg from reinforcing Johnston was by constantly standing ready to attack him, but not attacking. As it happened that Bragg was very much like Rosecrans, and was afraid to stir lest Rosecrans should go to Grant's assistance, the policy of quiet watchfulness proved successful—so far at least as immediate results were concerned.

But though the greater armies were quiescent, both sent out detachments to make destructive raids, and that season witnessed some of the most notable exploits of the guerilla bands that were operating in the West, all through the war, in aid of the Confederacy.

One of these affairs in the West was so bold and startling that it became famous even among the greater and more important events. This was Morgan's raid across the Ohio. In July he

entered Kentucky from the south, with 3000 cavalrymen, increased as it went by accessions of Kentucky sympathizers to about 4000, with ten guns. He captured and robbed the towns of Columbia and Lebanon, reached the Ohio, captured two steamers, and crossed into Indiana. Then marching rapidly toward Cincinnati, he burned mills and bridges, tore up rails, plundered right and left, and spread alarm on every side. But the Home Guards were gathering to meet him, and the great number of railways in Ohio and Indiana favored their rapid concentration, while farmers felled trees across the roads on hearing of his approach. He passed around Cincinnati, and and after much delay reached the Ohio at Buffington's Ford. Here some of his pursuers overtook him, while gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men were patrolling the river, on the watch for him. The gunboats prevented him from using the ford, and he was obliged to turn and give battle. The fight was severe, and resulted in Morgan's defeat. Nearly 800 of his men surrendered, and he with the remainder retreated up the river. They next tried to cross at Belleville by swimming their horses; but the gunboats were at hand again, and made such havoc among the troopers that only 300 got across, while of the others some were shot, some drowned, and the remnant driven back to the Ohio shore. Morgan with 200 fled still farther up the stream, but at last was compelled to surrender at New Lisbon. He was confined in the Ohio Penitentiary, but escaped a few months later by digging under the walls.

When at last Rosecrans did move, by some of the ablest strategy displayed in the whole war he compelled Bragg to fall back successively from one position to another, all the way from Tullahoma to Chattanooga. This was not done without frequent and heavy skirmishes, however, but the superiority of the National cavalry had now been developed at the West as well as at the East, and they all resulted in one way.

The purpose of Rosecrans was to get possession of Chattanooga; and when Bragg crossed the Tennessee and occupied that town he set to work to manœuvre him out of it. To effect this, he moved southwest, as if he were intending to pass around Chattanooga and invade Georgia. This caused Bragg to fall back to Lafayette, and the National troops took possession of Chattanooga.

Supposing that Bragg was in full retreat, Rosecrans began to follow him; but Bragg had received large reinforcements, and turned back from Lafayette. The two armies, feeling for each other and approaching somewhat cautiously for a week, met at last, and there was fought, September 19 and 20, 1863, a great battle on the banks of a creek, whose Indian name of Chickamauga is said to signify "River of Death."

Rosecrans had about 55,000 men; Bragg, after the arrival of Longstreet at midnight of the 18th, about 70,000. The general direction of the lines of battle was with the National troops facing southeast, and the Confederates facing northwest. Thomas held the left of Rosecrans' line, Crittenden the Centre, and McCook the right. Bragg was the attacking party, and his plan was, while making a feint on the National right, to fall heavily upon the left, flank it, crush it, and seize the roads that led to Chattanooga.

The battle of the 19th began at 10 a. m., and lasted all day. The Confederate army crossed the creek, and moved forward confidently to the attack. But the left of the position, the key-point, was held by the command of Thomas, who for a slow and stubborn fight was perhaps the best corps commander produced by either side in the whole war. Opposed to him, on the Confederate right, was General (also Bishop) Leonidas Polk. There was less of concerted action in the attack than Bragg had planned for, partly because Thomas unexpectedly struck out with a counter-movement when an opportunity offered; but there was no lack of bloody and persistent fighting. Brigades and divisions moved forward to the charge, were driven back, and charged again. Batteries were taken and retaken, the horses were killed, and the captains and gunners in some instances, refusing to leave them, were shot down at the wheels. Brigades and regiments were shattered, and on both sides many prisoners were taken. Thomas' line was forced back, but before night he regained his first position, and the day closed with the situation practically unchanged.

During the night both sides corrected their lines and made preparation for a renewal of the struggle. Bragg intended to attack again at daybreak, his plan (now perfectly evident to his opponent) being substantially the same as on the day before. He wanted to crush the National left, force back the centre, and make a grand left wheel with his entire army, placing his right firmly across the path to Chattanooga. But the

AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.

morning was foggy, Polk was slow, and the fighting did not begin till the middle of the forenoon. Between Polk and Thomas the edge of battle swayed back and forth, and the Confederates could make no permanent impression. Thomas was obliged to call repeatedly for reinforcements, which sometimes reached him and sometimes failed to, but whether they came or not, he held manfully to all the essential portions of his ground.

Rosecrans was constantly uneasy about his right centre, where he knew the line to be weak; and at this point the great disaster of the day began, though in an unexpected manner. It arose from an order that was both mis-written and misinterpreted. This order, addressed to General Thomas J. Wood, who commanded a division, was written by a member of Rosecrans' staff who had not had a military education, and was not sufficiently impressed with the exact meaning of the technical terms. It read: "The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him." It was impossible to obey both clauses of this order; since to "close up" means to bring the ends of the lines together so that there shall be no gap and they shall form one continuous line, while to "support," in the technical military sense, means to take a position in the rear, ready to advance when ordered. The aide that wrote the order evidently used the word "support" only in the general sense of assist, strengthen, protect, encourage, and did not dream of its conflicting with the command to "close up." General Wood, a West-Point graduate, instead of sending or going to Rosecrans for better orders, obeyed literally the second clause, and withdrew his command from the line to form it in the rear of Reynolds. Opposite to the wide and fatal opening thus left was Longstreet, who instantly saw his advantage and promptly poured six divisions through the gap. This cut off McCook's corps from the rest of the army, and it was speedily defeated and routed. The centre was crumbled, and it looked as if the whole army must be destroyed. Rosecrans, who had been with the defeated right wing, appeared to lose his head completely, and rode back in all haste to Chattanooga to make arrangements for gathering there the fragments of his forces. At nightfall he sent his chief of staff, General James A. Garfield (afterward President) to find what had become of Thomas, and Garfield found Thomas where not even the destruction of three-fifths of the army had moved or daunted him.

When Thomas' right flank was exposed to assault, he swung it back to a position known as Horseshoe Ridge, still covering the road. Longstreet was pressing forward to pass the right of this position, when he was stopped by Gordon Granger, who moved forward to the support of Thomas. The Confederate commander, when complete victory was apparently so near, seemed reckless of the lives of his men, thrusting them forward again and again in futile charges, where Thomas' batteries literally mowed them down with grape and canister, and a steady fire of musketry increased the bloody harvest. About dusk the ammunition was exhausted, and the last charges of the Confederates were repelled with the bayonet. Thomas had fairly won the title of "the rock of Chickamauga." In the night he fell back in good order to Rossville, leaving the enemy in possession of the field, with all the dead and wounded. Sheridan, who had been on the right of the line and was separated by its disruption, kept his command together, marched around the mountain, and before morning joined Thomas at Rossville, whence they fell back the next day to Chattanooga, where order was quickly restored and the defences strengthened.

The National loss in the two-days battle of Chickamauga was 16,336. The Confederate reports are incomplete and unsatisfactory; but estimates of Bragg's loss make it at least 18,000. Tactically it was a victory for Bragg, who was left in possession of the field; but that which he was fighting for, Chattanooga, he did not get. He advanced, however, to positions on Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, and put the town into a state of siege, managing to stop the navigation of the river below and cut off all of Rosecrans' routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road.

A month after the battle of Chickamauga, the National forces in the West were to some extent reorganized. The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans. General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. The troops had been on short rations for some time, and large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could

come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done within five days, the "cracker line," as the soldiers called it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and abundance of everything.

Bragg's army held a most singular position. Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley. This line was 12 miles long, and most of it was well intrenched.

Grant ordered Sherman to join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile, Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men. He placed Sherman on his left, on the north side of the Tennessee, opposite the head of Mission Ridge; Thomas in the centre, across Chattanooga valley; and Hooker on his right around the base of Lookout Mountain. He purposed to have Sherman advance against Bragg's right and capture the heights of Mission Ridge, while Thomas and Hooker should press the centre and left just enough to prevent any reinforcements from being sent against Sherman. If this were successful, Bragg's key-point being taken, his whole army would be obliged to retreat. Sherman laid two bridges in the night of November 23, and next day advanced upon the enemy's works; but he met with unexpected difficulties in the nature of the ground, and was only partially successful. Hooker moved around the base of Lookout Mountain, and attacked the seemingly impregnable heights. His men climbed the steep in the rain, clearing away abatis as they went, disappeared in a zone of mist or cloud that hung around the mountain, and made their way to its very summit, where they routed the enemy, taking many guns and prisoners. This action is famous as Hooker's "battle above the clouds." That night battalions were seen crossing the disk of the rising moon.

LIEUTENANT TILLOTTSON'S NAVAL BATTERY, CENTRAL DIVISION, UNDER LIEUTENANT McCOOK, AT THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE, N. C.

The next day, the 25th, Hooker was to pass down the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain, cross Chattanooga valley, and strike the left of Bragg's position as now held on the crest and western slope of Mission Ridge. But the destruction of a bridge by the retreating enemy delayed him four hours, and Grant saw that Bragg was weakening his centre to mass troops against Sherman. So he ordered an advance of the centre held by Thomas. Under the immediate leadership of Generals Sheridan and Wood, Thomas' men crossed the valley, walked right into the line of Confederate works at the base of Mission Ridge, followed the retreating enemy to a second line, half-way up the slope, took this, and still keeping at the very heels of the Confederates, who thus shielded them from the batteries at the top, reached the summit and swept everything before them. Bragg's army was completely defeated, and its captured guns were turned upon it as it fled.

In these battles the National loss was nearly 6000 men. The Confederate loss was about 10,000, of whom 6000 were prisoners, and 42 guns. Bragg established the remainder of his army in a fortified camp at Dalton, Ga., and was soon superseded in command by General Joseph E. Johnston. Granger and Sherman were sent to the relief of Burnside at Knoxville, and Longstreet withdrew to Virginia.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN.

AT the close of the third year of the war—the winter of 1863-4—it was evident to all thoughtful citizens that something was lacking in its conduct. To those who understood military operations on a large scale, this had been apparent long before. It was true that there had been great successes, as well as great failures. Both of Lee's attempts at invasion of the North had resulted disastrously to him—the one at the Antietam, the other at Gettysburg; and when he recrossed the Potomac the second time with half of his army disabled, it was morally certain that he would invade no more. Grant, first coming into notice as the captor of an army in February, 1862, had captured another, more than twice as large, in the summer of 1863, thus securing the stronghold of Vicksburg, and enabling the Mississippi, as Lincoln expressed it, to flow unvexed to the sea. Later in the same year he had won a brilliant victory over Bragg at Chattanooga,



VIEW OF FORT LAFAYETTE, NEW YORK HARBOR, IN WHICH STATE PRISONERS WERE INCARCERATED.

securing that important point and relieving east Tennessee. New Orleans, by far the largest city in the South, had been firmly held by the National forces ever since Farragut captured it, in April, 1862. There were also numerous points on the coast of the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida where the Stars and Stripes floated every day in assertion of the nation's claim to supreme authority. Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, West Virginia, and Tennessee—all confidently counted upon by the Confederates at the outset—were now hopelessly lost to them. The territory covered by Confederate authority had been steadily diminishing. Faulty though it was, if the military process thus far pursued had been kept up, it must ultimately have destroyed the Confederacy. And there was no military reason (using the word in its narrow sense) why it could not be kept up; for the resources of the North, in men and material, were not seriously impaired. All the farms were tilled, all the workshops were busy, the colleges had almost or quite their usual number of students; and there were not nearly so many young women keeping books or standing behind counters as now. Moreover, the ports of the North were all open, and the markets of the world accessible. It is true that the currency and the national securities were at a discount, and it was certain that their value would be diminished still further by the prolongation of the war; but this was not fatal so long as our own country produced everything essential.

The necessity for a swifter process was more political than military. There was a half-informed populace to be satisfied, and a half-loyal party to be silenced. The subtlest foe was in our own household; and the approach of the Presidential and Congressional elections, unless great National victories should intervene, might bring its opportunity and seal the fate of the Republic.

The one thing required was a single supreme military head for all the armies in the field. The faulty disposition by which, in many of the great battles, the several parts of an army had struck the enemy successively, instead of all at once, existed also on the grander scale. There was no concert of action between the armies of the East, the West, and the Southwest; so that large detachments of the Confederate forces were sent back and forth on their shorter interior lines, to fight wherever they were most needed. We had one general that from the first had gone directly for the most important objects in his department, and thus far had secured everything he went for. Accordingly Congress passed a bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in February, 1864, and President Lincoln promptly conferred that rank upon Ulysses S. Grant. Only Washington and Scott had previously borne this commission in the United States service, and through three years of the war we had nothing higher than a major-general in the field. Rank was cheaper in the Confederacy, where there were not only lieutenant-generals but several full generals. Some of the corps commanders in Lee's army, at the head of 10,000 men, had nominally the same rank (lieutenant-general) as Grant when he assumed command of all the National forces in the field. When Lincoln handed Grant his commission, they met for the first time. A year and a month later, the war was ended, Grant was the foremost soldier in the world, and Lincoln was in his grave.

JOHN H. MORGAN.



HENRY WAGER HALLECK.

Grant fixed his head-quarters with the Army of the Potomac, thus placing himself where, on the one hand, he could withstand interference that might thwart the operations of a subordinate, and where on the other he would personally conduct the campaign against the strongest army of the Confederacy and its most trusted leader.

He planned a campaign in which he considered the Army of the Potomac his centre; the Army of the James, under Butler, his left wing; the Western armies, now commanded by Sherman, his right wing; and the army under Banks in Louisiana a force operating in the rear of the enemy. In its great features, the plan was this: that all should move simultaneously—Butler against Petersburg, to seize the southern communications of the Confederate capital; Sherman against Johnston's army (then at Dalton, Ga.), to defeat and destroy it, if possible, or at least to force it back and capture Atlanta with its workshops and important communications; Banks to set out on an expedition toward Mobile, to capture that city and close its harbor to blockade-runners; Sigel to drive back the Confederate force in the Shenandoah valley, and prevent that fertile region from being used any longer as a Confederate granary; while the Army of the Potomac, taking Lee's army for its objective, should follow it wherever it went, fighting and flanking it until it should be captured or dispersed.

South of the Rapidan is a peculiar region 12 or 15 miles square, known as the Wilderness. Some of the earliest iron-works in the country were here, and much of the ground was dug over for the ore, while the woods were cut off to supply fuel for the furnaces. A thick second growth sprang up, with tangled underbrush, the mines were deserted, the furnaces went to decay, and the whole region was desolate, save a roadside tavern or two, and here and there a little clearing. Chancellorsville, where a great battle was fought in May, 1863, was on the eastern edge of this Wilderness. The bulk of Lee's army was now (May, 1864) on its western edge, with a line of observation along the Rapidan, and head-quarters at Orange Court-House. The Army of the Potomac was north of the Rapidan, opposite the Wilderness. It was now organized in three infantry corps, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth—commanded respectively by Generals Winfield S. Hancock, Gouverneur K. Warren, and John Sedgwick—and a cavalry corps commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan; General George G. Meade being still in command of the whole. Burnside's corps, the Ninth, nearly 20,000 strong, was at Annapolis, and nobody but General Grant knew its destination. He knew too well that there was a leak somewhere in Washington, through which every Government secret escaped to the Confederates; and he therefore delayed till the last moment the movement of Burnside's corps to a point from which it could follow the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan within 24 hours.

The Army of Northern Virginia consisted of two infantry corps, commanded by Richard S. Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill, with a cavalry corps commanded by General James E. B. Stuart; the whole commanded by General Robert E. Lee; while, as an offset to Burnside's corps, General James Longstreet's was within call. The exact number of men in either army cannot be told, as reports and authorities differ; nor can the approximate numbers be mentioned fairly, unless with an explanation. The method of counting for the official reports was different in the two armies. In the National army, a report that a certain number of men were present for duty included every man that was borne on the pay-rolls, whether officer, soldier, musician, teamster, cook, or mechanic, and also all that had been sent away on special duty. This was necessary, because they were all paid regularly, and the money had to be accounted for. In the Confederate army there was no pay worth speaking of, and the principal object of a morning report was to show the exact effective force available that day; accordingly, the Confederate reports included only the men actually bearing muskets or sabers, or handling the artillery; all officers, musicians, teamsters, etc., being excluded from the count. Counted in this way, Lee had 60,000 or perhaps 65,000 men—for exact reports are wanting, even on that basis. If counted after the fashion in the National army, his men numbered about 80,000. Grant puts his own numbers, everything included, at 116,000, and thinks the preponderance was fully offset by the fact that the enemy was on the defensive, seldom leaving his intrenchments, in a country admirably suited for defence, and with the population friendly to him. As each side received reinforcements from time to time about equal to its losses, the two armies may be considered as having, throughout the campaign, the strength just stated.

It was clearly set forth by General Grant at the outset that the true objective was the Army of Northern Virginia. In that lay the chief strength of the Confederacy.

The intention was to have the simultaneous movement of all the armies begin as near the 1st of May as possible. It actually began at midnight

of the 3d, when the Army of the Potomac was set in motion and crossed the Rapidan on five pontoon bridges near Germania, Culpeper Mine, and Ely's fords. On crossing, it plunged at once into the Wilderness, which is here traversed from north to south by two roads, a mile or two apart. And these roads are crossed by two—the Orange turnpike and Orange plank road—running nearly east and west. Besides these, there are numerous cross-roads and wood-paths. It would have been easy for the army to pass through this wooded tract in a very few hours, and deploy in the open country; but the supply and ammunition train consisted of 4000 wagons, and the reserve artillery of more than 100 guns—all of which must be protected by keeping the army between them and the enemy. Consequently the troops remained in the Wilderness during the 4th, while the long procession was filing across the bridges and

GENERAL ASBOTH AND STAFF AT THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, ARK.

stretching away on the easternmost roads. And after this the bridges were taken up. Grant's headquarters that night were at the old Wilderness Tavern, on the Orange turnpike, near the intersection of the road from Germania ford. It had been supposed that Lee would either dispute the passage of the river, or (as he had done on previous occasions) await attack on some chosen ground that was suitable for fighting. As he had not disputed the passage, the army now expected to march out of the Wilderness the next day, thus turning the enemy's right flank, and placing itself between him and his capital.

But Grant kept pickets out on all the roads to the west; and it cannot be said that he was surprised, though he was probably disappointed, when he found his lines attacked on the morning of the 5th, and it soon became evident that the Confederate commander had resorted to the bold device of launching his whole army down the two parallel roads, with the purpose of striking the Army of the Potomac when it was ill-prepared to receive battle. Under some circumstances he would thus have gained a great advantage; but as it was, the army was clear of the river, with all its trains safe in the rear, was reasonably well together, had had a night's rest, and was not in any proper sense surprised. Hancock's corps, which had the lead, was quickly recalled, Burnside's was hurried up from the rear, and a line of battle was formed—so far as there could be any line of battle in a jungle. Neither artillery nor cavalry could be used to any extent by either side, and the contest was little more than a murdering-match between two bodies of men, each individual having a musket in his hand, and being unable to see more than a few of his nearest neighbors. This went on all day, increasing hourly as more of the troops came into position, with no real advantage to either side. Lee's attack had been vigorous on his left, but imperfect on his right, where Longstreet's corps did not get up in time. No sooner had the battle ended than both sides began to intrench for the struggle of the morrow.

Grant intended to take the initiative on the morning of the 6th, and gave orders for an attack at five o'clock. But Lee, who did not want the real battle of the day to begin till Longstreet's corps should be in place on his right, attacked with his left at a still earlier hour. Grant recognized this as a feint, and went on with his purpose of attacking the enemy's right before Longstreet should come up. This work devolved upon Hancock's corps, which as usual was ready to advance at the hour named; but just then came rumors of a flank movement by Longstreet, and Hancock, detaching troops to meet it, greatly weakened the blow he was ordered to deliver. Yet this advance was powerful enough to drive the enemy before him for more than a mile. At that juncture Longstreet came up, the broken Confederate line rallied on his corps, and Hancock was in turn driven back. Here the fighting was stubborn, and the losses heavy. General James S. Wadsworth, one of the most patriotic men in the service, was mortally wounded and died within the Confederate lines. The Confederate General Jenkins was killed, and Longstreet was seriously wounded in almost exactly the same way that Stonewall Jackson had been, a year and three days before, on nearly the same ground. His men were thrown into great confusion, and General Lee, who now took command of them in person, found it impossible to rally them for an attack on Hancock's intrenchments. But late in the afternoon such an assault was made, and met with a little temporary success. The Confederates burst through the line at one point, but were soon driven back again with heavy loss. At this point a fire broke out in Hancock's front, and soon his log breastworks were burning. His men were forced back by the heat, but continued firing at their enemy through the flame. Large numbers of the dead and wounded were still lying where they fell, scattered over the belt of ground, nearly a mile wide, where the tide of battle had swayed back and forth, and an unknown number of the wounded perished by the fire and smoke. Burnside had come into line, and fighting had been kept up along the entire front, but it was nowhere so fierce as on the left or southern end of the line, where

each commander was trying to double up the other's flank. At night the Confederates withdrew to their intrenchments, and from that time till the end of the campaign they seldom showed a disposition to leave them.

The best authorities vary as to the National loss, from fewer than 14,000 to about 15,400. The Confederate loss did not differ materially from the National loss, and in the circumstances of the battle there was no reason for thinking it would. Among the officers lost, besides those already mentioned, were, on the National side, General Alexander Hays, killed; Generals Getty, Baxter, and McAllister, and Colonels Carroll and Keifer wounded; and Generals Seymour and Shaler captured; on the Confederate side, Generals Pegram and Benning wounded.

If General Lee supposed that the Army of the Potomac, after a sudden blow and a bloody battle, would turn about and go home to repair damages —as it had been in the habit of doing—he omitted from his calculation the fact that it was now led by a soldier who never did anything of the kind. Indeed, he is reported to have said to his lieutenants, after this costly experiment, "Gentlemen, at last the Army of the Potomac has a head." Tactically, it had been a drawn battle. Grant accounts it a victory, which he says "consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit."

There was no fighting on the 7th except a cavalry engagement at Todd's Tavern, by which Sheridan cleared the road for the southward movement of the army; and in the afternoon Grant gave the order to move by the left flank toward Spottsylvania.

Grant's general purpose was to place his army between the enemy and Richmond, interfering with the communications and compelling Lee to fight at disadvantage. The immediate purpose was a rapid march to Spottsylvania Court House, 15 miles southeast of the Wilderness battle-field, and a dozen miles southwest of Fredericksburg, to take a strong position covering the roads that radiate from that point. Warren's corps was to take the advance, marching by the Brock road, to be followed by Hancock's. Sedgwick's and Burnside's were to take a route farther north, through Chancellorsville. The trains were put in motion on Saturday, May 7, and Warren began his march at nine o'clock that evening. To withdraw an army in this manner, in the presence of a powerful enemy, and send it forward to a new position, is a difficult and delicate task, as it may be attacked after it has left the old position and before it has gained the new. The method adopted by General Grant was repeated in each of his flanking movements between the Wilderness and the James. It consisted in withdrawing the corps that held his right flank, and passing it behind the others while they maintained their position.

The distances that the two armies had to march to reach Spottsylvania Court House were very nearly the same; but two unforeseen circumstances determined the race and the form of the ensuing battle. The Brock road was occupied by Confederate cavalry, and Warren's corps stood still while the National cavalry undertook to clear the way. This was not done easily, and the road was further obstructed by felled trees. After precious time had been lost, Warren's corps went forward and cleared the way for itself. The other circumstance was more purely fortuitous. Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps led the Confederate advance, and Anderson had his orders to begin the march early on Sunday morning, the 8th. But from the burning of the woods he found no suitable ground for bivouac, and consequently marched all night. The National cavalry were in Spottsylvania Court House Sunday morning, and found there but a slight force of cavalry, easily brushed away; but they had to retire before the Confederate infantry when Anderson came down the road. Consequently, when Warren came within sight of the Court House, he found the same old foe intrenched in his front. Hancock had been held back, because of apprehensions that the Confederates would make a heavy attack upon the rear. So the remainder of Longstreet's corps, and finally all of Lee's troops, poured into the rude sylvan fortress, and once more the Army of Northern Virginia stood at bay.

Grant now sent Sheridan with his cavalry to do to the Confederate army what in previous campaigns its cavalry had twice done to the Army of the Potomac—to ride entirely around it. Sheridan destroyed ten miles of railroad and several trains of cars, cut all the telegraph wires, and recaptured 400 prisoners who had been taken in the battle of the Wilderness. The Confederate cavalry, by hard riding, got between him and Richmond. Sheridan's troops met them at Yellow Tavern, seven miles north of the city, and after a hard fight defeated and dispersed them, General J. E. B. Stuart, the ablest cavalry leader in the Confederacy, being mortally wounded. Sheridan then crossed the Chickahominy, and rejoined the army on the 25th.



DON CARLOS BUELL.



ORMSBY M. MITCHELL.

As the National army came into position before the intrenchments of Spottsylvania, Hancock's corps had the extreme right, or western end of the line; then came Warren's, then Sedgwick's, and on the extreme left Burnside's. While Sedgwick's men were placing their batteries, they were annoyed by sharpshooters. The men naturally shrank back from their work, when Sedgwick expostulated with them, remarking that "they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." As he stepped forward to the works a bullet struck him in the face and he fell dead. In his fall the army lost one of its best soldiers, and the country one of its purest patriots. General Horatio G. Wright succeeded him in the command of the Sixth Corps.

On the evening of the 9th, Hancock's corps moved to the right, with a view to flanking and attacking the Confederate left, and made a reconnoissance at the point where the road from Shady Grove church crosses the Po. A brigade of Barlow's division crossed the stream but was confronted by intrenchments. It was now seen that the Confederate left rested on the stream at a point above, and before he could withdraw Barlow, the enemy sallied out from their intrenchments and attacked that brigade in heavy force. The assault was repelled with considerable loss to Barlow, but with much greater loss to the assailants. After a short interval the experiment was renewed, with precisely the same result; and Barlow then re-crossed.

The weak point in the Confederate line was the salient at the northern point of their intrenchment. A salient is weak because almost any fire directed against it becomes an enfilading fire for one or another part of it. But the National army could only learn the shape of the Confederate intrenchments after traversing thick woods, following out by-paths, and scrambling through dark ravines. As soon as the salient was discovered preparations were made for assaulting it. The storming party consisted of 12 regiments of Wright's corps, commanded by Colonel Emory Upton, and was to be supported by Mott's division of Hancock's, while the remainder of Wright's and all of Warren's corps were to advance and take advantage of any opportunity that should be made for them. While a heavy battery was firing rapidly at the salient and enfilading one of its sides, Upton's men formed under cover of the woods, and the instant the battery ceased firing, about 6 p. m., burst out with a cheer, swept over the works after a short hand to hand fight, and captured more than 1000 prisoners and a few guns. Mott, forming in open ground, did not move so promptly, suffered more from the fire from the enemy, and effected nothing. Warren's corps moved forward, but was driven back with heavy loss. In a second assault they reached the breastworks and captured them after fierce fighting, but were not able to hold them when strong Confederate reinforcements came up. Upton, who had broken through a

second line of intrenchments, seemed to have opened a way for the destruction of the Confederate army; but the difficulties of the ground and the lateness of the hour made it impracticable to follow up the advantage. After dark, Upton's men withdrew, bringing the prisoners and the captured battle-flags.

On the 11th it rained heavily, and there was no fighting. Grant determined to make a heavier and more persistent assault upon the tempting salient, and moved Hancock's corps by a wood-road, after dark, to a point opposite the apex. The morning of the 12th was foggy, but by 4.30 p. m. it was light enough, and Hancock's men advanced. When they were half-way across the open ground in front of the salient, they burst into a wild cheer and rushed for the works. Here they were met by determined resistance on the part of the half-surprised Confederates, who fought irregularly with clubbed muskets. But Hancock's corps was over the breastworks in a few seconds. Large numbers of Confederates were killed, mostly with the bayonet. So sudden was Hancock's irruption, that he captured General Edward Johnson's entire division of nearly 4000 men, with its commander and General Steuart. Hancock's men had also captured 20 guns, with their horses and caissons, thousands of small arms, and 30 battle-flags. The guns were immediately turned upon the enemy, who was followed through the woods toward Spottsylvania Court House till the pursuers ran up against another line of intrenchments across the base of the salient. At the same time that Hancock assaulted at the apex, Warren and Burnside had assaulted at the sides, but with less success.

Lee poured his men into the salient with a determination to retake it. Hancock's men, when the pressure became too great, fell back slowly to the outer intrenchments, and turning used them as their own. Five times the Confederates attacked these in heavy masses, and five times they were repelled with bloody loss. Before they had been at disadvantage from defending a salient, and now they were at equal disadvantage in assailing a reëntrant angle. To add to the slaughter, Hancock had established several batteries on high ground, where they could fire over the heads of his own men and strike the enemy beyond. Here and along the western face of the angle the fighting was kept up all day, and was most desperate and destructive. Field guns were run up close to the works and fired into the masses of Confederate troops within the salient, creating terrible havoc; but in turn the horses and gunners were certain to be shot down. There was hand-to-hand fighting over the breastworks, and finally the men of the two armies were crouching on either side of them, shooting and stabbing through the crevices between the logs. The fighting around the "death-angle," as the soldiers called it, was kept up till past midnight, when the Confederates finally withdrew to their interior line. The dead were not only literally piled in heaps, but their bodies were terribly torn and mangled by the shot. Every tree and bush was cut down or killed by the balls, and in one instance the body of an oak tree nearly two feet in diameter was completely cut through by bullets. The National losses in the fighting around Spottsylvania, from the 8th to the 21st of May, were 13,600. Somewhat over half of this loss occurred on the 12th. The Confederate loss appears to have been 10,000 on the 12th, and was probably about equal in the aggregate to the National loss. In the National army, besides Sedgwick, Generals T. G. Stevenson and J. C. Rice were killed, and Generals H. G. Wright and Alexander S. Webb, and Colonel Samuel S. Carroll were wounded; the last named being promoted to brigadier-general on the field. Of the Confederates, Generals Daniel and Perrin were killed, Generals R. D. Johnston, McGowan, Ramseur and Walker wounded, and Generals Johnson and Steuart captured.

General Grant had written to Halleck on the 11th: "We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. . . . I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." A week was spent in manœuvring to find a new point of attack that promised success, but without avail, and it was determined to move again by the left flank. The movement was to the North Anna River; again it was a race, and this time the Confederates had the shorter line.



CAPTURE OF COLONEL ISAAC W. AVERY, OF SOUTH CAROLINA, BY LIEUTENANT HAMMOND, OF THE U. S. GUNBOAT "HETZEL," WHILE RALLYING HIS PANIC-STRICKEN REGIMENT.

FROM A SKETCH BY F. B. SCHELL.

The distance from Spottsylvania Court House to Richmond is a little more than 50 miles. Grant did not wish to conceal his movement altogether. He was anxions to induce the enemy to fight without the enormous advantage of intrenchments. So he planned to send one corps toward Richmond, hoping that Lee would be tempted to attack it with all his army, whereupon the other corps might follow up sharply and attack the Confederates before they had time to intrench. When the movement was begun, Lee, instead of moving at once in the same direction, sent Ewell's corps to attack the National right. It happened that 6000 raw recruits, under General R. O. Tyler, were on their way to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, and had not quite reached their place in line, when they were struck by Ewell's flank movement. Grant says they maintained their position in a manner worthy of veterans, till they were reinforced by the divisions of Birney and Crawford, and Ewell was then quickly driven back with heavy loss. This was on the 19th of May.

The corps thrown forward as a bait was Hancock's, and it marched on the night of the 20th, easterly to Guinea Station, and then southerly to Milford. Warren's corps followed 12 hours later, and 12 hours later still the corps of Burnside and Wright. The Confederates had no notion of taking any risk. They made a reconnoissance to their left, to be sure that Grant had not kept a corps at Spottsylvania to fall upon their rear, and then set out by a shorter line than his to interpose themselves once more between him and their capital.

The new position that was taken up was one of the strongest that could have been devised. The Confederate left stretched in a straight line, a mile and a half long, from Little River to the North Anna at Oxford. Here, bending at a right angle, the line followed the North Anna down stream for three-quarters of a mile, thence continuing in a straight line southeastward, to and around Hanover Junction. The North Anna here makes a bend to the south, and on the most southerly point of the bend the Confederate line touched and held it. If we imagine a ring cut in halves, and the halves placed back to back, in contact, and call one the line of Confederate intrenchments and the other the river, we shall have a fair representation of the essential features of the situation. It is evident that any enemy approaching from the north and attempting to envelop this position, would have his own line twice divided by the river, so that his army would be in three parts. The obvious point to assail in such a position would be the apex of the salient line where it touched the river; and Burnside was ordered to force a passage at that point. But the banks were high and steep, and the passage was covered by artillery. Wright's corps crossed the river above the Confederate position, and destroyed some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, while Hancock's crossed below, and destroyed a large section of the road to Fredericksburg. By this time they had learned the effective method of not only tearing up the track, but piling up the ties and setting them on fire, heating the rails and twisting them so that they could not be used again. These operations were not carried on without frequent sharp fighting, which cost each side about 2000 men.

In the night of May 26, which was very dark, the army withdrew to the north bank of the North Anna, and was put in motion again by the left flank. Sheridan's cavalry led the way and guarded the crossings of the Pamunkey. The direction was southeast, and the distance about 30 miles to a point at which the army would cross the Pamunkey and move southwest toward Richmond, the crossing being about 20 miles from that city. But between lie the swamps of the Chickahominy. In the morning of the 28th the cavalry moved out on the most direct road to Richmond, and at Hawes' Shop encountered a strong force of Confederate cavalry, which was dismounted and intrenched. After a bloody fight of some hours' duration, the divisions commanded by Gregg and Custer broke over the intrenchments and forced back the enemy; the other divisions came up promptly, and the position was held. Soon after noon of that day three-fourths of the army had crossed the Pamunkey, and the remaining corps crossed that night. Here were several roads leading to the Confederate capital; but the Confederate

army had moved in the same direction, by a shorter route, and had quickly taken up a strong position across all these roads, with flanks on Beaver Dam and Totopotomoy creeks. Moreover, at this time it was heavily reinforced.

Near Bethesda church there was a small engagement, where a portion of Early's corps made an attack on the National left and gained a brief advantage, but was soon driven back. At dusk, one brigade of Barlow's division made a sudden rush and carried a line of Confederate rifle-pits. But it was ascertained that the position offered no chance of success in a serious assault. Furthermore, Grant was expecting reinforcements from Butler's Army of the James, to come by way of White House. So he extended his left toward Cold Harbor, sending Sheridan with cavalry and artillery to secure that place. Sheridan was heavily attacked there on the morning of June 1, but held his ground. In the course of the day he was relieved by the Sixth Corps, to which the 10,000 reinforcements under General William F. Smith were added. At the same time the Confederate line had been extended in the same direction, so as still to cover all roads leading to Richmond.

At six o'clock in the evening, Smith's and Wright's corps attacked the Confederate intrenchments. Along most of the front they were obliged to cross open ground that was swept by artillery and musketry; but they moved forward steadily, in spite of their rapid losses, and everywhere carried the first line of works, taking some hundreds of prisoners, but were stopped by the second. They intrenched and held their advanced position; but it had been dearly bought, since more than 2000 of their men were killed or wounded.

When the entire army was in its new position at Cold Harbor, eight or ten miles from Richmond, with its enemy but a little distance in front of it, an attack was planned for the morning of the 3d. The Confederate position was very strong. The line was from three to six miles from the outer defences of Richmond, the right resting on the Chickahominy, and the left protected by woods and swamps. The Chickahominy was between it and Richmond, but the water was low and everywhere fordable. The only chance for attack was in front. If Lee's line could be disrupted at the centre, and a strong force thrust through, it would for the time being disorganize his army, though a large part of it would undoubtedly escape across the river and rally in the intrenchments nearer the city.

At 4.30 a. m. of the 3d, the Second, Sixth and Eighteenth (Smith's) Corps moved forward as rapidly and regularly as the nature of the ground would admit, under a destructive fire of artillery and musketry, till they carried the first line of intrenchments. Barlow's division struck a salient, and after a desperate hand to hand contest, captured it, taking nearly 300 prisoners and three guns, which were at once turned upon the enemy. But every assaulting column, on reaching the enemy's first line, found itself subjected to cross-fires from the artillery, and not one of them could go any farther. Most of them fell back speedily and took up positions midway between the lines. General Grant had given orders to General Meade to suspend the attack the moment it should appear hopeless, and the heavy fighting did not last more than an hour. A counter attack by Early's corps was as unsuccessful as those of the National troops had been, and one or two lighter attacks by the Confederates later in the day were also repelled.

JOHN ERICSSON.

The entire loss of the National army at Cold Harbor in the first twelve days of June—including the battles just described, and the almost constant skirmishing and minor engagements—was 10,058; and among the dead and wounded were many valuable officers. General Tyler and Colonel Brooke were wounded, and Colonels Porter, Morris, Meade and Byrnes were killed. The Confederate loss—which included General Doles among the killed, and Generals Kirkland, Lane, Law, and Finnegan among the wounded—is unknown, but it was much smaller than the National. The attack of June 3 is recognized as the most serious error in Grant's military career. He himself says in his "Memoirs" that he always regretted it was ever made. It was as useless, and almost as costly, as Lee's assault upon Meade's centre at Gettysburg. But we do not read that any of Grant's lieutenants protested against it, as Longstreet protested against the attack on Cemetery Ridge.

Grant determined to move once more by the left flank, swing his army across the James, and invest the city from the south. A direct investment of the Confederate capital on that side was out of the question, because the south bank of the James is lower than the city, and the movement would therefore resolve itself into a struggle for Petersburg, 30 miles south of Richmond, which was its railroad centre.

To withdraw an army from so close contact with the enemy, march it 50 miles, cross two rivers, and bring it into a new position, was a very delicate and hazardous task, and Grant performed it with consummate skill.

The march began in the evening of June 12, and at midday of the 13th a pontoon was thrown across at Long Bridge, 15 miles below the Cold Harbor position. The Fifth Corps followed quickly, and took a position covering these roads till the remainder of the army could cross. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Corps crossed the Chickahominy a few miles farther down; while the Eighteenth had embarked at White House, to be sent around by water. In the evening of the 13th, the Fifth reached Wilcox's Landing, 10 miles below Haxall's. The other corps reached the landing on the 14th. The river there is more than 2000 feet wide; but between 4 p. m. and midnight a pontoon was laid, and the crossing began. The artillery and trains were sent over first, and the infantry followed in a long procession that occupied 48 hours. General Ewell said that when the National army got across the James River he knew that the Confederate cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions.

JOHN LORIMER WORDEN.

CHAPTER XX.

THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS.

WHILE the Army of the Potomac was putting itself in fighting trim after its change of base, a decisive battle of the war took place 3000 miles away. A vessel known in the builders' yard as the "290," and afterward famous as the "Alabama," had been built for the Confederate Government in 1862, at Birkenhead, opposite Liverpool. She was of wood, a fast sailer, having both steam and canvas, was 220 feet long, and was rated at 1040 tons. She was thoroughly fitted in every respect, and cost nearly a quarter of a million dollars. The American Minister at London notified the British Government that such a ship was being built in an English yard, in violation of the neutrality laws, and demanded that she be prevented from leaving the Mersey. But either through design or stupidity the Government moved too slowly, and the cruiser escaped to sea. She went to Fayal, in the Azores, and there took on board her guns and coal, sent out to her in a merchant ship from London. Her commander was Raphael Semmes, who had served in the United States navy. Her crew were mainly Englishmen. For nearly two years she roamed the seas, and captured 69 American merchantmen, most of which were burned. Their crews were sent away on passing vessels, or put ashore at some convenient port. Several war-vessels were sent out in search of the "Alabama," but they were at constant disadvantage from the rule that when two hostile vessels are in a neutral port, the first that leaves must have been gone 24 hours before the other is permitted to follow.

In June, 1864, the "Alabama" was in the harbor of Cherbourg, France. The United

States man-of-war "Kearsarge," commanded by John A. Winslow, found her there, and lay off the port, watching her. By not going into the harbor, Winslow escaped the twenty-four-hour rule. The "Kearsarge" was almost exactly the size of the "Alabama," and the armaments were so nearly alike as to make a very fair match. But her crew were altogether supertor in gun-practice, and she had protected her boilers by chains "stoppered" up and down the side amidships, as had been done in the fights at New Orleans and elsewhere. On Sunday morning, June 19, the "Alabama" steamed out of the harbor amid the plaudits of thousands of Englishmen and Frenchmen, who had not a doubt that she was going to certain victory. The "Kearsarge" steamed away as she approached, and drew her off seven or eight miles from the coast. Winslow then turned and closed with his enemy. The two vessels steamed around on opposite sides of a circle half a mile in diameter, firing their starboard guns. The practice on the "Alabama" was very bad; she began firing first, discharged her guns rapidly, and produced little or no effect, though a dozen of her shots struck her antagonist. But when the "Kearsarge" began firing there was war in earnest. Her guns were handled with great skill, and every shot told. One of them cut the mizzenmast so that it fell. Another exploded a shell among the crew of the "Alabama's" pivot gun, killing half of them and dismounting the piece. Balls rolled in at the port-holes and swept away the gunners; and several pierced the hull below the water line. The vessels had described seven circles, and the "Alabama's" deck was strewn with the dead, when at the end of an hour she was found to be sinking, her colors were struck, and her officers, with a keen sense of chivalry, threw into the sea the swords that were no longer their own. The "Kearsarge" lowered boats to take off the crew; but suddenly the stern settled, the bow was thrown up into the air, and down went the "Alabama" to the bottom of the British Channel, carrying an unknown number of her men. An English yacht picked up Semmes and about 40 sailors and steamed away to Southampton with them; others were rescued by the boats of the "Kearsarge," and still others were drowned. On the "Kearsarge" only three men were wounded, one mortally.

GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, U. S. A.

A score of other Confederate cruisers roamed the seas, to prey upon United States commerce, but none of them became quite so famous as the "Sumter" and the "Alabama." They included the "Shenandoah," which made 38 captures; the "Florida," which made 36; the "Tallahassee," which made 27; the "Tacony," which made 15; and the "Georgia," which made 10. The "Florida" was captured in the harbor of Bahia, Brazil, in October, 1864, by a United States man-of-war, in violation of the neutrality of the port. For this the United States Government apologized to Brazil and ordered the restoration of the "Florida" to the harbor where she was captured. But in Hampton Roads she met with an accident and sank.

Most of these cruisers were built in British shipyards, and whenever they touched at British ports to obtain supplies and land prisoners, their commanders were ostentatiously welcomed and lionized by the British merchants and officials.

The English builders were proceeding to construct several swift iron-clad cruisers for the Confederate Government, when the United States Government protested so vigorously that the British Government prevented them from leaving port.

In 1856 the great powers of Europe signed at Paris a treaty by which they relinquished the right of privateering, and some of the lesser powers afterward accepted a general invitation to join in it. The United States offered to sign it, on condition that a clause be inserted declaring that private property on the high seas, if not contraband of war, should be exempt from seizure by the public armed vessels of an enemy, as well as by private ones. The powers that had negotiated the treaty declined to make this amendment, and therefore the United States did not become a party to it. When the war of secession began, and the Confederate authorities proclaimed their readiness to issue letters of marque for private vessels to prey upon American commerce, the United States Government offered to accept the treaty without amendment; but England and France declined to permit our Government to join in the treaty then, if its provisions against privateering were to be understood as applying to vessels sent out under Confederate authority. There the subject was dropped, and while the insurgents were thus left at liberty to do whatever damage they could upon the high seas, the United States Government was also left free to send not only its own cruisers but an unlimited number of privateers against the commerce of any nation with which it might become involved in war. When at the beginning of President Lincoln's administration Mr. Adams was sent out as Minister at London, he carried instructions that included this passage: "If, as the President does not at all apprehend, you shall unhappily find her Majesty's Government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding States, or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment that they can grant that application and remain the friends of the United States. You may even assure them promptly, in that case, that if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to enter into alliance with the enemies of this republic." England had had a costly experience of American privateering under sail in the war of 1812–15, and she now saw what privateering could become under steam power. While she was rejoicing at the destruction of American merchantmen, she knew what might happen to her own. Let her become involved in war with the United States, and not only a hundred war-ships but a vast fleet of privateers would at once set sail from American ports, and in a few months her commerce would be swept from every sea. Other considerations were discussed; but it was doubtless this contingency that furnished the controlling reason why the British Government resisted the tempting offers of cotton and free trade, resisted the importunities of Louis Napoleon, resisted the clamor of its more reckless subjects, resisted its own prejudice against republican institutions, and refused to recognize the Southern Confederacy as an independent nation. In 1872 the international court of arbitration, sitting in Geneva, Switzerland, decided that the position taken by the United States Government in regard to responsibility for the Confederate cruisers was right; and that the British Government, for failing to prevent their escape from its ports, must pay the United States fifteen and a half million dollars.

GENERAL RUFUS KING, U. S. A.

GENERAL PHILIP KEARNEY, U. S. A.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

AT the West, the first important movements in 1864 were for the purpose of securing the Mississippi River, possession of which had been won by the victories of Farragut at New Orleans and Grant at Vicksburg, and setting free the large garrisons that were required to hold the important places on its banks. On the 3d of February, General William T. Sherman set out from Vicksburg with a force of 20,000 men, in two columns commanded by Generals McPherson and Hurlbut. Their destination was Meridian, over 100 miles east of Vicksburg, where the Mobile and Ohio Railroad is crossed by that from Jackson to Selma. The march was made in 11 days, without notable incident, except that Sherman narrowly escaped capture at Decatur.

General Leonidas Polk, in command at Meridian, at the approach of Sherman's columns, retreated into Alabama. The National troops entered the town on the 14th, and at once began a thorough destruction of the arsenal and storehouses, the machine-shops, the station, and especially the railroads. Miles of the track were torn up, the ties burned, and the rails heated and then bent and twisted, or wound around trees. These were popularly called "Jeff Davis' neckties," and "Sherman's hair-pins." Wherever the columns passed, they destroyed the mills and factories and stations, leaving untouched only the dwelling-houses. Sherman was determined to disable those railroads so completely that the Confederates could not use them again, and in this he succeeded.

While the gap that had been made in the Confederacy by the seizure of the Mississippi was thus widened by destruction of railroads east of that river, General Banks, in command at New Orleans, attempted to perform a somewhat similar service west of it. With 15,000 men he set out in March for Shreveport, at the head of steam navigation on Red River, to be joined at Alexandria by 10,000 men under General A. J. Smith (loaned for the occasion by Sherman from the force at Vicksburg), and by Commodore David D. Porter with a fleet of gunboats and transports. Smith and Porter arrived promptly at the rendezvous, captured Fort DeRussey below Alexandria, and waited for Banks. After his arrival, the army moved by roads parallel with the river, and the gunboats kept even pace with them, though with great difficulty because of low water. The army jogged along strung out for 20 miles on a single road, with a small cavalry force in the advance, then the wagon-trains, and then the infantry.

As they approached Sabine Cross Roads, April 7, they were confronted by a strong Confederate force commanded by General Richard Taylor, and suddenly there was a battle, though neither commander intended it. Taylor, before camping for the night, had sent out troops merely to drive back the advance guard of the expedition. But the men on both sides became excited, and the Nationals fought persistently for an hour and a half to save their trains, while Banks tried to bring forward his infantry, but in vain, because his wagons blocked the road. At the end of that time the line suddenly gave way, and the cavalry and teamsters rushed back in a disorderly mass, followed closely by the victorious enemy. Three miles in the rear the Nineteenth Corps was drawn up in line, and here the rout was stayed. The Confederates attacked this line, but could not break it, and at nightfall retired. Banks had lost over 3000 men, 19 guns, and a large amount of stores. He fell back a short distance, to Pleasant Hill, where the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps came up, and next day he had nearly his whole force in line. Here the Confederates made a determined assault late in the afternoon, but were repelled, and, being attacked in return, lost many men and several guns. But Banks, instead of following up his victory, fell back to the river at Grand Ecore, partly for the reason that he had been ordered to return Smith's borrowed troops.



LEWIS WALLACE,

The water in the river had fallen so that the fleet, taken up over the rapids with difficulty, could not pass down again. But a genius came to the front in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, who said he could build dams across the river, and raise the water enough to float the fleet. He was laughed at by the regulation army engineers, but got permission to try the experiment, and set to work with 3000 men, cutting down trees, hauling stone, and building cribs. In eight days the work was done, the water had risen sufficiently, and the gunboat "Lexington" took the lead in the passage through the narrow opening that had been left in the dam. Here the water rushed like a mill-race, and as she swung into the current with a full head of steam on, probably few expected to see her make the passage unharmed. But though she rolled heavily, and seemed to hang for a moment on the edge of the rocks, she passed down without accident, and was quickly followed by three other gunboats. Within a few days the whole fleet was thus rescued.

General Steele had marched with 15,000 men from Little Rock toward Shreveport, to co-operate with Banks' expedition. But after the battles of Sabine Cross-Roads and Pleasant Hill the Confederates turned upon him and drove him back to Little Rock, capturing several of his guns and hundreds of wagons.

All these expeditions were preliminary to the great campaign that General Grant had designed for an army under Sherman, simultaneous with that conducted by himself in Virginia, and almost equal to it in difficulty and importance. The object was to move southward from Chattanooga, cutting into the heart of the Confederacy where as yet it had been untouched, and reach and capture Atlanta, which was important as a railroad centre and for its manufactures of military supplies. This involved conflict with the army under General Joseph E. Johnson, by some esteemed the ablest general in the Confederate service. If he was not the ablest in all respects, he was certainly equal to the conducting of a defensive campaign with great skill. The distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in a straight line, is 100 miles, through a country of hills and streams, with a great many naturally strong defensive positions. Johnston

J. S. NEGLEY.

was at Dalton, with an army which he sums up at about 43,000. If counted after the ordinary method, his army probably numbered not fewer than 55,000.

Sherman had 98,000 men, consisting of the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General George H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General James B. McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General John M. Schofield. The discrepancy in numbers seems very great, until we consider that Sherman was not only to take the offensive, but must constantly leave detachments to guard his communications; for he drew all his supplies from Nashville, over one single-track railroad, liable to be broken at any time by guerrilla raids. Johnston had nothing to fear in the rear, for he was fighting on his own ground, and could bring his entire force to the front at every emergency. All things considered, it was pretty nearly an even match.

When Sherman concentrated his forces at Chattanooga, he found that about 130 cars loaded with provisions must arrive at that point every day. But that railroad had not cars and locomotives enough for such a task, and so he sent orders to Louisville for the seizure of trains arriving there from the north, and soon had rolling-stock in great abundance and variety. While he thus provided liberally for necessary supplies, he excluded all luxuries. Tents were taken only for the sick and wounded. Sherman himself had no tent or train. Every man, whether officer or private, carried provisions for five days.



LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.

SAVED BY HIS WIG.

The army set out from Chattanooga on the 5th of May, following the line of the railroad south toward Atlanta. A direct approach to Dalton was impossible, because of Johnston's fortifications at Tunnel Hill. So Sherman made a feint of attacking there, and sent McPherson southward to march through the gap in the mountains, strike Resaca, and cut the railroad over which Johnston drew all his supplies. Here at the very outset was the brilliant opportunity of the campaign. McPherson reached Resaca, but found fortifications and an opposing force there, and just lacked the necessary boldness to thrust his army into a position where it would have made the destruction of Johnston's almost certain. Instead of this, he fell back to the gap, and waited for the remainder of the army to join him there. But this enabled Johnston to learn what was going on, and when Sherman had passed down to the gap with his entire army, he found of course, that his antagonist had fallen back to Resaca and concentrated his forces in a strong position.

On the 14th of May, Sherman's army was in postion around Resaca on the north and west, and on that and the next day there was continual skirmishing and artillery firing. Neither general was willing to fight at disadvantage; Sherman would not attack the intrenchments, and Johnston would not come out of them. McPherson, on the right, advanced his line of battle till he gained an elevated position from which his guns could destroy the railroad bridge over the Oostenaula in the Confederate rear, and all attempts to drive him out of this position ended only in bloody repulse. On the left of the line, Hooker exhibited something of his usual dash by capturing a small portion of the enemy's intrenchments with four guns and some prisoners. Meanwhile, Sherman had thrown two pontoon bridges across the river three miles below the town, so that he could send over a detachment to break the railroad, and had also sent a division of cavalry down the river, to cross at some lower point for the same purpose.



EVERETT PEABODY.

Johnston, therefore, having no good roads by which he could retreat eastward, in the night of the 15th retired southward across the river, following the railroad, and burned the bridges behind him. Sherman, without the slightest delay, started his entire army in pursuit of the enemy, who was found, on the 19th, in position at Cassville, just east of Kingston, and apparently ready to fight; but when Sherman's columns converged on the place the Confederates retreated again in the night of the 20th, and crossed Etowah River. Johnston had really intended to fight here, and he explains his refusal to do so by saying that Hood and Polk told him their corps could not hold their positions.

Here Sherman halted for a few days, to get his army well together, re-provision it and repair the railroad in his rear. Knowing that Allatoona Pass, through which runs the railroad south of Kingston, was very strong and would probably be held by Johnston, he diverged from the railroad at Kingston, passing considerably west of it, and directed his columns toward Dallas; his purpose being to threaten Marietta and Atlanta so as to cause Johnston to withdraw from Allatoona and release his hold on the railroad, which became more and more necessary to the invading army as it advanced into the country. Johnston understood this manœuvre, and moved westward to meet it. The armies, in an irregular way came into collision at the cross-roads by New Hope Church. Around this place for six days there was continuous fighting, sometimes mere skirmishing, and sometimes an attack by a heavy detachment of one party or the other, but all such attacks, on either side, were costly and fruitless. The general advantage, however, was with Sherman; for as he gradually got his lines into proper order, he strengthened his right, and then reached out with his left toward the railroad, secured all the wagon roads from Allatoona, and sent out a strong force of cavalry to occupy that pass and repair the railroad. Johnston then left this position at New Hope Church, and took up a new one.

Thus ended the month of May in this campaign, where each commander exercised the utmost skill, neither was guilty of anything rash, and the results were such as would naturally follow from the military conditions with which it began. The losses on each side, thus far, were fewer than 10,000 men; but strong positions had been successively taken up, turned, abandoned; and Sherman was steadily drawing nearer to his goal.

Johnston's new position was on the slopes of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains, thus crossing the railroad above Marietta. It had the advantage of a height from which everything done by Sherman's

approaching army could be seen; but it had the disadvantage of a line ten miles long, and so disposed that one part could not readily reinforce another. The National army kept close to its antagonist, and intrenched at every advance. The railroad was repaired behind it, and the trains that brought its supplies ran up almost to its front.

Sherman finally occupied a strongly intrenched line that followed the contour of Johnston's and at nearly all points was close to it. Both sides maintained skirmish-lines that were almost as strong as lines of battle, and occupied rifle-pits.

The next day Sherman advanced his lines, intending to attack between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, but found that Johnston had withdrawn from Pine Mountain, taking up a shorter line, from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain. Sherman promptly occupied the ground, and gathered in a large number of prisoners, including the 14th Alabama Regiment entire. The next day he pressed forward again, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Lost Mountain, but still occupied Kenesaw covering Marietta and the roads to Atlanta. The successive positions to which Johnston's army had fallen back were prepared beforehand by gangs of

to dislodge them; and the next day Hooker and Schofield pressed forward to within three miles of Marietta, and withstood an attack by Hood's corps, inflicting upon him a loss of 1000 men. As the National line was now lengthened quite as far as seemed prudent, and still the Confederate communications were not severed, Sherman determined upon the hazardous experiment of attacking the enemy in his intrenchments. He chose two points for assault, about a mile apart, and on the morning of the 27th launched heavy columns against them, while firing was kept up all along the line. He expected to break the

SIEGE OF ISLAND NO. 10.—NIGHT BOMBARDMENT BY THE FEDERAL MORTAR-BOATS, MARCH 18, 1862.
FROM A SKETCH BY HENRY LOVIE.

From these the roar of musketry was almost unceasing, and there was a steady loss of men. On June 14, while Sherman was reconnoitering the enemy's position, he observed a battery on the crest of Pine Mountain, and near it a group of officers. Ordering a battery to fire two or three volleys at them, he rode on. A few hours later, his signal officer told him that the Confederates had signaled from Pine Mountain to Marietta, "Send an ambulance for General Polk's body." The group on the mountain had consisted of Generals Johnston, Hardee and Polk, and a few soldiers that had gathered around them. One of the cannon-balls had struck General Polk in the chest and cut him in two.

slaves impressed for the purpose, so that his soldiers had little digging to do, and could save their strength for fighting. After a time Sherman adopted a similar policy by setting at work the crowds of negroes that flocked to his camp. The fortifications consisted of a sort of framework of rails and logs, covered with earth thrown up from a ditch on each side. Miles of such works were often constructed in a single night.

Sherman was now facing a little south of east, and kept pressing his lines closer up to Johnston's, with rifle and artillery firing going on all the time. On the 21st the divisions of Wood and Stanley gained new positions, on the southern flank of Kenesaw, where several determined assaults failed

centre, and with half of his army take half of Johnston's in reverse, while with the remainder of his troops he held the other half so close that it could not go to the rescue. But his columns wasted away before the fire from the intrenchments, and, as in Pickett's charge at Gettysburg and Grant's assault at Cold Harbor, only a remnant reached the enemy's works, there to be killed or captured. This experiment cost Sherman over 2500 men, while Johnston's loss was but little over 800.

It was evident that any repetition would be useless, and the approved principles of warfare seemed to supply no alternative. What Sherman therefore did was to disregard the maxim that an army

must always hold fast to its communications. He determined to let go of the railroad north of Kenesaw, take ten days' provisions in wagons, and move his whole army southward to seize the road below Marietta. This would compel Johnston either to fall back farther toward Atlanta, or come out and fight him in his intrenchments—which, as both commanders well knew, was almost certain destruction to the assaulting party. In the night of July 2, McPherson's troops marched southward, passing behind the lines held by Thomas and Schofield. This was the same manœuvre as that by which Grant had carried his army to its successive positions between the Wilderness and James River.

Johnston promptly abandoned his strong position at Kenesaw, and fell back to the Chattahoochee; but he did not attempt to cross the stream at once. Intrenchments had been prepared for him on the north bank, and here he stopped. Sherman, expecting to catch his enemy in the confusion of crossing a stream, pressed on reached, and on the day that Sherman crossed it something else took place, which, in the opinion of many military critics, was even more disastrous to the fortunes of the Confederacy. This was the supersession of the careful and skillful Johnston by General John B. Hood, an impetuous and sometimes reckless fighter, but no strategist.

Within 24 hours the National army learned that its antagonist had a new commander, and it was easily inferred that a new policy might be looked for. Sherman warned his army to be constantly prepared for sallies of the enemy, and his prediction did not wait long for fulfilment. On the 20th, at noonday, as his army was slowly closing in upon the city, the Confederates left the intrenchments along the line of Peachtree Creek, and made a heavy assault upon Thomas, who held the right of the National line. The weight of the blow fell mainly upon Hooker's corps, and the attack was so furious and reckless that in many places friend and foe were intermingled, fighting hand to hand. A heavy column of Confederates the Confederates with steady courage from noon till night. Seven heavy assaults were made, resulting in seven bloody repulses, guns were taken and retaken, and finally a counter attack was made on the Confederate flank by Wood's division, assisted by 20 guns that fired over the heads of Wood's men as they advanced, which drove back the enemy, who retired slowly to their defences, carrying with them some of the captured guns. The National loss in this battle was 3521 men and ten guns. The total Confederate loss is unknown, but it was very heavy; General Logan reported 3220 dead in front of his lines, and 2000 prisoners, half of whom were wounded. The most grievous loss to Sherman was General McPherson, who rode off into the woods at the first sounds of battle, almost alone. His horse soon came back bleeding and riderless, and an hour later the General's body was brought to headquarters. General Oliver O. Howard, who had lost an arm at Fair Oaks and was now in command of the Fourth Corps, was promoted to Mc-



NIGHT ATTACK ON ISLAND NO. 10 BY THE FEDERAL
FROM A SKETCH

rapidly with his whole army, and ran up against what he says was one of the strongest pieces of field fortification he has ever seen. A thousand slaves had been at work on it for a month. But Sherman occupied ground that overlooked it, and held the river for miles above and below, and was thus able to cross over and turn the position. On the 9th of July Schofield's army crossed above the Confederate position, laying two pontoon bridges, and intrenched on the left bank. Johnston, thus compelled to surrender the stream, crossed that night with his entire army, and burned the bridges behind him. Sherman was almost as cautious in the pursuit as Johnston was in the retreat; and he not only chose an upper crossing, farther from Atlanta, but spent a week in preparations to prevent disaster, before he threw over his entire army. This he did on the 17th, and the next day moved it by a grand right wheel toward Atlanta.

The Chattahoochee was the last great obstruction before the fortifications of the Gate City were attempted to fall upon an exposed flank of the Fourth Corps; but Thomas promptly brought several batteries to play upon it, and at the end of two hours the enemy was driven back to his intrenchments, leaving hundreds of dead on the field. Hooker also lost heavily, because his men fought without cover of any kind. A day or two later the Confederates fell back to the immediate defences of the city.

Sherman's left, which crossed the line of the railroad to Augusta, was without proper protection, and on the 22d Hood moved out with a part of his army and attacked it. He marched by a road parallel with the railroad, and the contour of the ground and the forests hid him until his men burst in upon the rear of Sherman's extreme left, seized a battery that was moving through the woods, and took possession of some of the camps. But McPherson's veterans quickly formed to meet the attack. That flank of the army was "refused"—turned back at a right angle with the main line—and met the onsets of Pherson's place in command of the Army of the Tennessee; whereupon General Hooker, commanding the Twentieth Corps, who believed that the promotion properly belonged to him, asked to be relieved, and left the army. His corps was given to General Henry W. Slocum.

Sherman now repeated his former manœuvre, of moving by the right flank to strike the enemy's communications. The Army of the Tennessee was withdrawn from the left on the 27th, and marched to the extreme right, with the intention of extending the flank far enough to cross the railroad south of Atlanta. The movement was but partially performed when Hood made a heavy attack on that flank, and for four or five hours on the 28th there was bloody fighting. Logan's men hastily threw up a slight breastwork, from which they repelled six charges in quick succession, and later in the day several other charges by the Confederates broke against the immovable lines of the Fifteenth Corps. Meanwhile Sherman sent Jefferson C. Davis' division to make a detour

and strike the Confederate flank in turn; but Davis lost his way and failed to appear in time. In this battle Logan's corps lost 572 men; while they captured five battle-flags and buried about 600 of the enemy's dead. The total Confederate losses during July, in killed and wounded, were reported by the Surgeon-General at 8841, to which Sherman adds 2000 prisoners. Sherman reports his own losses during that month at 9719; but this does not include the cavalry.

Sherman had sent out several cavalry expeditions to break the railroads south of Atlanta, but with no satisfactory results. The marvelous facility with which both sides mended broken railroads and replaced burned bridges is illustrated by many anecdotes. Sherman had duplicates of the important bridges on the road that brought his supplies, and whenever the guerrillas destroyed one, he had only to order the duplicate to be set up. On the 26th, General George Stoneman had set out with a cavalry force to break up the railroad at Jonesboro, with the intention of such damage as he thought it would take ten days to repair; but within 24 hours trains were again running into the city.

Finding that cavalry raids could effect nothing, Sherman posted Slocum's corps at the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, and, moving again by the right, swung all the remainder of his army into position south of Atlanta, where they tore up the railroads, burning the ties and twisting the rails, and then advanced toward the city. There was some fighting, and Govan's Confederate brigade was captured entire, with ten guns; but the greater part of Hood's forces escaped eastward in the night of September 1. They destroyed a large part of the Government property that night, and the sound of the explosions caused Slocum to move down from the bridge, when he soon found that he had nothing to do but walk into Atlanta. A few days later Sherman made his headquarters there, disposed his army in and around the city, and prepared for permanent possession.



GUNBOATS AND MORTAR FLEET, MARCH 18, 1862.
BY H. LOVIE.

pushing on rapidly to Macon and Andersonville, and releasing a large number of prisoners; while at the same time another cavalry force, under McCook, was sent around by the right to join Stoneman at Jonesboro. They destroyed two miles of track, burned two trains of cars and 500 wagons, killed 800 mules, and took 300 prisoners. But McCook was surrounded by the enemy at Newnan, and only escaped with a loss of 600 men; while Stoneman destroyed 17 locomotives and 100 cars, and threw a few shells into Macon, but was surrounded at Clifton, where he allowed himself and 700 of his men to be captured, in order to facilitate the escape of the remainder of his command.

Two or three weeks later, Wheeler's Confederate cavalry passed to the rear of Sherman's army, captured a large drove of cattle, and broke up two miles of railroad; and about the same time Kilpatrick's cavalry rode entirely round Atlanta, fought and defeated a combined cavalry and infantry force, and inflicted upon the railroad

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY.

THE capture of Mobile had long been desired, both because of its importance as a base of operations, whence expeditions could move inland, and communication be maintained with the fleet, and because blockade-running at that port could not be entirely prevented by the vessels outside. Grant and Sherman had planned to have the city taken by forces moving east from New Orleans and Port Hudson; but everything had gone wrong in that quarter.

The principal defences of Mobile Bay were Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and Fort Gaines, three miles northwest of it, on the extremity of Dauphin Island. The passage between these two works was obstructed by innumerable piles for two miles out from Fort Gaines, and from that point nearly to Fort Morgan by a line of torpedoes. The eastern end of this line was marked by a red buoy, and from that point to Fort Morgan the channel was open, to admit blockade-runners. Farragut's fleet had been for a long time preparing to pass these forts and take possession of the bay. But he wanted the co-operation of a military force to capture the forts. This was at last furnished, under General Gordon Granger, and landed on Dauphin Island August 4. The attacking column consisted of four iron-clad monitors and seven wooden sloops-of-war. To each sloop was lashed a gunboat on the port (or left) side, to help her out in case she was disabled. Before six o'clock in the morning of the 5th all were under way, the monitors forming a line abreast of the wooden ships and to the right of them. The "Brooklyn" headed the line of the wooden vessels, because she had an apparatus for picking up torpedoes. They steamed along in beautiful style, coming up into close order as they neared the fort, so that there were spaces of but a few yards from the stern of one vessel to the bow of the next. The forts and the Confederate fleet, which lay just inside of the line of torpedoes, opened fire upon them half an hour before they could bring their guns to answer. They made the "Hartford," Farragut's flag-ship, their especial target, lodged a 120-pound ball in her mainmast, and killed or wounded many of her crew. One ball killed ten men and wounded five. The other wooden vessels suffered in like manner; but when they came abreast of the fort they poured in rapid broadsides of grape-shot, shrapnel, and shells, which quickly cleared the bastions and silenced the batteries.

The captains had been warned to pass to the east of the red buoy. But Captain T. A. M. Craven, of the monitor "Tecumseh," eager to engage the Confederate ram "Tennessee," which was behind the line of torpedoes, made straight for her. The consequence was that his vessel struck a torpedo, which exploded, and she went down in a few seconds, carrying with her the captain and most of the crew. The "Brooklyn" stopped when she found torpedoes and began to back. This threatened to throw the whole line

into confusion while under fire, and defeat the project; but Farragut instantly ordered more steam on his own vessel and her consort, drew ahead of the "Brooklyn," and led the line to victory. All this time he was in the rigging of the "Hartford," and a quartermaster had gone up and tied him to one of the shrouds, so that if wounded he should not fall to the deck. As the fleet passed into the bay, several of the larger vessels were attacked by the ram "Tennessee" and considerably damaged. At length she withdrew to her anchorage, and the order was given from the flag-ship: "Gunboats chase enemy's gunboats," whereupon the lashings were cut and the National gunboats were off in a flash. In a little while they had destroyed or captured all the Confederate vessels save one, which escaped up the bay, where the water was too shallow for them to follow her.

But as the fleet was coming to anchor, the "Tennessee" steamed boldly into the midst of her enemies, firing in every direction and attempting to ram them. The wooden vessels stood to the fight in the most gallant manner, throwing useless broadsides against the monster, avoiding her blows by skillful manœuvering, and trying to run her down till some of them hammered their bows to splinters. The three monitors pounded at her to more purpose. They fired one 15-inch solid shot that penetrated her armor, they jammed some of her shutters so that the portholes could not be opened, they shot away her steering-gear, and knocked off her smoke-stack, so that life on board of her became intolerable, and she surrendered. Her commander, Franklin Buchanan, formerly of the United States navy, had been seriously wounded.

This victory cost Farragut's fleet 52 men killed and 170 wounded, besides 113 that went down in the "Tecumseh." Knowles, the same old quartermaster that had tied Farragut in the rigging, says he saw the Admiral coming on deck as the 25 dead sailors of the "Hartford" were being laid out, "and it was the only time I ever saw the old gentleman cry, but the tears came into his eyes like a little child." The Confederate fleet lost 10 men killed, 16 wounded, and 280 prisoners. The loss in the forts is unknown. They were surrendered soon afterward to the land forces, with 1000 men.

Another Confederate iron-clad, the "Albemarle," was destroyed in October. Lieutenant William B. Cushing, of the navy, ascended Roanoke River in the night, with a volunteer crew, in a small steam launch, placed a torpedo under her overhang, exploded it, and sent her to the bottom. The launch was destroyed, and Cushing and one of his companions escaped by swimming.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ADVANCE ON PETERSBURG.

IT had been a part of Grant's plan, in opening the campaign of 1864, that General Butler, with the Army of the James, should march against Richmond and Petersburg. He moved promptly, at the same time, with the armies led by Grant and Sherman, embarking his forces on transports at Fort Monroe, and first making a feint of steaming up York River. In the night the vessel turned back, and steamed up the James. Early the next day, May 6, the troops were landed at City Point, at the junction of the James and the Appomattox, and intrenchments were thrown up. Detachments were sent out to cut the railroads south of Petersburg, and between that city and Richmond; but no effective work was done. General Butler was ordered to secure a position as far up the James as possible, and advanced to Drury's Bluff, where he was attacked by a force under Beauregard and driven back to Bermuda Hundred. At the point where the curves of the James and the Appomattox bring those two streams within less than three miles of each other, Butler threw up a line of intrenchments, with his right resting on the James at Dutch Gap and his left on the Appomattox at Point of Rocks. The position was very strong, and it would be hopeless for the Confederates to assault it, But Beauregard had only to throw up a parallel line of intrenchments across the same neck of land, and Butler could not advance a step. What he had secured, however, was valuable as a protection for City Point, which became the landing-place for supplies, when Grant swung the Army of the Potomac across the James.

Grant had reinforced Butler with troops under General William F. Smith, and planned to have an immediate advance on Petersburg while the Army of the Potomac was crossing the James (June 14, 1864). The work was entrusted to Smith, who was to get close to the Confederate intrenchments in the night, and carry them at daybreak. He unexpectedly came upon the enemy fortified between City Point and Petersburg, and had a fight in which he was successful, but it caused a loss of precious time. Grant hurried Hancock's troops over the river, to follow Smith. But this corps was delayed several hours waiting for rations, and finally went on without them. It appears that Hancock's instructions were defective, and he did not know that he was expected to take Petersburg till he received a note from Smith urging him to hurry forward. Smith spent nearly the whole of the 15th in reconnoitering the defences of Petersburg, which were but lightly manned, and in the evening carried a portion of them by assault. In the morning of the 16th Hancock's men captured a small additional portion of the works; but here that General had to be relieved for ten days, because of the breaking out of a grievous wound that he had received at Gettysburg, and General David B. Birney succeeded him. General Meade came upon the ground, ordered another assault, and carried another portion. But by this time Beauregard had thrown more men into the fortifications, and the fighting was stubborn and bloody. It was continued through the 17th, with no apparent result, except that at night the Confederates fell back to an inner line, and in the morning the National line was correspondingly advanced. In these preliminary operations against Petersburg the National loss was nearly 10,000 men. The Confederate loss was about the same.

When Lee found where Grant was going, he crossed the James at Drury's Bluff, and presently confronted his enemy in the trenches east and south of Petersburg. The country is well adapted for defence, and the works were extensive and very strong. Seeing that the city itself could not be immediately captured, Grant endeavored to sever its important communications. The Norfolk Railroad was easily cut off. But the most important line was the Weldon Railroad, which brought up Confederate supplies from the south,

SHELLING THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY FROM THE HEIGHTS OF GREAT FALLS, MD.

and Grant and Meade made an early attempt to seize it. On the 21st and 22d Birney's corps was pushed to the left, extending south of the city, while Wright's was sent further south to strike directly at the railroad. Wright came into a position nearly at right angles with Birney, facing west toward the railroad, while Birney faced north toward the city. They were not in connection, and a heavy Confederate force under General A. P. Hill drove straight into the gap, turned the left flank of the Second Corps, threw it into confusion, and captured 1700 men and four guns. The fighting was not severe; but the movement against the railroad was arrested. Hill withdrew to his intrenchments in the evening, the Second Corps re-established its line, and the Sixth intrenched itself in a position facing the railroad and about a mile and a half from it. On this flank, affairs remained substantially in this condition till the middle of August.

LAST BROADSIDE OF THE "VARUNA."—COMMANDER BOGGS FIRES THREE GUNS OF THE FEDERAL GUNBOAT BEFORE SHE SINKS.
FROM A SKETCH BY W. WAUD.

But meanwhile something that promised great results was going on near the centre of the line, in front of Burnside's corps. A regiment composed largely of Pennsylvania miners dug a tunnel under the nearest point of the Confederate works. The digging was begun in a ravine, to be out of sight of the enemy, and the earth was carried out in barrows made of cracker-boxes, and hidden under brushwood. The work occupied nearly a month, and when finished it consisted of a straight tunnel 500 feet long, ending in a cross gallery 70 feet long. In this gallery was placed 8000 pounds of powder, with slow matches. The day fixed for the explosion was the 30th of July. The choice of a division to lead the assault following the explosion, being determined by lot, fell upon General James H. Ledlie's, which was probably the worst, and certainly the worst commanded.

A few minutes before five o'clock in the morning, the mine was exploded. A vast mass of earth, surrounded by smoke, with the flames of burning powder playing through it, rose 200 feet into the air, seemed to poise there for a moment, and then fell. The fort with its guns and garrison—about 300 men of a South Carolina regiment—was completely destroyed, and in place of it was a crater about 30 feet deep and nearly 200 feet long. At the same moment the heavy batteries in the National line opened upon the enemy, to protect the assaulting column from artillery fire. Ledlie's division pushed forward into the crater, and there stopped. Ledlie himself did not accompany the men, and there seemed to be no one to direct them. Thirty golden minutes passed, during which the Confederates, who had run away in terror from the neighboring intrenchments, made no effort to drive out the assailants. At the end of that time they began to rally to their guns, and presently directed a heavy fire upon the men in the crater. Burnside tried to remedy the difficulty by pushing out more troops, and at length sent his black division, which charged through the crater and up the slope beyond, but was there met by a fire before which it recoiled; for the Confederates had constructed an inner line of breastworks commanding the front along which the explosion had been expected. Finally, both musketry and artillery were concentrated upon the disorganized mass of troops huddled in the crater, while shells were lighted and rolled down its sloping sides, till those who were left alive scrambled out and got away as best they could. This affair cost the National army about 4000 men—many of them prisoners —while the Confederate loss was hardly 1000. Soon after this Burnside was relieved, at his own request, and the command of his corps was given to General John G. Parke.

On the 13th of August, Hancock made a demonstration from Deep Bottom toward Richmond. He assaulted the defences of the city, and fighting was kept up for several days. He gained nothing, for Lee threw a strong force into the intrenchments and repelled his attacks. But there was great gain at the other end of the line; for Grant took advantage of the weakening of Lee's right to seize the Weldon Railroad. Warren's corps was moved out to the road on the 18th, took a position across it four miles from Petersburg, and intrenched.

On the 19th, and again on the 21st, Lee made determined attacks on this position, but was repelled with heavy loss. Warren clung to his line, and made such dispositions as at length enabled him to meet any assault with but little loss to himself. A day or two later, Hancock returned from the north side of the James, and was rapidly marched to the extreme left, to pass beyond Warren and destroy some miles of the Weldon Railroad. He tore up the track and completely disabled it to a point three miles south of Reams Station, and on the 25th sent out Gibbon's division to continue the work some miles farther. But the approach of a heavy Confederate force under A. P. Hill caused it to fall back to Reams Station, where, with Miles' division (6000 men in all) and 2000 cavalry, it held a line of intrenchments. Three assaults upon this line were repelled, with bloody loss to the Confederates. General Hill then ordered Heth's division to make another assault and carry the works at all hazards. Heth found a place from which a part of the National line could be enfiladed by artillery, and after a brisk bombardment assaulted, carried the works, and captured three batteries. Miles' men were rallied, retook a part of the line and one of the batteries, and formed a new line, which they held, assisted by the dismounted cavalry,



ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE U. S. GUNBOAT "VARUNA" AND THE CONFEDERATE RAM "BRECKINRIDGE" AND GUNBOAT "GOVERNOR MOORE."
FROM A SKETCH BY WM. WAUD.

who poured an effective fire into the flank of the advancing Confederates. At night both sides withdrew from the field. Hancock had lost 2400 men, 1700 of whom were prisoners. The Confederate loss is unknown, but it was severe.

From the time Grant held possession of the Weldon Railroad, and whatever supplies came to the Confederate army by that route had to be hauled 30 miles in wagons. The National army constructed for its own use a railroad in the rear of its long line of intrenchments, running from City Point to the extreme left flank. This road was not particular about grades and curves, but simply followed the natural contour of the ground. Then began what is called the siege of Petersburg.

Partly to check the movements of General Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, and partly with the hope that an attack on Washington would cause Grant to withdraw from before Richmond and Petersburg, Lee sent Early's corps into the valley. Hunter, being out of ammunition, was obliged to retire, and Early marched down to the Potomac unopposed, and threatened the national capital.

General Lew Wallace, in command at Baltimore, gathered a body of recruits and went out to meet him, not with the hope of defeating him, but only of delaying him till a sufficient force could be sent from the Army of the Potomac. Ricketts' division of the Sixth Corps followed Wallace. They met the enemy at the Monocacy, 35 miles from Washington, July 9, and took up a position on the left bank of the stream, covering the roads to the capital. Wallace had six field guns and a small force of cavalry, and disposed his line so as to hold the bridges and fords as long as possible.

The Confederates attacked at first in front, and there was bloody fighting at one of the bridges. Then they marched a heavy force down stream, crossed at a ford out of range of the National artillery, and marched up stream again to strike Wallace's left flank. That part of the line was held by Ricketts, who changed front to meet the attack, and was promptly reinforced from Wallace's scanty resources. Two assaults in line of battle were repelled, after some destructive fighting, and Wallace determined still to hold his ground, as he was hourly expecting three additional regiments. But the afternoon wore away without any appearance of assistance, and when he saw preparations for a heavier assault he determined to retreat. While the left was being withdrawn, the right, under General Tyler, was ordered to prevent the remaining Confederate force from crossing at the bridges. The wooden bridge was burned, and the stone bridge was held to the last possible moment, when Tyler also retreated. The missing regiments were met on the road, and there was no pursuit. This action probably saved the city of Washington from pillage and destruction. Wallace lost about 1400 men, half of whom were prisoners. The Confederates admitted a loss of 600.

Early now marched on Washington. But by this time veteran troops were pouring into the defences of the city, and he wisely retreated. A part of his force was struck at Winchester, July 12, by one under General Averell, and defeated losing four guns and 300 men.

Three days later, Early defeated a force under General George Crook, and drove it across the Potomac, after which he sent his cavalry, under Generals McCausland and Bradley T. Johnson, to make a rapid raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland visited Chambersburg, and demanded immediate payment of $100,000 in gold, or $500,000 in United States currency, with a threat of burning the town. The money was not forthcoming, the torch was promptly applied, about two-thirds of the buildings were destroyed, and 300 families found themselves shelterless. Early, who ordered the burning, justifies it on the ground that it was in retaliation for the burning of the houses of well-known secessionists in Virginia.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH.

IT had become plainly evident that something must be done to cancel the whole Shenandoah Valley from the map of the theatre of war. The mountains that flanked it made it a secure lane down which a Confederate force could be sent to the very door of Washington; while the crops that were harvested in its fertile fields were a constant temptation to those who had to provide for the necessities of an army. General Grant took the matter in hand in earnest after Early's raid. His first care was to have the separate military departments in that section consolidated, his next to find a suitable commander, and finally to send an adequate force. He would have been satisfied with General Hunter, the ranking officer there; but Hunter had been badly hampered in his movements by constant interference from Washington, and knowing that he had not the confidence of General Halleck, he asked to be relieved, since he did not wish to embarrass the cause. Grant accepted his offer, and telegraphed for General Sheridan to take command of the new department. Sheridan was on hand promptly, and was placed at the head of about 30,000 troops, including 8000 cavalry.

GALLANT CHARGE OF THE SIXTH UNITED STATES REGULAR CAVALRY UPON THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY UNDER GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, MAY 9, 1862.

In his instructions, which were at first written out for Hunter and afterward transferred to Sheridan, Grant said: "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed destroy. The people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected; and we are determined to stop them at all hazards."

Early, whose main force was on the south bank of the Potomac, above Harper's Ferry, still had a large part of his cavalry in Maryland, where they

were loading their wagons with wheat on the battle-field of Antietam, and seizing all the cattle that the farmers had not driven off. But these were now recalled. As soon as Sheridan could get his force well in hand, he moved it southward toward Winchester, in order to threaten Early's communications and draw him into battle. Early retreated as far as Fisher's Hill to meet reinforcements, and was followed by Sheridan, who was about to attack there when warned by Grant to be cautious, as the enemy was too strong. He therefore withdrew to Opequan Creek, facing west toward Winchester and covering Snicker's Gap, through which reinforcements were to come to him. Here he was attacked, August 21, and after a fight in which 260 men on the National side were killed or wounded, he drew back to a stronger position at Halltown.

Early reconnoitred this position and found it too strong to be attacked, but for three or four weeks remained with his whole force at the lower end of the valley. There were frequent minor engagements, mainly by cavalry, with varying results.

Grant and Sheridan were in perfect accord as to the best policy, and they pursued it steadily. They knew that the time must come when Lee would recall a part of the forces that he had sent to the valley, and that would be the moment for Sheridan to spring upon Early. The opportunity arrived on the 19th of September, when Lee had recalled the command of R. H. Anderson, with which he had reinforced Early in August, and Early had sent a large part of his remaining troops to Martinsburg. Grant's order to Sheridan at this juncture was to "Go in," and Sheridan promptly went in.

The various movements of the two armies had brought them around to substantially the same positions that they held in the engagement of August 21—Early east of and covering Winchester, Sheridan along the line of Opequan Creek. Sheridan's plan was to march straight on Winchester with his whole force, and crush Early's right before the left could be withdrawn from Martinsburg to assist it. He set his troops in motion at three o'clock in the morning, to converge toward the Berryville pike. There was, as usual, some difficulty in moving so many troops by a single road, and it was midday before the battle began. This delay gave Early an opportunity to bring back his troops from Martinsburg and unite his whole force in front of Winchester. Sheridan's infantry deployed under a heavy artillery fire and advanced to the attack, when the battle began almost simultaneously along the whole line, and was kept up till dark. There were no field-works, and the fighting was obstinate and bloody. The usual difficulty of preserving the line intact while advancing over broken ground was met, and wherever a gap appeared it was promptly taken advantage of. In one instance, a Confederate force led by General Robert E. Rodes drove in between the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, crumbled their flanks, and turned to take the Nineteenth in reverse; but at this juncture a division of the Sixth Corps under General David A. Russell, coming forward to fill the gap, struck the flank of the intruding Confederate force in turn, enfiladed it with a rapid fire of canister from the 5th Maine battery, and sent it back in confusion, capturing a large number of prisoners. In this movement Generals Rodes and Russell were both killed.

Sheridan now brought up his reserves, while the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Averell, under Torbert, came in by a detour and struck Early's left, pushing back his cavalry and getting into the rear of a portion of his infantry. From this time Sheridan drove everything before him. The Confederates fled through the town in complete rout and confusion. But darkness favored them, and most of them escaped up the valley. The National loss was nearly 5000 men. The Confederates lost about 4000—including Generals Rodes and Godwin—with five guns and nine battle-flags.

When Early retreated southward after this battle of the Opequan (or battle of Winchester) he took up a position at Fisher's Hill, where the valley is but four miles wide. His right rested on the North Fork of the Shenandoah and was sufficiently protected by it; but for the left there was no natural protection. There was an eminence overlooking the Confederate intrenchments, and after a sharp fight this was gained by the National troops, who at once began to cut down the trees and plant batteries. When Sheridan had thoroughly reconnoitered the position, he planned to send the greater part of his cavalry through the Luray Valley to get into the rear of the Confederates and cut off retreat, then to attack in front with the Sixth and

HEROIC CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MORRISON, SEVENTY-NINTH NEW YORK (HIGHLANDERS), ON THE PARAPET OF THE TOWER BATTERY, JAMES ISLAND.
FROM A SKETCH BY AN OFFICER.



HENRY W. BENHAM.

THE THIRD RHODE ISLAND VOLUNTEERS, COLONEL WILLIAMS, DRIVING, BY A BAYONET CHARGE, THE CONFEDERATE SHARPSHOOTERS FROM THE WOODS ON JAMES ISLAND, JUNE 16, 1862.
FROM A SKETCH BY AN OFFICER.

Nineteenth Corps, while Crook with the Eighth Corps should make a detour and come in on the enemy's left flank. The ground was so broken that the manœuvres were necessarily slow, and it was almost sunset when Crook reached Early's flank. He then came out of the woods so suddenly and silently that the Confederates were simply astounded. Their works were taken in reverse, and their dismounted cavalry was literally overrun. The forward movement of the troops in front was prompt, and everywhere Sheridan and his lieutenants were with the men, repeating the command to push forward constantly, without stopping for anything. The result was a complete rout of the Confederates, who fled in confusion up the valley, leaving 16 guns behind. But Sheridan's plan for their capture was foiled because his cavalry, meeting a stout resistance from Early's cavalry, failed to get through to their rear. In this battle, which was fought on the 22d of September, the National loss was about 400, the Confederate about 1400.

For the next three days the retreat was continued. Early went to Port Republic to meet reinforcements, and there stopped. Sheridan halted his infantry at Harrisonburg, but sent his cavalry still further up the valley. The column under Torbert reached Staunton, where it destroyed a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, and then tore up the track of the Virginia Central Railroad eastward to Waynesboro, and pulled down the iron bridge over the stream at that point. Here it was attacked in force, and retired. Grant wanted the movement continued to Charlottesville; but Sheridan found serious difficulties in his lack of supplies and transportation so far from his base. On the 5th of October the march down the valley was begun. The infantry went first, and the cavalry followed, being stretched entirely across the valley, burning and destroying, as it went, everything except the dwellings

Early, being reinforced, now turned and pursued Sheridan. At Tom's Brook, on the 7th, the National cavalry under Torbert, Merritt and Custer engaged the Confederate cavalry under Rosser and Lamont. After a spirited engagement, Rosser was driven back 25 miles, and Torbert captured over 300 prisoners, 11 guns, and a large number of wagons—or, as was said in the report, "Everything they had on wheels."

Sheridan halted at Cedar Creek, north of Strasburg, and put his army into camp there, while he was summoned to Washington for conference, leaving General Wright in command. Early, finding nothing in the valley for his men and horses to eat, was obliged to advance and capture provisions from the stores of his enemy, or retreat and give up the ground. He chose to assume the offensive, and in the night of the 18th moved silently around the left of the National line. In the misty dawn of the 19th the Confederates burst upon the flank held by Crook's corps, with such vehemence that it was at once thrown into confusion. They were among the tents before anybody knew they were coming, and many of Crook's men were shot or stabbed before they could fairly awake. The Nineteenth Corps was also routed, but the Sixth stood firm, and the Confederates themselves became somewhat demoralized by the eagerness of the men to plunder. Wright's Sixth Corps covered the retreat; and when Sheridan, hearing of the battle and riding with all speed from Winchester, met the stream of fugitives, he deployed some cavalry to stop them, and inspired his men with a short and oft-repeated oration, which is reported as "Face the other way, boys! We are going back to our camps! We are going to lick them out of their boots!" This actually turned the tide, a new line was quickly formed and intrenched, and when Early attacked it he met with a costly repulse. In the afternoon Sheridan advanced to attack in turn, sending his irresistible cavalry around both flanks, and after some fighting the whole Confederate line was broken up and driven in confusion, with the cavalry close upon its heels. All the guns lost in the morning were retaken, and 24 besides. In this double battle the Confederate loss was about 3100; the National 5764, of whom 1700 were prisoners taken in the morning. The campaign in the valley was now practically ended.

REPULSE OF THE CONFEDERATE TROOPS ON JAMES ISLAND, S. C., IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE PICKETS OF GENERAL WRIGHT'S DIVISION.

FROM A SKETCH BY AN OFFICER.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THE length of time that the war had continued, the drain upon the resources of both belligerents, and especially the rapidity and destructiveness of the battles in the summer of 1864, had naturally suggested the question whether there were not some possibility of a satisfactory peace without further fighting. In each section there was a party, or at least there were people, who believed that such a peace was possible, and the loud expression of this opinion led to several efforts at negotiation, as it also shaped the policy of a great political party.

The first Presidential convention of the year met at Cleveland, Ohio, on the last day of May, in response to a call addressed "to the radical men of the nation." The platform declared, among other things, "that the rebellion must be suppressed by force of arms, and without compromise; that the rebellion has destroyed slavery, and the Federal Constitution should be amended to prohibit its re-establishment. General John C. Frémont was nominated for the Presidency, and General John Cochrane for the Vice-Presidency.

The Republican National Convention met in Baltimore on the 7th of June. The platform, reported by Henry J. Raymond, one of the ablest of American journalists, was probably written largely if not entirely by him. Its most significant passages were these:

"That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with the rebels, nor to offer them any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an unconditional surrender of their hostility and a return to their full allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

"That as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic. . . .

"That we approve and applaud the practical wisdom, the unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity to the Constitution and the principles of American liberty, with which Abraham Lincoln has discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office.

On the first ballot all the delegations voted for Mr. Lincoln, except that from Missouri, whose vote was given to General Grant. Andrew Johnson was nominated for Vice-President.

The Democratic National Convention, called to meet in Chicago, did not convene till nearly three months after the Republican, August 29. In the meantime the hard fighting around Richmond and on Sherman's road to Atlanta, the fruits of which were not yet evident, the appearance of Confederate forces at the gates of Washington, and the delay of Sheridan's movements in the Shenandoah Valley, had produced a more gloomy

feeling than had been experienced before since the war began; and this feeling, as was to be expected, operated in favor of whatever opposed the National administration. Seizing upon this advantage, the Democratic Convention made a very clear and bold issue with the Republican. It was presided over by Horatio Seymour, then Governor of New York, while Clement L. Vallandigham was a member of the committee on resolutions, and is supposed to have written the most significant of them. The platform presented these propositions:

"That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of military necessity, of a war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired—



BATTLE OF SECESSIONVILLE, JAMES ISLAND, S. C.—BAYONET CHARGE OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS, UNDER GENERAL STEVENS, UPON THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES, JUNE 16, 1862.

FROM A SKETCH BY AN OFFICER.

justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

"That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired."

On the first ballot General George B. McClellan was nominated for President. George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, an ultra peace man, was nominated for Vice-President.

The declaration that the war had been a failure received a crushing comment the day after the Convention adjourned; for on that day Sherman's army marched into Atlanta. And this success was followed by others,—notably Sheridan's brilliant movements in the valley—all of which, when heralded in the Republican journals, were accompanied by the quotation from the Democratic platform declaring the war a failure. General Frémont withdrew from the contest in September.

The canvass was exceedingly bitter, especially in the abuse heaped upon Mr. Lincoln. The undignified and disgraceful epithets that were applied to him by journals of high standing were not such as would make any American proud of his country.

One of the most effective arguments of the canvass was furnished in a condensed form by one of Mr. Lincoln's famous little stories, and in that form was repeated thousands of times. Answering the address of a delegation of the Union League, a day or two after his nomination, he said: "I have not permitted myself to conclude that I am the best man in the country; but I am reminded in this connection of the story of an old Dutch farmer, who once remarked to a companion that 'it was not best to swap horses when crossing streams.'"

The Confederates were now looking eagerly for the result of the Presidential election as a possible solution of the great question in their favor.

Before the canvass was over the land had settled down to the belief that the only way to secure the continuance of the war to a successful termination was to re-elect Mr. Lincoln, while a vote for General McClellan meant something else—nobody knew exactly what. The solemnity of the occasion appeared to be universally appreciated, and though a heavy vote was polled the election was the quietest that had ever been held. The citizens were dealing with a question that, in most of its aspects at least, they by this time thoroughly understood. When they sprang to arms in 1861, they did not know what war was; but now they had had three years of constant schooling to its burdens and its horrors. They had seen regiment after regiment march away to the music of drum and fife, with a thousand men in the ranks, and come back at the end of two years' service with perhaps two hundred bronzed veterans to be mustered out. They had read in their newspapers, after every great battle, the long lists of killed and wounded, which the telegraph was quick to report. Every city had its fair for the relief of the widows and orphans, every hamlet its two or three crippled soldiers hobbling about in their faded blue overcoats, almost every house its incurable sorrow. They had seen the wheel turning in the provost-marshal's office, in places where volunteering was not sufficiently rapid, and knew that their own names might be the next to be drawn for service at the front. They knew how many graves there were at Gettysburg, how many at Shiloh, how many at Stone River; they knew what was to be seen in the hospitals of every Northern city, and something of the unspeakable horrors of captivity. They saw the price of gold go beyond two hundred, while the Government was spending between two and three millions of dollars a day, piling up a national debt in undreamed-of proportions, for which they were already heavily taxed, and which must some day be paid in solid coin.

Seeing and understanding all this, and having the privilege of a secret and unquestioned ballot, they quietly walked up to the polls and voted for a vigorous prosecution of the war, re-electing Mr. Lincoln by a popular majority of more than 400,000, and giving him the votes of all the States excepting Delaware, New Jersey and Kentucky —212 against 21. The vote of the soldiers in the field, so far as it could be counted separately (for in some States it was sent home sealed, and

mingled with the other ballots in the boxes), showed about 119,000 for Lincoln, and about 34,000 for McClellan.

If there is any one act of the American people that above all others, in the sober pages of history, reflects credit upon them for correct judgment, determined purpose, courage in present difficulties, and care for future interests, that act, it seems to me, was the re-election of President Lincoln.

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CHAPTER XXVI.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

BEFORE Sherman's army had been a week in Atlanta, he determined to send away all the inhabitants of the city, giving each the choice whether to go south or north, and furnishing transportation for a certain distance. His reason for this measure is given briefly in his own words: "I was resolved to make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civil population to influence military measures."

Among the considerations that influenced General Sherman's action at that time, two appear to have been paramount—one a hope, the other a fear. The fear was that some portion of Hood's army would make a serious break in his communications by destroying portions of the long single-track railroad over which he drew all his supplies from Chattanooga. The hope was that Georgia, seeing any further prosecution of the war to be useless, would withdraw her troops from the Confederate armies and practically secede from the Confederacy. Some color was given to this by the fact that Governor Joseph E. Brown had recalled the Georgia militia from Hood's army.

Sherman sent word to Governer Brown that if Georgia's troops were withdrawn from the Confederate service, he would pass across the State as harmlessly as possible, and pay for all the corn and fodder that he took; but if not, he would devastate the State through its whole length and breadth.

In North Carolina there had been a strong movement for peace this year, the only difference of opinion being as to the method in which peace should be sought. The Governor, Zebulon B. Vance, as a candidate for re-election, represented those who held that the State should only act in co-operation with the other States that were engaged with her in the war. At the election in August, Vance received 54,000 votes, against 20,000 for his opponent.

Georgia did not secede from the Confederacy, but Hood did attack the communications. At every important point on the railroad there was a strong guard, and at the bridges there were block-houses with small but well-appointed garrisons. About the 1st of October Hood crossed the Chattahooche, going northward to strike the railroad. Sherman hurried after him, and on the 5th looked down from Kenesaw Mountain upon the fires that were burning the ties and heating the rails of a dozen miles of his road. Anticipating an attack on Allatoona, which was held by a small brigade under command of Lieutenant-Colonel John T. Tourtellotte, he signaled over the heads of the enemy a message to Allatoona conveying an order for General John M. Corse, then at Rome, to go to the relief of Tourtellotte with a strong force. Corse obeyed promptly, arriving at midnight. In the morning the garrison, now nearly 2000 strong, was summoned to surrender immediately, to avoid a needless effusion of blood. General Corse answered, "We are prepared for the needless effusion of blood whenever it is agreeable to you," and at once his men were attacked from all sides. They were driven into their redoubts, and there made so determined a resistance that after five hours of desperate fighting the Confederates withdrew, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. Corse had lost 707 men, reported burying 231 of the enemy's dead and taking 411 prisoners, which would indicate a total loss of about 1600.

General Thomas had been sent to Nashville with two divisions, General Slocum was left in Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and with the remainder of his forces Sherman pursued Hood through the country between Rome and Chattanooga and westward of that region. But he could not bring the Confederates to battle, and had little expectation of overtaking them. He thinks he conceived of the march to the sea some time in September; the first definite proposal of it was in a telegram to General Thomas, on the 9th of October, in which he said: "I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea-cost. We can not defend this long line of road." In various despatches between that date and the 2d of November, Sherman proposed the great march to Grant and to the President. Grant thought Hood's army should be destroyed first, but finally said: "I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are, to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose." This was on the understanding, suggested by Sherman, that Thomas would be left with force enough to take care of Hood. Sherman sent him the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, commanded by Generals Stanley and Schofield, and further reinforced him with troops that had been garrisoning various places on the railroad, while he also received two divisions from Missouri and some recruits from the North.

Sherman rapidly sent north all his sick and disabled men, and all baggage that could be spared. Commissioners came and took the votes of the soldiers for the Presidential election, and departed. Paymasters came and paid off the troops, and went back again. Wagon trains were put in trim and loaded for a march. As the last trains whirled over the road to Chattanooga, the track was destroyed, the bridges burned, the wires torn down, and all the troops that had not been ordered to



THE FIRST NEW JERSEY BRIGADE, GENERAL TAYLOR, DETACHING ITSELF FROM GENERAL SLOCUM'S DIVISION AND RUSHING TO THE SUPPORT OF KEARNEY, WHO HAD BEEN DRIVEN BACK, AT CHARLES CITY ROAD, JUNE 30, 1862.
FROM A SKETCH BY WM. WAUD.

join Thomas were concentrated in Atlanta. From the 12th of November nothing more was heard from Sherman till Christmas.

The depot, machine-shops and locomotive-house in Atlanta were all torn down, and fire was set to the ruins. The shops had been used for the manufacture of Confederate ammunition, and all night the shells were exploding in the midst of the ruin, while the fire spread to a block of stores, and finally burned out the heart of the city. With every unsound man and every useless article sent to the rear, General Sherman now had 55,329 infantrymen, 5063 cavalrymen, and 1812 artillerymen, with 65 guns. There were four teams of horses to each gun, with its caisson and forge; 600 ambulances, each drawn by two horses; and 2500 wagons, with six mules to each. Every soldier carried 40 rounds of ammunition, while the wagons contained an abundant additional supply and 1,200,000 rations, with oats and corn enough to last five days. Probably a more thoroughly appointed army never was seen, and it is difficult to imagine one of equal numbers more effective. Every man in it was a veteran, and felt the most perfect confidence that under the leadership of "Uncle Billy" it would be impossible to go wrong.

On the 15th of November they set out on the march to the sea, nearly 300 miles distant. The infantry consisted of four corps. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth formed the right wing, commanded by General Howard; the Fourteenth and Twentieth the left, commanded by General Slocum. The cavalry was under the command of General Judson Kilpatrick. The two wings marched by parallel routes, generally a few miles apart, each corps having its own proportion of the artillery and trains. General Sherman issued minute orders as to the conduct of the march, which were systematically carried out. Some of the instructions were these:

"The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, who will gather corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions. Soldiers must not enter dwellings or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc. Where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. In all foraging, the parties engaged will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance."

The great army moved steadily, day after day, cutting a mighty swath, from 40 to 60 miles wide, through the very heart of the Confederacy. The columns passed through Rough and Ready, Jonesboro, Covington, McDonough, Macon, Milledgeville, Gibson, Louisville, Millen, Springfield, and many smaller places. The wealthier inhabitants fled at the approach of the troops. The negroes in great numbers swarmed after the army, believing the long-promised day of jubilee had come.

The army destroyed nearly the whole of the Georgia Central Railroad. As they had learned that a rail merely bent could be straightened and used again, a special tool was invented with which a red-hot rail could be quickly twisted like an auger, and rendered forever useless. They also had special appliances for tearing up the track methodically and rapidly. As bloodhounds had been used to track escaped prisoners, the men killed all that they could find.

The foraging parties—or "bummers," as they were popularly called—went out for miles on each side, starting in advance of the organizations to which they belonged, gathered immense quantities of provisions, and brought them to the line of march, where each stood guard over his pile till his own brigade came along. The progress of the column was not allowed to be interrupted for the reception of the forage, everything being loaded upon the wagons as they moved. The "flankers" were thrown out on either side, passing in thin lines through the woods to prevent any surprise by the enemy, while the mounted officers went through the fields to give the road to the troops and trains.

The only serious opposition came from Wheeler's Confederate cavalry, which hung on the flanks of the army and burned some bridges, but was well taken care of by Kilpatrick's, who generally defeated it when brought to an encounter. When the advance guard was within a few miles of Savannah, there was some fighting with infantry, and a pause before the defences of the city.

Fort McAllister, which stood in the way of

SKIRMISHING IN THE WOODS ON THE ADVANCE TO VICKSBURG.

EDWIN VOSE SUMNER.

communication with the blockading fleet, was elaborately protected with ditches, palisades, and *chevaux-de-frise;* but General William B. Hazen's division made short work with it, going straight over everything and capturing the fort on the 13th of December, losing 92 men in the assault, and killing or wounding about 50 of the garrison. That night General Sherman, with a few officers, pulled down the river in a yawl and visited a gunboat of the fleet at Ossabaw Sound. Four days later, having established full communication, Sherman demanded the surrender of the city, which General William J. Hardee, who was in command there with a considerable force, refused. Sherman then took measures to make its investment complete; but on the morning of the 21st it was found to be evacuated by Hardee's forces, and General John W. Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps marched in. The next day Sherman wrote to the President: "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about 25,000 bales of cotton." Sherman's entire loss in the march had been 764 men.

That phase of war which reaches behind the armies in the field and strikes directly at the sources of supply, bringing home its burdens and its hardships to men who are urging on the conflict without participating in it, was never exhibited on a grander scale or conducted with more complete success. This in fact is the most humane kind of war, since it accomplishes the purpose with the least destruction of life and limb.

When Hood found that he could not lure Sherman away from Atlanta, he turned toward Nashville, under orders from Richmond, hoping to destroy the army that Thomas was organizing. He was hindered by heavy rains, and it was late in November when he arrived at Duck River, about 40 miles south of the city. Here he found a force under General Schofield, which was easily flanked by crossing the river, whereupon Schofield fell back to Franklin, on Harpeth River, 18 miles from Nashville, intrenched a line south and west of the town, with both flanks resting on bends of the river, and got his artillery and trains across the stream, placing the guns where they could play upon any attacking force. Schofield had about 25,000 men, and Hood over 40,000. In the afternoon of November 30, the attack was made. Schofield's rear guard, instead of falling back to the main body, as ordered, so as to permit the fire of the whole line to be poured into the advancing enemy, attempted to withstand the Confederate onset. Of course it was quickly swept back, and as the men rushed in confusion into the lines they were closely followed by the enemy, who captured a portion of the intrenchments. From a part of the line thus seized they were driven in turn, but they clung tenaciously to the remainder, and Schofield established a new line a few rods in the rear. Here the fight continued long after dark, with no special advantage to either side. Hood lost 6300 men, and Schofield 2500. At midnight Schofield crossed the river and retreated to Nashville. Hood followed him, and there confronted Thomas' whole army.

Everybody complained of Thomas' slowness, and he was in imminent danger of being superseded; but he would not assume the offensive till he felt that his army was prepared to make sure work. When all was ready, he still had to delay because of bad weather; but on the 15th of December the long-meditated blow was given. Thomas' army advanced against Hood's, striking it simultaneously in front and on the left flank. The weight of the attack fell upon the flank, which was completely crushed, and a part of the intrenchments with their guns fell into the hands of the National forces. In the night Hood retreated a mile or two, to another line on the hills. He was seriously embarrassed by the absence of a large part of Forrest's cavalry. In the afternoon of the 16th, Thomas, having sent Wilson's cavalry around the enemy's left flank, attacked with his whole force. He made no headway against Hood's right, but again he crushed the left flank, and followed up the advantage so promptly and vigorously that all organization in the Confederate army was lost, and what was left of it fled in wild confusion toward Franklin, pursued by Wilson's cavalry. Thomas captured all their artillery, and took 4500 prisoners. The number of their killed and wounded was never reported. His own loss was about 3000.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE FINAL BATTLES.

AFTER Sherman's army had marched through Georgia and captured Savannah, he and Grant at first contemplated removing it by water to the James, and placing it where it could act in immediate connection with the Army of the Potomac against Petersburg and Richmond. But several considerations soon led to a different plan. One was, the difficulty of getting together enough transports to carry 65,000 men and all their equipage without too much delay. A still stronger one was the fact that in a march through the Carolinas Sherman's army could probably do more to help Grant's and bring the war to a speedy close than if it were set down beside it in Virginia. The question of supplies, always a vital one for an army, had become very serious in the military affairs of the Confederacy. The trans-Mississippi region had been cut off long ago, the blockade of the seaports had been growing more stringent, Sheridan had desolated the Shenandoah Valley, Sherman had eaten out the heart of Georgia. And now if that same army, with its increased experience and confidence, should go through South and North Carolina, living on the country, Lee's position in the defences of Richmond would soon become untenable from mere lack of something for his army to eat. After tarrying at Savannah three weeks, Sherman gathered up his forces for another strike toward the final victory.

The right wing was concentrated at Pocotaligo, 40 miles north of Savannah, and the left at Robertsville, 20 miles west of Pocotaligo. The northward march was begun on the 1st of February. Sherman had sent out rumors that represented both Charleston and Augusta as his immediate goal; but he pushed straight northward, on a route midway between them, toward Columbia.

This march, though not so romantic as that through Georgia, where a great army was for several weeks hidden from all its friends, was really much more difficult and dangerous. In the march from Atlanta to the sea, the army moved parallel with the courses of the rivers, and found highways between them that it was not easy for any but a large force to obstruct or destroy. But in the march through the Carolinas all the streams had to be crossed. A single man could burn a bridge and stop an army for several hours. Moreover, after the disasters that befell Hood at Franklin and Nashville, public sentiment in the Confederacy had demanded the reinstatement of General Joseph E. Johnston, and that able soldier had been placed in command of whatever remained of Hood's army, to which were added all the scattered detachments and garrisons that were available, and with this force he took the field against his old antagonist.

Sherman expected to meet serious opposition at Columbia, for it was the capital of the State; but the Confederate leaders were holding their forces at Charleston and Augusta, confidently expecting those cities to be attacked, and nothing but Hampton's cavalry was left to take care of Columbia. The main difficulty was at the rivers, where

JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.

the Confederates had burned the bridges, which Sherman's men rapidly rebuilt, and on the 17th the National troops entered the city as Hampton's cavalry left it. Bales of cotton, piled up in the streets, were on fire, there was a high wind, and the flakes of cotton were flying through the air like a snow-storm. In spite of all efforts of the soldiers, the fire persistently spread at night, several buildings burst into a blaze, and before morning the heart of the city was a heap of ruins. There has been an acrimonious dispute as to the responsibility for this fire. It seems probable that Hampton's soldiers set fire to the cotton, perhaps without orders, and it seems improbable that any one would purposely set fire to the city. At all events, Sherman's men did their utmost to extinguish the flames, and that General gave the citizens 500 head of cattle, and did what he could to shelter them. He did destroy the arsenal purposely, and tons of powder, shot and shell were taken out of it, hauled to the river, and sunk in deep water. He also destroyed the foundries and the establishment in which the Confederacy's paper money was printed.

That same day, the 18th, Charleston was evacuated by the Confederate forces under General Hardee, and a brigade of National troops commanded by General Schimmelpfennig promptly took possession of it.

On the 20th, leaving Columbia, Sherman's army bore away for Fayetteville. The most serious difficulty was met at Catawba River, where the bridges were destroyed, the floods interfered with the building of new ones, and there was a delay of nearly a week.

Fayetteville was reached on the 11th of March, and here communication was opened with General Alfred H. Terry, whose men had captured Fort Fisher, below Wilmington, after a gallant fight, in January, and later the city itself, thus closing that harbor to blockade-runners. In taking the fort, Terry's men had fought their way from traverse to traverse, and the stubborn garrison had only yielded when they literally reached the last ditch.

At Averysboro, 35 miles south of Raleigh, on the 16th of March, the left wing suddenly came upon Hardee's forces intrenched across its path. The left flank of the Confederates was soon turned,

GEORGE CROOK.

and they fell back to a stronger position. Here a direct attack was made, but without success, and Kilpatrick's cavalry was roughly handled by a division of Confederate infantry. General Slocum then began a movement to turn the flank again, and in the night Hardee retreated. Each side had lost 500 men.

Averysboro is about 40 miles west of Goldsboro. Midway between is Bentonville, where, on the 19th, the left wing again found the enemy intrenched across the way, this time in greater force and commanded by Johnston. Thickets of black-jack protected the flanks, and it was ugly ground for fighting over. Slocum's men attacked the position in force as soon as they came upon it. They quickly broke the Confederate right flank, drove it back, and planted batteries to command that part of the field. On the other flank the thickets interfered more with the organization of both sides, the National troops threw up intrenchments, both combatants attacked alternately, and the fighting was very bloody. After nightfall the Confederates withdrew toward Raleigh, and the road was then open for Sherman to march into Goldsboro. At Bentonville, the last battle fought by this army, the National loss was 1604 men, the Confederate 2342. At Goldsboro Sherman was joined by Schofield's corps, which had been transferred thither from Thomas' army.

Several attempts to negotiate a peace were made during the winter of 1864–5, the most notable of which took place early in February, when Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, accompanied by John A. Campbell and Robert M. T. Hunter, applied for permission to pass through Grant's lines for the purpose. They were conducted to Fort Monroe, met President Lincoln and Secretary Seward on a steamer in Hampton Roads, and had a long and free discussion. The Confederate commissioners proposed an armistice, with the hope that after a time, if trade and friendly relations were resumed, some sort of settlement or compromise could be reached without more fighting. But Mr. Lincoln would consent to no peace or armistice of any kind, except on condition of the immediate disbandment of the Confederate armies and government, the restoration of the Union, and the abolition of slavery. The Confederate commissioners were not authorized to concede the restoration of the Union, and the conference had no practical result.

Late in February General Sheridan, at the head of 10,000 cavalry, moved far up the Shenandoah Valley, and at Waynesboro his Third Division, commanded by General Custer, met Early's force on the 2d of March. In the engagements that ensued, Early was completely defeated, and about 1500 of his men were captured, together with every gun he had, and all his trains. Sheridan then ruined the locks in the Jamer River Canal, destroyed portions of the railroads toward Lynchburg and Gordonsville, and rode down the peninsula to White House, crossed over to the James, and joined Grant, taking post on the left of the army, and occupying Dinwiddie Court House on the 29th.

Grant and Lee had both been waiting impatiently for the roads to dry, so that wagons and guns could be moved—Lee because he saw that Richmond could not be held any longer, and was anxious to get away; Grant because he was anxious to begin the final campaign and prevent Lee from getting away. The only chance for Lee to escape was by slipping past Grant's left, and either joining Johnston in North Carolina or

A DETACHMENT OF THE FIRST SOUTH CAROLINA (COLORED) FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS, COLONEL BEARD, REPELLING AN ATTACK OF THE CONFEDERATE TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF DOBOY RIVER, GA.

From a Sketch by Colonel Brewerton.

JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

taking a position in the mountainous country to the west. But Grant's left extended too far westward to permit of this without great hazard. To compel him to contract his lines, drawing in his left, Lee planned a bold attack on his right, which was executed in the night of the 24th. Large numbers of deserters had recently left the Confederate army and walked across to Grant's lines, bringing their arms with them, and this circumstance was now used for a ruse. At a point where the hostile lines were not more than 100 yards apart, some of General Gordon's men walked out to the National picket-line, as if they were deserters, seized the pickets, and sent them back as prisoners. Then a column charged through the gap, surprised the men in the main line, and captured a section of the works. But the Confederates were headed off in both directions, and a large number of guns were soon planted where they could sweep the ground that had been captured. A line of intrenchments was thrown up in the rear, and the survivors of the charging column found themselves where they could neither go forward nor retreat nor be reinforced. This affair cost the Confederates about 4000 men, and inflicted a loss of 2000 upon the National army.

Grant, instead of contracting his lines, was making dispositions to extend them. Three divisions under General E. O. C. Ord were brought from his right in the night of the 27th and placed on his extreme left, while a movement was planned for the 29th by which that wing was to be pushed out to the South-side Railroad. When the day arrived, heavy rains had made the ground so soft that the roads had to be corduróyed before the artillery could be dragged over them. But the army was used to this sort of work, and performed it with marvelous quickness.

Grant's extreme left was now held by his most energetic lieutenant, Sheridan, with his magnificent cavalry. By Grant's orders, Sheridan made a march through Dinwiddie Court House, to come in upon the extreme Confederate right at Five Forks, which he struck on the 31st. He had no difficulty in driving away the Confederate cavalry; but when a strong infantry was encountered he was himself driven back, and called for help. Grant sent the Fifth Corps to his assistance; but it was unusually slow in moving, and was stopped by the loss of a bridge at Gravelly Run, so that it was midday of April 1st before Sheridan taken. Sheridan's loss was about 1000. In the hour of victory came orders from Sheridan relieving Warren of his command, because of that officer's slowness in bringing his corps to the attack.

Judging that Lee must have drawn forces from other parts of his line to strengthen his right, Grant followed up the advantage by attacking Lee's centre at daybreak the next morning, Sunday, April 2, with the corps of Wright and Parke. Both of these broke through the Confederate lines in the face of a musketry fire, took large portions of them in reverse, and captured over 3000 prisoners and several guns. The Second Corps, under General Andrew A. Humphreys, and three divisions under General Ord, made a similar movement, with similar success, Sheridan moved up on the left, and the outer defences of Petersburg were now in the possession of the National forces, who encircled the city with a continuous line from a point on Appomattox River above to one below. In the fighting of this day the Confederate General A. P. Hill was killed.

General Lee now sent a telegram to Richmond, saying that both cities must be evacuated. It was received in church by Mr. Davis, who quietly withdrew without waiting for the service to be finished. As the signs of evacuation became evident to the people, there was a general rush for means of conveyance, and property of all sorts was brought into the streets in confused masses. Committees appointed by the city council attempted to destroy all the liquor, and hundreds of barrelfuls were poured into the gutters. The great tobacco warehouses were set on fire, under military orders, and the iron-clad rams in the river blown up. The next morning a detachment of black troops from General Godfrey Weitzel's command marched into the city.

CAPTAIN FRAZER, OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT, TURNING UPON AND CAPTURING HIS GUARD WHILE BEING CONVEYED TO THE CONFEDERATE CAMP.



A FLAG OF TRUCE.

began to get it in hand. Lee had strengthened the force holding Five Forks; but Sheridan, when his troops were all up, late in the afternoon, opened the battle of a well-conceived plan. Engaging the enemy with his cavalry in front, he used the Fifth Corps as if it were his immense right arm, swinging it around so as to embrace and crush the Confederate force. With bloody but brief fighting the manœuvre was successful; Five Forks was secured, and more than 5000 prisoners were

Lee, with the remnant of his army, fled westward, still keeping up the organization, though his numbers were constantly diminishing by desertion, straggling and capture. Grant, in close pursuit, moved mainly on a parallel route south of Lee's, attacking vigorously whenever any portion of the hostile forces approached near enough. Some of these engagements were very sharply contested, and as the men on both sides had attained the highest perfection of destructive skill, and were not sheltered by intrenchments, the losses were severe, and the 70 miles of the race was a long track of blood. There were collisions at Jetersville, Detonville, Deep Creek, Sailor's Creek, Paine's Cross Roads and Farmville; the most important being that at Sailor's Creek, where Custer broke the Confederate line, capturing 400 wagons, 16 guns and many prisoners, and then the Sixth Corps came up and captured the whole of Ewell's corps, including Ewell himself and four other generals. Lees was

STONEMAN'S EXPEDITION.—BIVOUAC AT LOUISA COURT HOUSE.



BURNING CONFEDERATE STOREHOUSES.

stopped by the loss of a provision train, and spent a day in trying to collect from the surrounding country something for his soldiers to eat.

When he arrived at Appomattox Court House, April 9, a week from the day he set out, he found Sheridan's dismounted cavalry in line across his path, and his infantry advanced confidently to brush them away. But the cavalrymen drew off to the right, and disclosed a heavy line of blue-coated infantry and gleaming steel. Before this the weary Confederates recoiled, and just as Sheridan was preparing to charge upon their flank with his cavalry a white flag was sent out, and hostilities were suspended on information that negotiations for a surrender were in progress. Grant had first demanded Lee's surrender in a note written on the afternoon of the 7th. Three or four other notes had passed between them, and on the 9th the two commanders met at a house in the village, where they wrote and exchanged two brief letters by which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia was effected; the terms being simply that the men were to lay down their arms and return to their homes, not to be molested so long as they did not again take up arms against the United States. The exceeding generosity of these terms, to an army that had exacted almost the last life it had power to destroy, was a surprise to many who remembered the unconditional surrender that Grant had demanded at Vicksburg and Fort Donelson. But he considered that the war was over, and thought the defeated insurgents would at once return to their homes and become good citizens of the United States. In pursuance of this idea, he ordered that they be permitted to take their horses with them, as they "would need them for the ploughing." The starving Confederates were immediately fed by their captors, and by General Grant's orders cheering, firing of salutes, and other demonstrations of exultation over the great and decisive victory, were immediately stopped. The number of officers and men paroled, according to the terms of the surrender, was 28,365.

The next day Lee issued, in the form of a general order, a farewell address to his army, in which he lauded them in unmeasured terms, to the implied disparagement of their conquerors, and assured them of his "unceasing admiration of their constancy and devotion to their country." It seems not to have occurred to the General that he had no army, for it had been taken away from him, and no right to issue a military document of any kind, for he was a prisoner of war; and he certainly must have forgotten that the costly court of last resort, to which he and they had appealed, had just decided that their country as he defined it had no existence.

General Johnston, confronting Sherman in North Carolina, surrendered his army to that commander at Durham Station, near Raleigh, on the 26th of April, receiving the same terms that had been granted to Lee; and the surrender of all the other Confederate armies soon followed, the last being the command of General E. Kirby Smith, at Shreveport, La., on the 26th of May. The number of Johnston's immediate command surrendered and paroled was 36,817, to whom were added 52,453 in Georgia and Florida.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PEACE.

NO account of the war, however brief, can properly be closed without some mention of the forces other than military that contributed to its success. The assistance and influence of the "war Governors," as they were called—including Andrew G. Curtin of Pennsylvania, John A. Andrew of Massachusetts, William A. Buckingham of Connecticut, Edwin D. Morgan of New York, William Dennison of Ohio, and Oliver P. Morton of Indiana—was vital to the cause, and was acknowledged as generously as it was given. There was also a class of citizens who, by reason of age or other disability, did not go to the front, and would not have been permitted to, but found a way to assist the Government perhaps even more efficiently. They were thoughtful and scholarly men, who brought out and placed at the service of their country every lesson that could be drawn from history; practical and experienced men, whose hard sense and knowledge of affairs made them natural leaders in the councils of the people; men of fervid eloquence, whose arguments and appeals aroused all there was of latent patriotism in their younger and hardier countrymen, and contributed wonderfully to the rapidity with which quotas were filled and regiments forwarded to the seat of war. There were great numbers of devoted women, who performed uncomplainingly the hardest hospital service, and managed great fairs and relief societies with an enthusiasm that never wearied. And there were the Sanitary and Christian Commissions, whose agents went everywhere between the depot in the rear and the skirmish-line in front, carrying not only whatever was needed to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded, but also many things to beguile the tedious hours in camp and diminish the serious evil of home-sickness.

It was a common remark, at the time, that the Confederacy crumbled more suddenly in 1865 than it had risen in 1861. It seemed like an empty shell, which, when fairly broken through, had no more stability, and instantly fell to ruins. To some on the Confederate side, especially in Virginia, the surrender was a surprise, and came like a personal and irreparable grief. But people in other parts of the South, especially those who had seen Sherman's legions marching by their doors, knew that the end was coming. Longstreet had pronounced the cause lost by Lee's want of generalship at Gettysburg; Ewell had said there was no use in fighting longer when Grant had swung his army across the James; Johnston and his lieutenants declared it wrong to keep up the hopeless struggle after the capital had been abandoned and the Army of Northern Virginia had laid down its weapons, and so expressed themselves to Mr. Davis when he stopped to confer with them, in North Carolina, on his flight



CHARGING A CONFEDERATE BATTERY NEAR RICHMOND.

DESTROYING CANAL LOCKS AND BOATS.



ADMIRAL DUPONT'S MACHINE-SHOP IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C.—From a Sketch by W. T. Crane.



RECEPTION OF THE SECOND NEW YORK FIRE ZOUAVES, COLONEL BURNS, BY CHIEF DECKER AND THE NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY 9, 1864.

southward. But he said their fortunes might still be retrieved, and independence established, if those who were absent from the armies without leave would but return to their places.

Nevertheless, he continued his flight through the Carolinas into Georgia; his Cabinet officers, most of whom had set out with him from Richmond, leaving him one after another. When he had arrived at Irwinsville, Ga., accompanied by his family and Postmaster-General Reagan, their little encampment in the woods was surprised, on the morning of May 11, by two detachments of Wilson's cavalry, and they were all taken prisoners. Mr. Davis was taken to Savannah, and thence to Fort Monroe, where he was a prisoner for two years, after which he was released on bail. He was never tried.

The secession movement had been proved to be a rebellion and nothing else—although the mightiest of all rebellions. It never rose to the character of a revolution; for it never had possession of the capital or the public archives, never stopped the wheels of the Government for a single day, was suppressed in the end, and attained none of its objects. But although it was clearly a rebellion, and although its armed struggle had been maintained after all prospect of success had disappeared, such was the magnanimity of the National Government and the Northern people that its leaders escaped the usual fate of rebels. Except by temporary political disabilities, not one of them was punished—neither Mr. Davis nor Mr. Stephens, nor any member of the Confederate Cabinet or Congress; neither Lee nor Johnston nor any of their lieutenants, not even Beauregard, who advocated the black flag, nor Forrest, who massacred his prisoners at Fort Pillow. Most of the officers of high rank in the Confederate army were graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, and had used their military education in an attempt to destroy the very government that gave it to them, and to which they had solemnly sworn allegiance. Some of them, notably General Lee, had rushed into the rebel service without waiting for the United States War Department to accept their resignations. But all such ugly facts were suppressed or forgotten, in the extreme anxiety of the victors lest they should not be sufficiently magnanimous toward the vanquished. There was but a single act of capital punishment. The keeper of the Andersonville stockade was tried, convicted and executed for cruelty to prisoners. His more guilty superior, General Winder, died two months before the surrender. No such exhibition of mercy has been seen before or since.

The general feeling in the country was of relief that the war was ended—hardly less at the South than at the North. After the surrender the Confederates were fed liberally from the abundant supplies of the National commissariat, and many of them were furnished with transportation to their homes in distant States.

If the people of the North had any disposition to be boisterous over the final victory, it was completely quelled by the shadow of a great sorrow that suddenly fell upon them. A conspiracy had been in progress for a long time among a few half-crazy secessionists in and about the capital. It culminated on the night of Good Friday, April 14, 1865. One of the conspirators forced his way into Secretary Seward's house and attacked the Secretary with a knife, but did not succeed in killing him. Mr. Seward had been thrown from a carriage a few days before, and was lying in bed with his jaws encased in a metallic frame-work, which probably saved his life. The chief conspirator, an obscure actor, made his way into the box at Ford's Theatre, where the President and his wife were sitting, witnessing the comedy of "Our American Cousin," shot Mr. Lincoln in the back of the head, jumped from the box to the stage with a flourish of bravado, shouting "*Sic semper tyrannis!*" and escaped behind the scenes and out at the stage door. The dying President was carried to a house across the street, where he expired the next morning. As the principal Confederate army had already surrendered, it was impossible for any one to suppose that the killing of the President could affect the result of the war. Furthermore, Mr. Lincoln had long been in the habit of going to the War Department in the evening, and returning to the White House, unattended, late at night; so that an assassin who merely wished to put him out of the way had abundant opportunities for doing so, with good chances of escaping and concealing his own identity. It was therefore perfectly obvious that the murderer's principal motive was the same as that of the youth who set fire to the temple of Diana at Ephesus. And the newspapers did their utmost to give him the notoriety that he craved, displaying his name in large type at the head of their columns, and repeating about him every anecdote that could be recalled or manufactured.

Mr. Lincoln had grown steadily in the affections and admiration of the people. His state papers were the most remarkable in American annals; his firmness where firmness was required, and kindheartedness where kindness was practicable, were almost unfailing; and as the successive events of the war called forth his powers, it was seen that he had unlimited shrewdness and tact, statesmanship of the broadest kind, and that honesty of purpose which is the highest wisdom.

A day or two after the evacuation of Richmond, he walked through its smoking and disordered streets, where the negroes crowded about him and called down all sorts of uncouth but sincere blessings on his head. He had lived to enter the enemy's capital, lived to see the authority of the United States restored over the whole country, and then was snatched away, when the people were as much as ever in need of his genius for the solution of new problems that suddenly confronted them.

The funeral train retraced the same route over which Mr. Lincoln had gone to Washington from his home in Springfield, Ill., four years before, and to the sorrowful crowds that were gathered at every station, and even along the track in the country, it seemed as if the light of the nation had gone out forever.

The armies returning from the field were brought to Washington for a grand review before being mustered out of service. The Army of the Potomac was reviewed on May 23, and Sherman's army on the 24th, the troops marching in close column around the Capitol and down Pennsylvania Avenue to the music of their bands.

It was computed that the loss of life in the Confederate service was about equal to that in the National. Their losses in battle, as they were generally on the defensive, were smaller, but their means of caring for the wounded were inferior. Thus it cost us nearly 600,000 lives and more than $6,000,000,000 to destroy the doctrine of State sovereignty, abolish the system of slavery, and begin the career of the United States as a nation

THE PRISON PEN AT MILLEN, GA., IN WHICH FEDERAL PRISONERS WERE CONFINED.

The home-coming at the North was almost as sorrowful as at the South, because of those that came not. In all the festivities and rejoicings there was hardly a participator whose joy was not saddened by missing some well-known face and from now numbered with the silent three hundred thousand. Grant was there, the commander that had never taken a step backward; and Farragut was there, the sailor without an equal; and the unfailing Sherman, and the patient Thomas, and the intrepid Hancock, and the fiery Sheridan, and the brilliant Custer, and many of lesser rank, who in a smaller theatre of conflict would have won a larger fame. But where was young Ellsworth? Shot dead as soon as he crossed the Potomac. And Winthrop—killed in the first battle, with his best books unwritten. And Lyon—fallen at the head of his little army in Missouri, the first summer of the war. And Baker—sacrificed at Ball's Bluff. And Kearney at Chantilly, and Reno at South Mountain, and Mansfield at Antietam, and Reynolds at Gettysburg, and Wadsworth in the Wilderness, and Sedgwick at Spottsylvania, and McPherson before Atlanta, and Craven in his monitor at the bottom of the sea, and thousands of others, the best and bravest, all gone—all, like Latour, the immortal captain, dead on the field of honor, but none the less dead and a loss to their mourning country. The hackneyed allegory of Curtius had been

given a startling illustration and a new significance. The South, too, had lost heavily of her foremost citizens in the great struggle—Bee and Bartow at Bull Run; Albert Sidney Johnston, leading a desperate charge at Shiloh; Zollicoffer, soldier and journalist, at Mill Spring; Stonewall Jackson, at Chancellorsville; Polk, priest and warrior, at Lost Mountain; Armistead, wavering between two allegiances and fighting alternately for each, and Barksdale and Garnett—all at Gettysburg; Hill at Petersburg; and the dashing Stuart, and Daniel, and Perrin, and Dearing, and Doles, and numberless others. The sudden hush and sense of awe that impresses a child when he steps upon a single grave, may well overcome the strongest man when he looks upon the face of his country scarred with battle-fields like these, and considers what blood of manhood was rudely wasted there. And the slain were mostly young, unmarried men, whose native virtues fill no living veins, and will not shine again on any field.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S SOLDIERS HAILING GENERAL FOSTER'S FLAGSHIP.

It is poor business measuring the mouldered ramparts and counting the silent guns, marking the deserted battle-fields and decorating the grassy graves, unless we can learn from it all some nobler lesson than to destroy. Men write of this as of other wars as if the only thing necessary to be impressed upon the rising generation were the virtue of physical courage and contempt of death.



INCIDENT ON THE OGEECHEE RIVER, NEAR FORT McALLISTER—OPENING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ADMIRAL DAHLGREN AND GENERAL SHERMAN, DECEMBER 13, 1864.

It seems to me that is the last thing that we need to teach; for since the days of John Smith in Virginia and the men of the "Mayflower" in Massachusetts, no generation of Americans has shown any lack of it. From Louisburg to Petersburg—a hundred and twenty years, the full span of four generations—they have stood to their guns and been shot down in greater comparative numbers than any other race on earth. In the War of Secession there was not a State, not a county, probably not a town, between the great lakes and the Gulf, that was not represented on fields where all that men could do with powder and steel was done, and valor was exhibited at its highest pitch. It was a common saying in the Army of the Potomac that courage was the cheapest thing there; and it might have been said of all the other armies as well. There is not the slightest necessity for lauding American bravery or impressing it upon American youth. But there is the gravest necessity for teaching them respect for law, and reverence for human life, and regard for the rights of their fellow-men, and all that is significant in the history of our country—lest their feet run to evil and they make haste to shed innocent blood. I would be glad to convince my compatriots that it is not enough to think they are right, but they are bound to know they are right, before they rush into any experiments that are to cost the lives of men and the tears of orphans, in their own land or in any other. I would warn them to beware of provincial conceit. I would have them comprehend that one may fight bravely, and still be a perjured felon; that one may die humbly, and still be a patriot whom his country cannot afford to lose; that as might does not make right, so neither do rags and bare feet necessarily argue a noble cause. I would teach them that it is criminal either to hide the truth or to refuse assent to that which they see must follow logically from ascertained truth. I would show them that a political lie is as despicable as a personal lie, whether uttered in an editorial, or a platform, or a president's message, or a colored cartoon, or a disingenuous ballot; and that political chicanery, when long persisted in, is liable to settle its shameful account in a stoppage of civilization and a spilling of life. These are simple lessons, yet they are not taught in a day, and some whom we call educated go through life without mastering them at all.

It may be useful to learn from one war how to conduct another; but it is infinitely better to learn how to avert another. I am doubly anxious to impress this consideration upon my readers, because history seems to show us that armed conflicts have a tendency to come in pairs, with an interval of a few years, and because I think I see, in certain circumstances now existing within our beloved Republic, the elements of a second civil war.

No American citizen should lightly repeat that the result is worth all it cost, unless he has considered how heavy was the cost, and is doing his utmost to perpetuate the result. To strive to forget the great war, for the sake of sentimental politics, is to cast away our dearest experience and invite, in some troubled future, the destruction we so hardly escaped in the past. There can be remembrance without animosity, but there cannot be oblivion without peril.

ONE OF THE CAVES MADE BY THE CITIZENS OF ATLANTA, TO PROTECT THEIR FAMILIES FROM THE SHELLS DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.